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Mujahedin Khalq in the List of terrorist Organizations

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US Department of State report transfixed the laughter on MKO lips

Happiness and rejoice of the Mojahedin-e Khlaq members did not last for a long time and the laughter transfixed on their lips soon. After that the US federal court issued an order to the Department of State for reviewing the terrorist designation of the MKO, Leaders of this organization intended to pretend that they had nothing to do with arms and terrorism. Now following the Department of state’s report for keeping the name of this organization in the terrorist list of US, they are completely stupefied.

Mojahedin leaders along with some anti- Iran newspapers of the United States including Washington Post were considering the rule of the court as the victory of Justice (!!). They thought that it is done and they will not be kept anymore in the terrorist list. However the security issues and the classified information of the US government and department of state were more than the documents of the judges who had not any clear awareness of the terrorist nature and background of Mojahedin-e Khalq. The order issued by the judge in this court was mainly dependent upon the claims of some Mojahedin members and their faked documents.

In early 70s, Mojahedin members who were angry with the US support of Shah, attacked on Americans and killed many civilian and non-civilian Americans that were working on a defensive project in Iran.

After the Islamic Revolution, Mojahedin- e Khalq announced armed conflict against Islamic Republic and in short time Masoud Rajavi along with Bani sadr fled from Iran and took French refugee. In 1364 they began their cooperation with Saddam Hussein who was fighting against Iran at that moment. Until the collapse of Baath regime by American forces, they were working for Saddam and committing treason against Islamic Republic of Iran.

Some of the prominent attacks of Mojahedin-e Khalq terrorist organization include: killing 12 thousand civilians who had mostly private jobs; the explosion of presidential office; the explosion of prime minister’s office; assassination of Assadollah Lajavardi, the head of Iran prisons; assassination of Ali Sayyad Shirazi, commander of armed forces; mortar attacks on president office in 2000 which led to the martyrdom of 1 civilian.

This terrorist group which once had strong anti-American ideology and called this country the Imperialism of the century now is under complete support of the US. However the terrorist background of this organization is as much that the US Department of State could not remove the name of MKO from it Foreign Terrorist Organization’s list.

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US Intelligence Assessments Warn about MKO’s Terrorist Activities

The recent US intelligence assessments said that the anti-Iran terrorist Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO) still retains the ability to stage terrorist operations.
US Intelligence Assessments Warn about MKO's Terrorist Activities
According to a Saturday report by the Habilian Association, an Iran-based human rights group, the US Department of State made the announcement in newly declassified documents for the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colombia Circuit.

Among the disclosures in the declassified material was an August 2008 US Intelligence Community Terrorist Threat Assessment, which clearly states that "the MKO retains a limited capability to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism".

"The MKO publicly renounced violence in 2001, but limited intelligence reporting indicates that the group has not ended military operations, repudiated violence, or completely or voluntarily disarmed," the US intelligence report said.

"The intelligence community assesses that although there has not been a confirmed terrorist attack by the MKO since the organization surrendered to Coalition Forces in 2003, the MKO retains a limited capability and the intent to use violence to achieve its political goals," the document added, ignoring the several terrorist operations conducted by the MKO in Iran and Iraq since the US invasion of the country in 2003..

"UN inspectors say that much of the information provided to the UN by the MKO about Iran’s nuclear program has a political purpose and has been wrong," the document noted.
The US announced last month that the group will remain in the US list of terrorist groups and organizations.

The announcement came despite intense efforts by Zionist lobbies and a number of the US Congressmen to delist the group.

The US State Department announced in its recent annual report on terrorism that no change has been made in the MKO’s status.

The MKO insists that the US should delist it as a terrorist organization, a demand which has been rejected so far by Washington.
An appeals court in the US had earlier ruled that the State Department should review the terror status of the MKO.

The MKO had filed a petition against the US blacklisting in 2008.

The Bush administration, however, rejected the request in its final days in 2009, after examining the material submitted by the group and the US intelligence community, including classified information.

In July 2010, a three-judge panel of the US Court of Appeals in Washington said in a 22-page decision that the US government failed to give the group a fair chance to rebut unclassified information that claimed the group supported terrorist activities.

The government was obligated under a 1996 antiterrorism law and 2004 revisions to give the group the chance to rebut unclassified information, the appeals court said, adding that the group was "permitted access to the unclassified portion of the record only after the decision was final."

In a statement, the State Department said it would study the decision, but added that the US government continues to view the group as a terrorist organization.
The MKO, whose main stronghold is in Iraq, is blacklisted by much of the international community, including the United States.

Before an overture by the EU, the MKO was on the European Union’s list of terrorist organizations subject to an EU-wide assets freeze. Yet, the MKO puppet leader, Maryam Rajavi, who has residency in France, regularly visited Brussels and despite the ban enjoyed full freedom in Europe.

Some other members of the MKO who have had a role in the assassination of a large number of Iranian citizens and officials are currently living in France.

The group started assassination of Iranian citizens and officials after the Islamic Revolution in a bid to take control of the newly established Islamic Republic. It killed several of Iran’s new leaders in the early years after the Revolution, including the then President, Mohammad Ali Rajayee, Prime Minister, Mohammad Javad Bahonar and the Judiciary Chief, Mohammad Hossein Beheshti who were killed in bomb attacks by MKO members in 1981.

The group fled to Iraq in 1986, where it was protected by Saddam Hussein and where it helped the Iraqi dictator suppress Shiite and Kurd uprisings in the country.
The terrorist group joined Saddam’s army during the Iraqi imposed war on Iran (1980-1988) and helped Saddam and killed thousands of Iranian civilians and soldiers during the US-backed Iraqi imposed war on Iran.

Earlier this year, Iraqi security forces took control of the training base of the MKO at Camp Ashraf – about 60km (37 miles) north of Baghdad – and detained dozens of the members of the terrorist group.

The Iraqi authority also changed the name of the military center from Camp Ashraf to the Camp of New Iraq.

Many of the MKO members have abandoned the terrorist organization while most of those still remaining in the camp are said to be willing to quit but are under pressure and torture not to do so.

A May 2005 Human Rights Watch report accused the MKO of running prison camps in Iraq and committing human rights violations.

According to the Human Rights Watch report, the outlawed group puts defectors under torture and jail terms.

Numerous articles and letters posted on the Internet by family members of MKO recruits confirm reports of the horrific abuse that the group inflicts on its own members and the alluring recruitment methods it uses.

The most shocking of such stories includes accounts given by former British MKO member Ann Singleton and Mustafa Mohammadi — the father of an Iranian-Canadian girl who was drawn into the group during an MKO recruitment campaign in Canada.

Mohammadi recounts his desperate efforts to contact his daughter, who disappeared several years ago – a result of what the MKO called a ‘two-month tour’ of Camp Ashraf for teenagers.

