Mojahedin, Iraqi government and the future

There are some issues that have attracted the attention of the world toward MKO. The settlement of Mojahedin in Iraqi soil and recently the recent statements made by Nouri Al-Maliki claiming that the Iraqi government refrains to deliver organization members to the Iranian government and seeks their transfer to a third country is another issue. The world is also encountering propaganda blitz of the organization on the position taking of the US in keeping on its control over Camp Ashraf and also the MKO’s petitioning the world to hew to international conventions concerning individual rights of MKO members. The focus Mojahedin put on these issues in their sites on the one hand and their recent claim of calling their present situation a remarkable victory on the other hand seems contradictory and calls for a deep study on the overall issue and the concerned parties, i.e. MKO, Iraq, Iran, and the US. In this regard, position of Iran, Iraq, and the US toward MKO has to be reviewed to make us find an appropriate answer to the question; what are Mojahedin after by means of their present considerable propaganda blitz?

1. US position toward MKO

As acknowledged by Mojahedin, US officials consider MKO as a terrorist group; however, they insist on keeping them in Iraqi soil according to international conventions as long as its members will have been settled in a second country; yet the US considers the Iraqi government responsible for controlling Camp but recognizes its rights of deciding to keep or expel the organization from its soil. The US is after all trying to find a solution to prevent the transfer of MKO members to Iran. 

2. Iraq positions toward MKO

Up to now, Iraqi officials have desisted to make any statement on their decision to deliver MKO members to the Iranian government; on the contrary, their statements imply that they will never do it. Nevertheless, Iraqi officials believe that national constitution of Iraq necessitates it to expel Mojahedin from Iraqi soil due to their committing terrorist activities therein and has let them free to decide whether relocate their camp to another country or return to Iran. It has to be noted that Iranian officials have repeatedly declared their disinclination to admit MKO members and leaders who have taken part in numerous terrorist attacks inside Iran and even have reveled a prepared list of them in advance. Therefore, there is no possibility that Iraq and the US transfer MKO members to Iran. 

3. Iran position toward MKO

Although the Iranian government asked for the transfer of a number of MKO leaders as terrorist criminals to Iran after the fall of Saddam, the fact is that despite a great number of MKO detached members have returned to Iran deliberately, it is a long time when Iranian officials have declared their unwillingness to accept MKO members or even the deliberately detached members. It has to be pointed out that Iranian officials have repeatedly asserted that they have allowed MKO detached members to enter Iran due to humanistic causes and with no political motivation. However, the coming events may prove or disapprove the honesty of Iran in its claims. It is likely that the US-Iran conflict has its roots partly in the approach followed by the US toward MKO and the fact that it defends a notorious organization whose name is in its terrorist list.

  ***

Despite the clear position of the three parties mentioned, Mojahedin insist on pursuing their common approach of perverting and fabricating Iraqi and Iranian officials’ statements. In this regard, they make an attempt to inculcate their European advocators with the idea that Iraq has decided to deliver them to Iran in an act of breaking international conventions and human rights. However, the fact is that due to the crises and tensions posed to the organization during years of exile, Mojahedin cannot solve their problems legally and rationally and are used to resort to illegal shortcuts. The tactics grabbed at by Mojahedin reveal that they have always held grab to putting pressure on their dissidents to further their interests and achieve their objectives. Likewise, they are to put Iraqi government in a position to make inappropriate reactions favored by Mojahedin.

In this way, they resort to heavy propaganda blitz and illegal activities like making contact to Iraqi terrorists, intensifying the tensions inside Iraqi soil, etc. Their hostile position toward Iraqi government and their relation with problematic groups therein implies the fact that they rely much on these relations to further their interests in Iraq and also one of their pretexts for refraining to deliver the control of camp Ashraf to Iraqi government is to pave the way for their misusing of the present conditions for making contact to Iraqi problematic groups. Therefore, the Iraqi government has to concentrate its efforts on preventing Mojahedin to misuse the tensions occurred inside Iraq and also be careful not to give them any subterfuge to get their own way. However, does it mean Mojahedin are to be let free to make contact to problematic and insurgent Iraqi trends?

The fact is that perversing tactics of Mojahedin has put the winning card in their hands. The legal measures taken by Iraqi government against MKO may increase the chance of their unexpected reactions and also pave the way for their petitioning the world, yet any negligence of Mojahedin’s illegal activities may result in Mojahedin’s favored condition in furthering their illegal interests in Iraqi soil. Taking this viewpoint into consideration, whatever the course of events in the future, Mojahedin would be the winner. Furthermore, the experience shows that Mojahedin easily take advantage of suicide operations when encountering any impasse to win over, like the self-immolation of a number of MKO members in June 17th 2003 in France. However, it suffices not to take preventive measures against these activities since Mojahedin have proved that they are masters of plotting unexpected activities. In fact, they are like time bombs that despite their high destructive potentials can be deactivated if detected in time. What is of importance at the time being is that the world has to believe the destructive potentiality of MKO leaders and members.

 

 What is to be done?

Now, this question arises: what is to be done? Evidently, the one-sided decision making of Iraq on MKO’s destiny is a risky and problematic action since, as it was experienced in global scene, Mojahedin may resort to defensive measures to foil Iraqi governments’ efforts by means of fabricating false information, suppressing the truth, initiating psychological and propaganda war, poisoning atmosphere in their own favor, and presenting themselves as the victimized party in the existing crises. In this regard and taking the strong support the US offers to Mojahedin and Mojahedin’s inclination to receive the support of the US as well as  other international bodies like the ICRC, Red Crescent, and human rights activists into consideration,  the cooperation of the US and international organizations with the Iraqi government may prevent MKO’s misusing the critical situation.

Therefore, the collaboration of the US as a mediator to control the overall process, the internationally recognized bodies and the Iraqi government seems necessary to arrive at a general consensus. The necessity of the presence of the US and international bodies is due to the fact that Mojahedin have proven that they have a big hand in changing their strategy and position taking in a blink of an eye and it is likely that they may accuse the Iraqi government of engaging in plots against the group as it has already spread fabrications over explosion of water pipes of camp Ashraf, missile attacks to camp Ashraf, hijacking some MKO members, and terror of Mojahedin leaders. However, the presence of the US and international bodies may put a stop to such fabrications. Also it is necessary to exercise full security control over Camp Ashraf, Mojahedin have to be totally disarmed and the cyanide capsules as well as explosives located therein be detected and collected.

In the second phase and after the formation of the council consisting of Iraq, the US and a number of concerned international organs, MKO’s high rankings should be separated from its rank-and-files so that the latter may find the opportunity of making free contacts to their families. It has to be noted that Rajavis’ refusal to separate top officials from rank-and-files implies the fact that there is a high possibility of plotting terrorist attacks regardless of the cost and form.

Also, it is necessary to declare the names of Ashraf residents openly since there are some families that are unaware of the presence of their relatives therein. Second, Ashraf residents are to interact with the outside world freely. Providing internet, satellite, journals, newspapers, and books for them is necessary in this regard. Third, they should be let free to choose their own destiny and decide for their future.

Another responsibility on international organizations in this regard is to identify those volunteer to separate MKO, and according to their will, make the ground for their transfer to Iran or other countries that may let them in. It may convince Iraqi government to allow the settlement of Mojahedin in Iraq until the time when a country consents to provide MKO members with asylum. As it was mentioned before, this solution and the interference of the US and international bodies in Iraq-Mojahedin conflict may put an end to it and prevent any possible misuse on the part of the concerned parties.

Tags

Recommanded

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published.

Back to top button
Close