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NCRI/MEK Response to the West’s Package of Incentives

Following the package of incentives offered to Iran by five permanent members of the UN Security Council as a democratic solution to Iran’s nuclear issue, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), the political arm of the terrorist MKO, characterized it an appeasement policy. The group implicitly voiced it to incite crisis in the region. Although the UN Security Council’s stance to solve the issue follows a policy of circumspection so as not to escalate the tension between Iran and the world community, the MKO’s baneful role that guarantees its survival through crises can never be ignored.

The Mojahedin shows great interest in Iran’s nuclear issue so that it constitutes a big bulk of its propagandistic activities. Its news headlines exclusively reflect the opinions of the extremist American parties while it censures Condoleezza Rice’s offer indicating the U.S. willingness to sit at the negotiation table with Iran in an effort to give rise to tension and widen the gap. As a terrorist group, the Mojahedin is more concerned about its own interests rather than what it regards to be a threat against global peace and the interests of the international community. Iran’s nuclear issue works as a precious opportunity to provoke a united hostile front against Iran to intensify the already existing disorder in the region, that is to say, once Saddam gone, the U N Security Council may work as a beneficial alternative. Not the least concerned about global peace and security, the Mojahedin are anxious to succeed to Iran’s political power. Bijan Nyabati, a left member of NCRI, in a recent interview stated:

If it is impossible to fulfill this option (change within Iran), which is absolutely impossible for the reasons I have already theorized, then, the sole left option is from the outside which, as I have told, is on the table of the US foreign policy. [1]

In a statement issued by the NCRI taking position against what it calls a retreat by five permanent members of the U N Security Council we read:

The Iranian Resistance considers the incentives offered to the clerical regime by five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and Germany as a clear retreat from February 4, 2006 resolution by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. [2]

Although Nyabati implicitly refers the US and the Security Council as leverage to overthrow Iran’s ruling power, however, his fellow Mojahedin very explicitly relate the nuclear issue and the Security Council’s resolution to the proposed third option:

The only effective policy vis-à-vis the mullahs’ nuclear threat is a firm policy including comprehensive sanctions and the recognition of the Iranian people’s demands for a democratic change. [3]

For the time being, Mojahedin does its best to get advantage of the existing gap between Iran and the US, with all the international levers of pressure atop, to incite a military option. Mohammad Mohaddessin, chairman of the NCRI’s Foreign Affairs Committee, following Ms. Condoleezza Rice’s offer stated:

Only a firm and decisive policy can prevent the regime from acquiring nuclear weapons. Such a policy must include comprehensive sanctions being imposed by the UN Security Council continuing negotiations and offering further incentives give the mullahs the only thing they need to develop nuclear weapons to bring the region and the world closer to the prospect of a catastrophic war. [4]

Of course, the world community is prudent enough to disregard Mojahedin in dealing with Iran’s nuclear issue through peaceful ways, but those who chorus what Mojahedin voice should know the outcome would intensify the global tension. Compelled to conceal its discrepancies with the Western capitalism, Mojahedin is stealthy creeping into the existing gaps to advance its ambitions. The Machiavellian tenets mingled in all layers of the group’s body, decides for Mojahedin what line to follow:

In this line which has to be discussed within the strategic issues, that is to say, what line we have to follow, and how we have to get advantage of the existing discrepancies among the imperialists, I have already discussed in detail. [5]

The slogans of the global peace, democracy, democratic change and more are all utilized to achieve ideological objectives in the same way Mojahedin once utilized Islam in Iran. They know better than anyone that, in contrast to their claim, they can never represent Iranian people; in fact, they try to foist themselves:

From an internationally point of view, we want to convince the world that we are representing Iranian people. [6]

Never can they face the world with their bare ideology, they need a camouflager:

Of course, in international conduct it is not the issue of ideology and political stances that has to be brought on. It is essential to impose ourselves as representatives of Iranian people. [7]

In fact, Mojahedin have long been urging upon the international bodies, world community, and human rights organizations through unconventional measures. They abstain no lies, groundless claims, distortion, and bullying manners in their international conducts. Mojahedin denounces the five permanent members of the U N Security Council as if it was the authoritative lead to decide what is right or wrong. It is after a new blood-bath but this time through a legalized terrorism. Its harsh reaction against any shown international flexibility to solve Iran’s nuclear issue in a calm, peaceful context well indicates its delirious accentuation of violence and terror. Now it is up to international bodies and organizations to decide how to tackle with this repugnant, cancerous phenomenon of terrorism if they mean business.



[1]. Bijan Nyabati interview, Taliah-Sepidedaman.com

[2]. ncr-iran.org, 7 June 2006.


[4]. ncr-iran.org, 4 June 2006.

[5]. Mehdi Abrishamchi’s speech addressed to Muslim Students Association, Italy, 15.

[6]. Ibid, 12.

[7]. ibid.



Bahar Irani    11 June 2006

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