He also explains how the group forces the families of its recruits to take part in pro-MKO demonstrations in the western countries by threatening to kill their loved ones.

Lacking a foothold in Iran, the terrorist group recruits ill-informed teens from Iranian immigrant communities in western states and blocks their departure afterwards.

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Mujahedin Khalq Organization as a terrorist group

Court Order Doesn’t Mean MKOs Removal from U.S. FTO List

The Mujahedin-eh Kalq Organization (MKO/MEK) since 1997 has been listed by the State Department as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). The designation was reaffirmed in January 2009 by then-secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. The MKO has had a long history of Court Order Doesn’t Mean MKOs Removal from U.S. FTO Listterror and violence and has recently and eagerly tried to clean up its image—hoping the effort will help remove them from the FTO list. The MKO believes that if they are removed from the FTO list, they will have more credibility as an organization, and therefore gain more support from Western nations. The MKO currently argues that it had ceased its military campaign against the Iranian government in 2001, voluntarily handed over its arms to U.S. forces in 2003 and provided a flood of information to U.S. intelligence about Iran’s nuclear programs. [1] The MKO’s ultimate goal in this plan is to replace the Iranian government with their own, and they are seeking support from Western nations, never mind the fact that neither of the MKO leaders nor many members of this cult have stepped foot inside Iran for more than three decades. The MKO is out of touch with the pulse of the nation and the more they press for being removed from the FTO list, the more wary regular Iranians become—as it signifies that the MKO is becoming tighter with the very nations which impeded Iran’s natural political progress; Iranian citizens do not want a U.S. supported MKO—they simply see it as treacherous liaison, which if nurtured, will make an already tense relationship with Iran even worse.

The MKO believes they have made an advancement because now, by way of a heavy handed legal battle, they are celebrating a federal appeals court decision—argued January 12, 2010 and recently decided July 16, 2010—which orders the State Department to review its FTO designation of the MKO on the grounds that the MKO was not privy to classified information, and therefore could not establish an argument and rebuttal which they believe would generate a stronger case to get them removed from the list. The final order was not about lifting the MKO off the Foreign Terrorist Organization list, but about due process for the group. The court stated that the purpose of the remand was to afford the MKO “an opportunity to review and rebut the unclassified portions of the record.” [2] The court also stated in the order that the Secretary of State’s “denial of the People’s Mojahedin of Iran’s petition for revocation of its 2003 designation as a foreign terrorist organization is remanded to the Secretary for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.” [3] What this means, is that the petition will end up back on the Secretary’s desk and the Secretary will look at it again. The judge who preceded over the case made a note in the order which states that “none of the AEDPA (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) cases decides whether an administrative decision relying critically on undisclosed classified material would comport with due process because in none was the classified record essential to uphold an FTO designation.[4] This is an unfavorable comment—although the Secretary is obligated to reconsider, she is unlikely to lift the MKO from the FTO list.

Standard procedure for the MKO in a situation like this is to celebrate as if it was a huge victory. The celebration is meant to bolster morale among members and augment interest from anyone from the media who will listen and report on the MKO’s plight. In essence they have used this ruling to exaggerate the issue and create a positive hype. In celebrating, they also hope to reinforce support from agenda-pushing neoconservative politicians who believe that Iran cannot handle its own domestic affairs. In France, in Auver Sur d-Oise where Maryam Rajavi, the self-imposed leader of the MKO, who feels entitled to speak on behalf of Iranian citizens despite, as previously mentioned, not having set foot in Iran for more than three decades, spoke to her sympathizers after the ruling; her response to the court order was that "sanctions against this regime are necessary and very important, but not enough. A regime change materializes in the resistance of a nation. International peace and security can only be guaranteed when ruling religious fascism is gone. So barriers to change must be removed. The chains tying the hands of the organized resistance of people must be removed." [5]. The chains she speaks of is the designation of the MKO as an FTO, and the bottom line here is that the MKO has not been de-listed from the Foreign Terrorist List—a statement she wishes to twirl into a bondage metaphor.

Rajavi claims that the FTO designation of her cult is a barrier to gain international peace and security. This is fine to claim, but the logic is fuzzy because the information gleaned from the court proceedings suggests nothing about moving Iran towards peace and security. According to Glen Kessler’s report from the Washington Post, “During the court proceedings, some of that information was declassified. State asserted that the group has not ended its military operations, still intends to use violence to achieve its political goals, has trained females to be suicide bombers and that much of the information it has provided on Iran’s nuclear program has been wrong. But the court cast doubt on some of these assertions and said the group now must be given the opportunity to rebut these charges.” [6] Kessler asserts that the State Department said it would study the opinion ‘carefully’ and noted it continues to view the group as a terrorist organization.” [7] It’s clear that promptly, the court cast doubt not because they thought the MKO was really a peaceful and non-violent group, but because the MKO was denied access to classified information and therefore could not rebut.

It is important for Iranians to know that the people in the West are aware of the use of violence by the MKO against Iranian authorities and civilians. In fact, MKO terrorist activities are always mentioned in the United States’ description of the group. The following excerpt regarding the MKO’s activities is from the State Department’s “Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003”:

The group’s worldwide campaign against the Iranian Government stresses propaganda and occasionally uses terrorism. During the 1970s, the MEK killed U.S. military personnel and U.S. civilians working on defense projects in Tehran and supported the takeover in 1979 of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. In 1981, the MEK detonated bombs in the head office of the Islamic Republic Party and the Premier’s office, killing some 70 high-ranking Iranian officials, including Chief Justice Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, President Mohammad-Ali Rajaei, and Premier Mohammad-Javad Bahonar. Near the end of the 1980-1988 war with Iran, Baghdad armed the MEK with military equipment and sent it into action against Iranian forces. In 1991, the MEK reportedly assisted the Government of Iraq in suppressing the Shia uprisings in southern Iraq and the Kurdish uprisings in the north. In April 1992, the MEK conducted near-simultaneous attacks on Iranian embassies and installations in 13 countries, demonstrating the group’s ability to mount large-scale operations overseas. In April 1999, the MEK targeted key military officers and assassinated the deputy chief of the Iranian Armed Forces General Staff. In April 2000, the MEK attempted to assassinate the commander of the Nasr Headquarters, Tehran’s interagency board responsible for coordinating policies on Iraq. The normal pace of anti-Iranian operations increased during "Operation Great Bahman" in February 2000, when the group launched a dozen attacks against Iran. One of those attacks included a mortar attack against the leadership complex in Tehran that housed the offices of the Supreme Leader and the President. In 2000 and 2001, the MEK was involved regularly in mortar attacks and hit-and-run raids on Iranian military and law enforcement units and government buildings near the Iran-Iraq border, although MEK terrorism in Iran declined toward the end of 2001. The MEK leadership ordered its members not to resist Coalition forces at the outset of Operation Iraqi Freedom, and they surrendered their arms to Coalition forces in May 2003. [8]

