Mass escape, an alternative option before MKO

The fate of MKO and Ashraf residents in Iraq appears to have been sealed and the members are waiting their relocation to another temporary camp that can put them under the strict control of the Iraqi forces until they will have been sent out of the country completely. Unpredictable as a dangerous terrorist cult, the question is whether the dismantlement of MKO in Iraq and eviction of its stronghold will be an unchallenged task to accomplish? According to the assertions of Mrs. Soltani, a ranking detached member of MKO, the Ashraf residents have Rajavi’s order of committing a mass suicide as a protest to any imposed decision that may happen to be a challenge against the entity of the organization and its forcible displacement. However, it might be the last solution but not necessarily the first as it may cost a lot and at the present Rajavi prefers to expend as little as possible and not to venture the forces that can be used as human shield at any time. Although a working cult tactic of having revenge and imposing demands on the Iraqi Government, as they have already practiced it in France, Rajavi seems determined to preserve them for their potentialities to perform other big tasks.

It is not the first time Rajavi is getting mired in a grave situation to save the forces. Concentrated in a variety of camps and benefitting the benevolence and patronage of Saddam, Rajavi’s solution to weather the consequences of the coalition force’s invasion and decrease the casualties was to disperse the concentrated members throughout the Iraqi soil to reorganize them when the right time came. The process stopped, however, just when it was to start since the both side made a bargain and came to an agreement and the forces were concentrated in a single camp, Ashraf. It was much better to take a shelter under the protective umbrella of the US forces to guarantee the preservation of its forces and it actually worked and lasted at least for a few years. But where and under whose protection could they take shelter if the forces had to disperse?

No better option could they find than to seek and find refuge in the strongholds and areas under the control of the advocates of Saddam and dissidents to the newly established Iraqi Government. The remnants of the loyalists to Saddam and Baath Party could better than anybody protect and shelter them, trusting them as Saddam had before, and take advantages of their various military and information potentialities. Who knows, it could become much harder for the new government to confront and tackle with the insurgent and dissident parties and groups, less experienced in activities that required organizational aptitudes. Experts in masterminding violent and terrorist plots, MKO’s collaboration with rebellious dissidents could lead the country to a worse chaotic situation and harder-to-control internal disorder.

Failing to arrive at any agreement with the present government to prolong its stay in Iraq and within its walled Ashraf stronghold, MKO can only rely on Saddamists and remnants of Baath Party that predominate in Takrit region. They have an open arm for MKO since it objected Saddam’s execution that was a green light of loyalty and its readiness to be at the service of his loyalists. Always opportunists, MKO has never cut ties with dissidents as it had anticipated a day when it needed friends in high places. MKO has two alternatives before it; just wait to be relocated to Baghdad and to be transplanted to an isolated prison camp or implement the same plan it suspended after establishing rapport with the US forces. The Iraqi forces must be cautious about the unexpected.

A purely hypothetical question at the first look, the escape and dispersion of Ashraf residents is an option on the table of the organization; it may be a hard job to control the stealthy escape operation and to block their escape routes although not impossible. For Rajavi, tying the destiny of its organization to that of al-Qaeda and Baath dissidents is less challenging than easily assenting to an uncertain destiny of relocation. Early concerns over the presence of the terrorist MKO in Iraq somehow abated when it was disarmed and reduced the danger of its terrorist collaboration with the Iraqi dissidents and insurgents regardless of how costly it was for the new government. But to permit an easy scattering and escape of these trained members to fight on the side of the dissidents would bring more violence in the disturbed Iraq and will be much more costly to tackle with them. MKO is unpredictable and the Iraqi Government has to be cautious and serious as well as considering all controlling and security measures in the process of the members’ relocation.

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