In May 2005, Newsweek’s Michael Isikoff and Mark Hosenball wrote an article about the hullabaloo of the MKO. They state that the MKO has long been controversial because of its history of violent attacks in Iran, its relationship with Saddam’s regime and its background as a quasi-religious, quasi-Marxist radical resistance group founded in the era of the late Iranian shah. They mention that in 1997, the Clinton administration put MKO on the State Department’s list of foreign terrorist groups. They also put forward that the MKOs U.S. supporters, among whom at one point numbered dozens of members of Congress, charged that the Clinton administration only labeled MKO as a terrorist group as part of an ill-conceived attempt to improve relations with the ayatollahs who currently run Iran. They relate that the Bush administration added two alleged MKO front organizations to the State Department’s terrorist list in 2003. [9] Isikoff and Hosenball state that “despite the group’s notoriety, Bush himself cited purported intelligence gathered by [MKO] as evidence of the Iranian regime’s rapidly accelerating nuclear ambitions. At a March 16 press conference, Bush said Iran’s hidden nuclear program had been discovered not because of international inspections but ‘because a dissident group pointed it out to the world.’ White House aides acknowledged later that the dissident group cited by the president is the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), one of the [MKO] front groups added to the State Department list two years ago.”[10] Finally the Newsweek article reveals that “in an appearance before a House International Relations Subcommittee a year ago, John Bolton, the controversial State Department undersecretary who Bush has nominated to become U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, was questioned by a Congressman sympathetic to [MKO] about whether it was appropriate for the U.S. government to pay attention to allegations about Iran supplied by the group. Bolton said he believed that [MKO] ‘qualifies as a terrorist organization according to our criteria.’ But he added that he did not think the official label had ‘prohibited us from getting information from them. And I certainly don’t have any inhibition about getting information about what’s going on in Iran from whatever source we can find that we deem reliable.’” [11]

Regardless of John Bolton’s—or any other official’s ambition for Iran, and regardless of the MKOs position or non-position on the FTO list, the MKO simply can not and should not be a trusted device. Following the 2005 report of Human Rights Watch on MKO atrocities against its own members titled "No Exit," various cases of human rights violations by the MKO was revealed through testimonies made by the group’s former members. Joe Stork, a Human Rights Watch expert on the Middle East, in a UN Refugee Agency report stated that “it would be a mistake to promote an opposition group that is responsible for serious human rights abuses". [12]

U.S. officials, especially those of the State Department should research and reflect deeply before making any decision about a group that owns all the criteria of a destructive terrorist cult. Western politicians should realize that their support for the MKO will never improve their standing among Iranians inside or outside the country and the reason why is articulated by Trita Parsi, an author who founded the National Iranian American Council (NIAC):

[The MKOs] involvement in terrorism is undisputed. It assassinated several Americans in Iran in the 1970s. It supported the taking of the U.S. Embassy in Iran and blasted Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini for releasing the American diplomats in 1981, arguing instead that the hostages should have been executed. It made a pact with Saddam Hussein in the 1980s and fought alongside his army against their Iranian countrymen. Later in the 1990s, they became Saddam’s most trusted henchmen, tasked with quelling Kurdish and Shiite uprisings against the Iraqi dictator.

According to defectors, Mujahedin members in Camp Ashraf celebrated the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.
In 2003, French authorities descended upon the Mujahedin headquarters in France, arresting the leader of the cult, Mrs. Maryam Rajavi. Immediately, zealous Mojahedin members staged hunger strikes and several set themselves ablaze. Hardly the behavior of a democratically oriented opposition group. [13]

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, whose reputation would be tarnished should she allow a change of status for the MKO after the current court ordered remand, would be making an insouciant error. The removal of the MKO from the FTO list is a Pandora’s Box and both the U.S. and Iran would face a political nightmare over the next several years. In order to be fair, the U.S. should afford the MKO the right to a democratic process in which they can review the charges against them, but they should also be acutely conscious as to why they are on the Foreign Terrorist Organization list in the first place, and why they need to remain there.

References:
[1] United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit. Argued January 12, 2010. Decided July 16, 2010 No. 09-1059. PMOI v. Hillary Clinton. http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/201007/09-1059-1255582.pdf
[2] Ibid
[3] Ibid
[4] Ibid
[5] Policy prevents this author from citing this source, which is readily available on the web.
[6]Kessler, Glenn. "Court tells State Dept. to reconsider terrorist label for Iran opposition group." Washington Post 17 July 2010, Print.
[7] Ibid
[8] http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/65275.htm
[9] Isikoff Michael & Hosenball Mark. "Consider the Source: The State Department says MEK is a terror group. Human Rights Watch says it’s a cult. For the White House,
MEK is a source of intelligence on Iran.
”MSNBC.com 20 May 2005: Web. 10 Aug 2010. <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7902719/site/newsweek/>.
[10] Ibid
[11] Ibid
[12] Human Rights Watch, No Exit: Human Rights Abuses Inside the Mojahedin Khalq Camps, 18 May 2005. Web. 10 August 2010 http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/45d085002.html
[13] Parsi, Trita. "Deciding the Fate of the Mojahedin Khalq Organisation." Iran Press Service 10 October 2008: Web. 10 Aug 2010.
<http://www.iran-press-service.com/ips/articles-2008/october-2008/
deciding-the-fate-of-the-mojahedin-khalq-organisat.shtml>.

By Mazda Parsi

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Mujahedin Khalq Organization members' families

Letter of Ms. Abdullahi to the US Secretary of States

How is it that you recognize the MKO as a terrorist group but at the same time you support it to keep our children as gladiators in slavery?
(No wages! No spouses! No family! No outside contact! No readings! No thinking! No future! No . . . ! Just worshiping Rajavi, being terrorists, and killing until being killed)

Ms. Sorayya Abdullahi has written a letter to the US Secretary of States on behalf of the familiesMs. Sorayya Abdullahi has written a letter to the US Secretary of States on behalf of the families picketing in front of Ashraf cultic garrison picketing in front of Ashraf cultic garrison in Iraq which is seen below. It is worth mentioning that hundreds of family members of the victims seized inside Rajavi cult (Mojahedin-e Kahlq Organization – MKO) in Iraq have been picketing outside Ashraf garrison the base of this cult in Iraq for about six months and demanding visiting their relatives, but the MKO is still refusing to fulfill their demands. The physical and psychological pressure on these families caused by long time demonstration has led to Ms. Abdullahi and some others to be hospitalized in Baghdad.

Mrs. Hilary Clinton
US Secretary of States

I have learned that the Mojahedin-e Kahlq Organization (MKO- Rajavi cult) has once again been designated as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) by the US State Department. We are of course pleased that the United States government recognizes the group as a terrorist cult. But this letter is about the rights of the families of the members of the cult in Ashraf garrison the base of the MKO in Iraq. I am a mother and my son has been seized inside the garrison for many years. I am writing this letter from the hospital and I am not in a healthy condition at all.

It is now round 6 months that I am picketing along some other families outside the main gate of Ashraf garrison. Not only the leaders of the cult have not given a positive answer to us, but also they have continuously intimidated and insulted us in order to keep us away from our relatives. Isn’t it our right to be able to visit our loved ones and freely talk to them while they are just a few hundred meters away?

The Iraqi government wished to dismantle the garrison and put the leaders of the cult on trial for their crimes against the Iraqi people and free the victims. Apparently they cannot execute their official decision since the influence of dominating powers in Iraq would not let them do so. Would you consider this a just policy that on one hand you designate the MKO as a terrorist group and on the other hand use your influence to support them and do not let the families reach their just and natural demands?

The UNHCR, the ICRC, the AI, the HRW, the Iraqi officials and the ministry of human rights of this country, and many lawyers and politicians have approved the legitimacy of our demand and believe that the leaders of the MKO must be under pressure to accept the wish of the families.

Even well-known international institutes such as the American RAND and the British Chatham House are now criticizing US the support for the Rajavi terrorist cult and are disturbed by this support. We do not need or ask for the support of the US, but if your government stop backing the group which you designate as terrorists, this would be a great help to us to reach our just demands to see our loved ones.

There are some views indications that some war mongering cliques who have a great influence on US policy wish to save the cultic structure of the MKO with the hope that one day maybe they can be used against the Islamic Republic of Iran the same way that Saddam Hussein did. Is this true? If not how would you justify the double standard policy of US administration against this terrorist group?

I, as well as the suffering mothers and families who have gathered outside Ashraf garrison despite the high temperature and hard living, would like to have a clear answer from you. Please do not respond to us saying that this is not related to your government since it is clear for all of us and even for the international officials in Baghdad that the American forces and the American influence in Iraq is the only obstacle against to freely visiting our relatives and I write this letter on their recommendation and I ask for answer.

Apparently some currents among US policy makers consider our children as free and ready to use terrorists who must go to kill until they are killed. How do you justify this undue policy for your people and for the people of the world? It seems that we have no choice but to either continue the present sufferings and go to hospital one by one or reach to our right and see our beloved ones.

Copy to:
US Ambassador in Baghdad
UN General Secretary
UNHCR
ICRC
IA
HRW
Iraqi minister of human rights
Iraqi and international media
American Forces Commander in Iraq

Sorayya Abdullahi
On behalf of the families picketing outside Ashraf garrison in Iraq
Baghdad – hospital
Saturday 7 Aug 2010

hundreds of family members of the victims seized inside Rajavi cult (Mojahedin-e Kahlq Organization – MKO) in Iraq have been picketing outside Ashraf

About Ms. Abdullahi and her son:
Ms. Sorayya Abudllahi Mirzanaqi the daughter of Gholam-Reza was born in 1961 and lives in the city of Ardabil in the north west of Iran. She has two daughters and one son. His son named Amir-Aslan Hassanzadeh the son of Manuchehr was born in 1982. He left Iran to Turkey in June 2002 along with his friend Mahmoud Akbari to find a job and of course a better life in Germany.

After 10 days Amir called his mother and said that he is in a hotel in Ankara and has found a man called Ali Ankaraii and he is supposed to take them to Germany.

Ali Ankaraii is a known name for all trapped in the Rajavi cult in Turkey. He was the MKO contact man in Turkey and of course he never used to reveal his true identity and the organization he was working for to his victims. He managed to send many individuals to Iraq through Jordan deceiving them for a job and a better life in Europe.

Ali Ankaraii called Amir’s mother and asked her several thousand dollars but Ms. Abdullahi could only manage to send 1700 USD to Ali’s bank account.

Finally Amir told her mother that she could ring him after two weeks and gave her a telephone number in Germany. Ms. Abdullahi tried several times to call the given number but did not succeed and could never find a trace of her son.

Round 5 years after Amir had been disappeared one day Mahmoud Akbari, Amir’s friend, went to Ms. Abdullahi’s house. She was surprised to see him there and asked him what happened in Germany and asked him after Amir. Mahmoud answered that they did not go to Germany but to Ashraf garrison the base of the MKO in Iraq. He then explained that he left the MKO when the Americans invaded Iraq and came to Iran with the help of the Red Cross. He also said that he asked Amir to go along with him but Amir said that if he leaves the MKO he would have no choice but to go to Iran where he would definitely be executed.

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MKO Remains in US Blacklist

The anti-Iran terrorist group, the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO), remained in the US list of terrorist groups and organizations despite intense efforts by Zionist lobbies and a number of the Congressmen to delist the group.

The US State Department announced in its recent annual report on terrorism that no change has been made in the MKO’s status.

The MKO insists that the US should delist it as a terrorist organization, a demand which has been rejected so far by Washington.

An appeals court in the US had earlier ruled that the State Department should review the terror status of the MKO.

The MKO had filed a petition against the US blacklisting in 2008.

The Bush administration, however, rejected the request in its final days in 2009, after examining the material submitted by the group and the US intelligence community, including classified information.

In July 2010, a three-judge panel of the US Court of Appeals in Washington said in a 22-page decision that the US government failed to give the group a fair chance to rebut unclassified information that claimed the group supported terrorist activities.

The government was obligated under a 1996 antiterrorism law and 2004 revisions to give the group the chance to rebut unclassified information, the appeals court said, adding that the group was "permitted access to the unclassified portion of the record only after the decision was final."
In a statement, the State Department said it would study the decision, but added that the US government continues to view the group as a terrorist organization.

The MKO, whose main stronghold is in Iraq, is blacklisted by much of the international community, including the United States.

Before an overture by the EU, the MKO was on the European Union’s list of terrorist organizations subject to an EU-wide assets freeze. Yet, the MKO puppet leader, Maryam Rajavi, who has residency in France, regularly visited Brussels and despite the ban enjoyed full freedom in Europe.

Some other members of the MKO who have had a role in the assassination of a large number of Iranian citizens and officials are currently living in France.

The group started assassination of Iranian citizens and officials after the Islamic Revolution in a bid to take control of the newly established Islamic Republic. It killed several of Iran’s new leaders in the early years after the revolution, including the then President, Mohammad Ali Rajayee, Prime Minister, Mohammad Javad Bahonar and the Judiciary Chief, Mohammad Hossein Beheshti who were killed in bomb attacks by MKO members in 1981.

The group fled to Iraq in 1986, where it was protected by Saddam Hussein and where it helped the Iraqi dictator suppress Shiite and Kurd uprisings in the country.

The terrorist group joined Saddam’s army during the Iraqi imposed war on Iran (1980-1988) and helped Saddam and killed thousands of Iranian civilians and soldiers during the US-backed Iraqi imposed war on Iran.

Earlier this year, Iraqi security forces took control of the training base of the MKO at Camp Ashraf – about 60km (37 miles) north of Baghdad – and detained dozens of the members of the terrorist group.

The Iraqi authority also changed the name of the military center from Camp Ashraf to the Camp of New Iraq.

Many of the MKO members have abandoned the terrorist organization while most of those still remaining in the camp are said to be willing to quit but are under pressure and torture not to do so.

A May 2005 Human Rights Watch report accused the MKO of running prison camps in Iraq and committing human rights violations.

According to the Human Rights Watch report, the outlawed group puts defectors under torture and jail terms.

Numerous articles and letters posted on the Internet by family members of MKO recruits confirm reports of the horrific abuse that the group inflicts on its own members and the alluring recruitment methods it uses.

The most shocking of such stories includes accounts given by former British MKO member Ann Singleton and Mustafa Mohammadi — the father of an Iranian-Canadian girl who was drawn into the group during an MKO recruitment campaign in Canada.

Mohammadi recounts his desperate efforts to contact his daughter, who disappeared several years ago – a result of what the MKO called a ‘two-month tour’ of Camp Ashraf for teenagers.
He also explains how the group forces the families of its recruits to take part in pro-MKO demonstrations in the western countries by threatening to kill their loved ones.
Lacking a foothold in Iran, the terrorist group recruits ill-informed teens from Iranian immigrant communities in western states and blocks their departure afterwards.

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The MEK remained in US terror list

The MEK remained in US terror listDespite all the vast propaganda campaign and pulling any lobbying string, while leaving no stone unturned, for taking the name of MEK out of the US State Department terror list, once again this terrorist group was designated as a foreign terrorist organization.

In a new report by the US Department of State office of the coordination for counterterrorism which was released on August 5, 2010, Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization was referred to as a terrorist organization.

MUJAHADIN-E KHALQ ORGANIZATION
aka MEK; MKO; Mujahadin-e Khalq (Iranian government name for group); Muslim Iranian Students’ Society; National Council of Resistance; NCR; Organization of the People’s Holy Warriors of Iran; the National Liberation Army of Iran; NLA; People’s Mujahadin Organization of Iran; PMOI; National Council of Resistance of Iran; NCRI; Sazeman-e Mujahadin-e Khalq-e Iran
Description:

The MEK was originally designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1997. The MEK is a Marxist-Islamic Organization that seeks the overthrow of the Iranian regime through its military wing, the National Liberation Army (NLA), and its political front, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI).

The MEK was founded in 1963 by a group of college-educated Iranian Marxists who opposed the country’s pro-western ruler, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. The group participated in the 1979 Islamic Revolution that replaced the Shah with a Shiite Islamist regime led by Ayatollah Khomeini. However, the MEK’s ideology – a blend of Marxism, feminism, and Islamism – was at odds with the post-revolutionary government and its original leadership was soon executed by the Khomeini regime. In 1981, the group was driven from its bases on the Iran-Iraq border and resettled in Paris, where it began supporting Iraq in its eight year war against Khomeini’s Iran. In 1986, after France recognized the Iranian regime, the MEK moved its headquarters to Iraq, which facilitated its terrorist activities in Iran. Since 2003, roughly 3,400 MEK members have been encamped at Camp Ashraf in Iraq.

Activities:
The group’s worldwide campaign against the Iranian government uses propaganda and terrorism to achieve its objectives. During the 1970s, the MEK staged terrorist attacks inside Iran and killed several U.S. military personnel and civilians working on defense projects in Tehran. In 1972, the MEK set off bombs in Tehran at the U.S. Information Service office, a U.S. diplomatic facility staffed by internationally protected persons, the Iran-American Society, and the offices of several U.S. companies to protest the visit of President Nixon to Iran. In 1973, the MEK assassinated the deputy chief of the U.S. Military Mission in Tehran and bombed several businesses, including Shell Oil. In 1974, the MEK set off bombs in Tehran at the offices of U.S. companies to protest the visit of then U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger. In 1975, the MEK assassinated two U.S. military officers who were members of the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group in Tehran. In 1976, the MEK assassinated two U.S. citizens who were employees of Rockwell International in Tehran. In 1979, the group claimed responsibility for the murder of an American Texaco executive.

In 1981, MEK leadership attempted to overthrow the newly installed Islamic regime; Iranian security forces subsequently initiated a crackdown on the group. The MEK instigated a bombing campaign, including an attack against the head office of the Islamic Republic Party and the Prime Minister’s office, which killed some 70 high-ranking Iranian officials, including Chief Justice Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, President Mohammad-Ali Rajaei, and Prime Minister Mohammad-Javad Bahonar. These attacks resulted in a popular uprising against the MEK and an expanded Iranian government crackdown that forced MEK leaders to flee to France. For five years, the MEK continued to wage its terrorist campaign from its Paris headquarters. Expelled by France in 1986, MEK leaders turned to Saddam Hussein’s regime for basing, financial support, and training. Near the end of the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, Baghdad armed the MEK with heavy military equipment and deployed thousands of MEK fighters in suicidal, mass wave attacks against Iranian forces.

The MEK’s relationship with the former Iraqi regime continued through the 1990s. In 1991, the group reportedly assisted the Iraqi Republican Guard’s bloody crackdown on Iraqi Shia and Kurds who rose up against Saddam Hussein’s regime. In April 1992, the MEK conducted near-simultaneous attacks on Iranian embassies and installations in 13 countries, demonstrating the group’s ability to mount large-scale operations overseas. In June 1998, the MEK was implicated in a series of bombing and mortar attacks in Iran that killed at least 15 and injured several others. In April 1999, the MEK targeted key Iranian military officers and assassinated the deputy chief of the Iranian Armed Forces General Staff, Brigadier General Ali Sayyaad Shirazi.
In April 2000, the MEK attempted to assassinate the commander of the Nasr Headquarters, Tehran’s interagency board responsible for coordinating policies on Iraq. The pace of anti-Iranian operations increased during “Operation Great Bahman” in February 2000, when the group launched a dozen attacks against Iran. One attack included a mortar attack against a major Iranian leadership complex in Tehran that housed the offices of the Supreme Leader and the President. In 2000 and 2001, the MEK was involved in regular mortar attacks and hit-and-run raids against Iranian military and law enforcement personnel, as well as government buildings near the Iran-Iraq border. Also in 2001, the FBI arrested seven Iranians in the United States who funneled US$ 400,000 to an MEK-affiliated organization in the UAE, which used the funds to purchase weapons. Following an initial Coalition bombardment of the MEK’s facilities in Iraq at the outset of Operation Iraqi Freedom, MEK leadership negotiated a cease-fire with Coalition Forces and surrendered their heavy-arms to Coalition control. Since 2003, roughly 3,400 MEK members have been encamped at Ashraf in Iraq.

In 2003, French authorities arrested 160 MEK members at operational bases they believed the MEK was using to coordinate financing and planning for terrorist attacks. Upon the arrest of MEK leader Maryam Rajavi, MEK members took to Paris’ streets and engaged in self-immolation. French authorities eventually released Rajavi. Although currently in hiding, Rajavi has made “motivational” appearances via video-satellite to MEK-sponsored conferences across the globe.
According to evidence which became available after the fall of Saddam Hussein, the MEK received millions of dollars in Oil-for-Food program subsidies from Saddam Hussein from 1999 through 2003. In addition to discovering 13 lists of recipients of such vouchers on which the MEK appeared, evidence linking the MEK to the former Iraqi regime includes lists, as well as video footage of both Saddam Hussein handing over suitcases of money to known MEK leaders, and of MEK operatives receiving training from the Iraqi military.

Strength:
Estimates place MEK’s worldwide membership at between 5,000 and 10,000 members, with large pockets in Paris and other major European capitals. In Iraq, roughly 3,400 MEK members are gathered at Camp Ashraf, the MEK’s main compound north of Baghdad. As a condition of the 2003 cease-fire agreement, the MEK relinquished more than 2,000 tanks, armored personnel carriers, and heavy artillery. Between 2003 and 2006, a significant number of MEK personnel voluntarily left Ashraf, and an additional several hundred individuals renounced ties to the MEK and been voluntarily repatriated to Iran.

Location/Area of Operation:
The MEK’s global support structure remains in place, with associates and supporters scattered throughout Europe and North America. Operations target Iranian government elements across the globe, including in Europe and Iran. The MEK’s political arm, the National Council of Resistance of Iran, has a global support network with active lobbying and propaganda efforts in major Western capitals. NCRI also has a well-developed media communications strategy.

External Aid:
Before Operation Iraqi Freedom began in 2003, the MEK received all of its military assistance and most of its financial support from Saddam Hussein. The fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime has led the MEK increasingly to rely on front organizations to solicit contributions from expatriate Iranian communities.
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2009/140900.htm

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Mujahedin Khalq Organization as a terrorist group

Brushing the Dust off a Court Ruling

As already predicted, triumphalism was the order of MKO media and propaganda machine for nearly two weeks since the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled that the State Department review designation of Mojahedin Khalq Organization (MKO, MEK, PMOI, NCR, NLA)the State Department’s response in all the last threes has been nothing but to re-designate it, as it will be probably with this last one. as a foreign terrorist organization. This was not MKO displaying itself as the winner of a petition but a terrorist organization shaking its fist at the world. However, now the cloud of the triumph subsided and anything returning to normal, it is time to have a review of the ruling to dig out the facts MKO were trying to bury under the heavy cloud of disturbing the usual pattern of events. Although improbable to be removed from the terror list, as the ruling has nothing to do with the issue, there are points in the ruling indicating that the State Department insists on the accuracy of its decision makings.

It has to be pointed out that the case in the question is not the first but the fourth through which MKO is challenging its designation as a FTO and bringing it before the court. And the State Department’s response in all the last threes has been nothing but to re-designate it, as it will be probably with this last one. Let’s see what remarkable points the organization has noticed specified in the ruling that may signify a triumph for it.

1. Stated in per curiam, it affirms that “This case is the fifth in a series of related actions challenging the United States Secretary of State’s designation of the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK) and its aliases as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). The MEK, also called the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI), has challenged its FTO status before this court three times”. Accordingly, the organizations attempts so far has proved unproductive against the State Department’s reasonable evidences.

2. MKO’s provided evidences to defend itself against the charges have been piles of letters of recommendations from its lobby in the Congress and other European parliamentarians. Asserted in the ruling, the State Department’s decision to keep MKO on the list as a FTO relies on sound classified and unclassified information. “The PMOI also thrice supplemented its petition with additional information and letters in support from members of the U.S. Congress, members of the UK and European parliaments and retired members of the U.S. military, among others. After reviewing an administrative record consisting of both classified and unclassified information, the Secretary denied the PMOI’s petition and published its denial in the Federal Register on January 12, 2009. She also provided the PMOI with a heavily redacted 20-page administrative summary of State’s review of the record, which summary referred to 33 exhibits, many of which were also heavily or entirely redacted.”

3. The court upholds that the Secretary resolved to designate MKO based on sound records and evidences. “We are to uphold the Secretary’s determination unless it “lack[s] substantial support in the administrative record taken as a whole or in classified information submitted to the court.”
4. The court asserts that in all his/her previous responses, the Secretary has shown no satisfaction that the organization has permanently renounced terrorism and that, it might resume such activities in future. “In my view, (Karen LeCraft Henderson, Circuit Judge) the classified portion of the administrative record provides “substantial support” for her determination that the PMOI either continues to engage in terrorism or terrorist activity or retains the capability and intent to do so and, consequently, for her denial of the PMOI’s revocation petition.”

5. The State Department in its explanations for keeping MKO on the list argues that there is no evidence to confirm that the organization has permanently renounced terrorism since its present circumstances are the same as the previous. The State Department relies on sound facts rather than claims. “To seek revocation, an FTO “must provide evidence in that petition that the relevant circumstances . . . are sufficiently different from the circumstances that were the basis for the designation such that a revocation with respect to the organization is warranted.”

It adds that “While the Secretary may revoke a designation at any time, the statute directs that she shall revoke a designation if she finds that either “the circumstances that were the basis for the designation have changed in such a manner as to warrant revocation,” or “the national security of the United States warrants a revocation,” She wrote that “in considering the evidence as a whole, the MEK has not shown that the relevant circumstances are sufficiently different from the circumstances that were the basis for the 2003re-designation,” and that “[a]s a consequence, the MEK continues to be a foreign organization that engages in terrorist activity . . . or terrorism . . . or retains the capability and intent to” do so.

Accordingly, America has concluded that in spite of the cease of open military operations and the voluntary surrender of arsenal and weapons to the occupying forces in Iraq, MKO does not seem to have adopted a total non-aggressive attitude. The militarism potentiality submits that the continued proscription of MKO has not been unjustified.

6. The ruling admits that “although the Secretary must give the PMOI an opportunity to rebut the unclassified material on which she relies, AEDPA does not allow access to the classified record as it makes clear that classified material “shall not be subject to disclosure for such time as it remains classified, except that such information may be disclosed to a court ex parte and in camera for purposes of judicial review.”

It indicates that the US has a comprehensive understanding of MKO compared to other designated organizations. Naturally, classified information include sensitive compartmented information and special access data and are to be used by government departments and agencies if deemed necessary. Disclosure of these information in the presence of an ineligible terrorist organization increases the risk of an unauthorized disclosure of classified information that puts terrorists in full alert.

However, the court requires that MKO be notified of only unclassified information: “In short, we have held due process requires that the PMOI be notified of the unclassified material on which the Secretary proposes to rely and an opportunity to respond to that material before its redesignation; nothing in the amended statute suggests that this protection is any less necessary in the revocation context.”

MKO is well aware that the only probable, granted chance before it is to refute unclassified information or to ask for further opportunity to provide justifications to prolong the process. “And even though the PMOI was given the opportunity to include in the record its own evidence supporting delisting, it had no opportunity to rebut the unclassified portion of the record the Secretary was compiling—an omission, the PMOI argues, that deprived it of the due process protections detailed in our previous decisions.”

The ruling concludes that because of the foreign policy and national security concerns it leaves the designation in place: “As we noted in NCRI I, “[w]e recognize that a strict and immediate application of the principles of law which we have set forth herein could be taken to require a revocation of the designation[] before us[, but] . . . we also recognize the realities of the foreign policy and national security concerns asserted by the Secretary in support of th[e] designation.” 251 F.3d at 209. We thus leave the designation in place but remand with instructions to the Secretary to provide the PMOI the opportunity to review and rebut the unclassified portions of the record on which she relied.”

Consequently, what MKO is trumpeting as a ruling of being removed from the terrorist list is nothing but an urge by the court requiring the State Department to grant MKO an opportunity to defend itself against unclassified information, an opportunity already granted. The court has judicial responsibilities to fulfill, as it will be also held accountable for the consequences of unleashing a terrorist organization. It is complying with all regulations that struggle to diminish the nightmare of terrorist threats that has jeopardized the national security since 9/11.

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Mujahedin Khalq Organization as a terrorist group

No Court’s Ruling Helps MKO Evade Terrorist Charges

Last Friday, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in Washington ruled that the U.S. State Department should review designation of Mojahedin Khalq Organization (MKO, MEK, PMOI, NCR, NLA) as a foreign terrorist organization. The ruling is the last of a quintuple series of petitions by MKO, out of which only two have been ruled by the U.S. Court of Appeals to remand the case for further proceedings.No Court’s Ruling Helps MKO Evade Terrorist Charges

In the first of the two, decided on June 8, 2001, the ruling stated: “While we determine that the designation was in compliance with the statute, we further determine that the designation does violate the due process rights of the petitioners under the Fifth Amendment, and we therefore remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion”. In the other three cases, however, the court denied the petitions for review.

MKO claims that the decision represents a victory for it and it may give them enough time to convince the Secretary of State that it has long since 2001 abandoned any commitment to violence. But the State Department has since designation of MKO as a foreign terrorist organization been relying on its own classified and unclassified data and has absolutely ignored the organization’s assertions of abandoning terrorism. To know the State Department’s reasoning, as the case required that the Secretary provide a meaningful opportunity for MKO to review the unclassified record on which she relied, one does not need to look for classified information; there are periodically published reports and researches that release up to date information on MKO.

In a research analysis, commissioned by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Status Determination and Protection Information Section, mainly prepared on the basis of publicly available information, you can easily fathom the structure and the true nature of MKO regardless of its claims. The CORI research published on 21 September 2009 publicized Information on the People’s Mujahedin of Iran (PMOI) based on the fact that “Every effort has been taken to ensure accuracy and comprehensive coverage of the research issue”. Far from any propaganda, the research delves into the group’s past and current activities covered and made available by the media and authentic sources of information. Interestingly, the bulk of information released in the report concerns the military operations of the organization under NLA alias.

On re-designation of MKO as a FTO, the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism in itsApril 30, 2009 report once more asserted MKO’s terrorist activities done against America: “The group’s worldwide campaign against the Iranian government uses propaganda and terrorism to achieve its objectives and has been supported by reprehensible regimes, including that of Saddam Hussein. During the 1970s, the MEK assassinated several U.S. military personnel and U.S. civilians working on defense projects in Tehran and supported the violent takeover in 1979 of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran”.

And there is the latest one published by Congressional Research Service dated June 11, 2010 entitledIran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses in which the reason for the designation of the group is referred to. It has a reference to MKO’s made petition against its designation in 2008 and the State Department determination to keep it on the list: “The FTO designation was up for formal review in October 2008, and, in July 2008, the PMOI formally petitioned to the State Department that its designation be revoked, on the grounds that it renounced any use of terrorism in 2001. However, the State Department announced in mid-January 2009 that the group would remain listed. The group remained on the FTO list when the list was reviewed and reissued in October 2009”.

And there are lot more evidences to corroborate the group’s unchanged terrorist disposition regardless of any court’s judgment. How can an organization with proven notorious, bloody history claim that it has been designated unjustifiably and in the absence of due process of law? Being removed from any list or not, however, is a test for the countries on whose lists it was labeled to prove their seriousness in war against terrorism. For Iranian people, it remains a terrorist group as terrorism and militarism is innate in its ideology.

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USA

The DOS responses to previous demands of MKO designation review

The judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia urging the State Department to review its decision to label MKO as a terrorist is the last ofthe State Department has never changed its views about the inclusion of the notorious MKO terrorists a quintuple series concerning MKO’s designations by the Secretary of State. The following text is the last response by the Department of State denying MKO petition for review of the order in question. The three previous responses are also linked in this last one. The response well indicates that the State Department has never changed its views about the inclusion of the notorious MKO terrorists and has ever insisted that the group’s designation complied with the governing statute and all constitutional requirements. We have to wait to see how sincere and determined America is in its war against terrorism when it designates a group as a FTO on sound evidences.

National Council of Resistance of Iran, Petitioner, v. Department of State and Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State, Respondents

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit. – 373 F.3d 152

Argued April 2, 2004 Decided July 9, 2004

On Petition for Review of Orders of the Department of State.

Paul F. Enzinna argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner. Martin D. Minsker entered an appearance.

Douglas Letter, Litigation Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General.

Before: HENDERSON, GARLAND, and ROBERTS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROBERTS.

ROBERTS, Circuit Judge:

1 This is the fourth in a series of related cases concerning the biennial designations by the Secretary of State of the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK)1 and its aliases as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO). See People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d 17 (D.C.Cir.1999) (PMOI I); National Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192 (D.C.Cir.2001) (NCRI); People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 327 F.3d 1238 (D.C.Cir.2003) (PMOI II); see generally 8 U.S.C. § 1189. In 1999, and again in 2001, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) was determined by the Secretary of State to be an alias of MEK and was accordingly also designated an FTO. See 1999 Designation, 64 Fed.Reg. at 55,112; 2001 Redesignation, 66 Fed.Reg. at 51,089. In May 2003, after a remand to cure certain due process deficiencies, see NCRI, 251 F.3d at 208-09, the Secretary decided to leave in place the 1999 and 2001 designations of NCRI as an FTO. NCRI now again petitions for review. After reviewing NCRI’s arguments, the entirety of the administrative record, and certain classified materials appended to that record, we conclude that the Secretary’s latest designation complied with the governing statute and all constitutional requirements. We therefore deny the petition for review.

2 The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) empowers the Secretary of State to designate an entity as an FTO whenever the Secretary determines that (1) the entity is foreign; (2) it engages in terrorist activity; and (3) the terrorist activity threatens the security of the United States or its nationals. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1). A designation as an FTO persists for two years, after which the Secretary may redesignate the entity as an FTO for a succeeding two-year period upon finding that the statutory circumstances still exist. Id. § 1189(a)(4)(B).

3 An FTO designation visits serious consequences on the affected organization: The Secretary of the Treasury may require financial institutions to freeze any assets of the FTO, id. § 1189(a)(2)(C); the members and representatives of the FTO become ineligible to enter the United States, id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(IV), (V); and anyone who knowingly provides "material support or resources" to the FTO &#x2014; including any donation of money &#x2014; may be prosecuted and imprisoned for up to fifteen years, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1). The manifest purpose of these provisions is to deny terrorist organizations support &#x2014; financial or otherwise &#x2014; in and from the United States. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-383, at 43-45 (1995) (House Report on AEDPA’s primary predecessor bill).

4 Despite these serious consequences of designation, the governing statute affords suspect entities only "truncated" participation in the administrative process leading to the designation and "quite limited" judicial review after the fact. NCRI, 251 F.3d at 196. As we noted in PMOI I, "unlike the run-of-the-mill administrative proceeding," "there is [under AEDPA] no adversary hearing, no presentation of what courts and agencies think of as evidence, [and] no advance notice to the entity affected by the Secretary’s internal deliberations." 182 F.3d at 19. Once the Secretary has designated an entity an FTO, the statute directs us to "hold unlawful and set aside a designation" only if we find it to be:

5 (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law;

6 (B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;

7 (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitation, or short of statutory right;

8 (D) lacking substantial support in the administrative record taken as a whole or in classified information submitted to the court [ex parte and in camera], or

9 (E) not in accord with the procedures required by law.

10 8 U.S.C. § 1189(b)(3). Although the statute permits this court to base its review either "solely upon the administrative record" "taken as a whole," or as supplemented by any classified information submitted by the Secretary, the Act makes no provision for the disclosure of that classified material to the designated entity. See id. § 1189(b)(2), (3)(D); see generally 28 C.F.R. pt. 17 (governing access to classified national security information).

11 In 1997, and every two years since, the Secretary has designated MEK an FTO. See 1997 Designation, 62 Fed.Reg. at 52,650; 1999 Designation, 64 Fed.Reg. at 55,112; 2001 Redesignation, 66 Fed.Reg. at 51,089; 2003 Redesignation, 68 Fed.Reg. at 56,861. Starting in 1999, the Secretary added NCRI to the list of designated FTOs, having concluded that NCRI was an alias of MEK. See 1999 Designation, 64 Fed.Reg. at 55,112 ("I hereby designate … the following organization as a foreign terrorist organization: … Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization … also known as National Council of Resistance, also known as NCR."). NCRI now, for the second time, seeks review of that designation. In NCRI’s previous challenge &#x2014; brought jointly with MEK &#x2014; we concluded that both the 1999 designation of MEK as an FTO and the designation of NCRI as an alias of MEK satisfied the requirements of the statute. Specifically concerning NCRI, we held &#x2014; based on the record then presented to us by the Secretary &#x2014; that the Secretary’s conclusion that NCRI was an alias of MEK "does not lack substantial support and … is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor otherwise not in accordance with law." NCRI, 251 F.3d at 199.

12 As a constitutional matter, however, we determined that the procedures afforded by the statute and employed by the Secretary in arriving at those designations violated both organizations’ due process rights. See id. at 208-09. We did not vacate the Secretary’s designation as to either MEK or NCRI, but remanded to the Secretary with instructions that each entity be afforded the opportunity to: (1) respond to any part of the Secretary’s administrative record that is not classified material; (2) file evidence on its own behalf; and (3) be meaningfully heard by the Secretary. Id. at 210.

13 Both MEK and NCRI availed themselves of these opportunities. NCRI submitted voluminous materials that purported to demonstrate that it was sufficiently independent of MEK that it could not be considered an alias of that organization. On September 24, 2001, the State Department informed MEK and NCRI that the Secretary had decided to leave the 1999 designation of MEK in place but that "no such determination regarding the NCRI as an alias of the MEK is possible at this time." Letter of Ambassador Francis X. Taylor, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Dep’t of State, at 2 (Sept. 24, 2001). This was shortly followed, on October 5, 2001, by the Secretary’s redesignation of both MEK as an FTO and NCRI as an alias of MEK. See 2001 Redesignation, 66 Fed.Reg. at 51,089. At that time, the State Department assured NCRI that although "the present situation… requires continued designation of [NCRI] as an alias of MEK for now," upon the completion of review of NCRI’s submissions, "the Secretary will make a de novo determination in light of the entire record, including the material you have submitted." Letter of Ambassador Francis X. Taylor, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Dep’t of State, at 1 (Oct. 5, 2001).

14 Nearly a year later, the State Department provided for NCRI’s review additional materials obtained by the FBI in the course of "its long-running investigation of the MEK and NCRI." Letter of Ambassador Francis X. Taylor, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Dep’t of State, at 1 (Sept. 4, 2002). Within two months, NCRI submitted its response. See Letter of Paul F. Enzinna, Esq. (Nov. 1, 2002). In May 2003, the State Department completed its review process and, on May 24, the Secretary decided to leave in place the 1999 and 2001 "designations of the National Council of Resistance (NCR) and the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) as foreign terrorist organization aliases of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK)." Action Mem. from William Pope & William H. Taft, IV to the Secretary of State, at 3 (May 22, 2003) (Action Mem.). NCRI now petitions for review of this latest decision.

15 NCRI’s primary argument is that the Secretary’s conclusion that NCRI is an alias of MEK lacks substantial support in the administrative record. NCRI insists that it is an umbrella organization of Iranian dissident persons and groups of which MEK is only a single member, no more powerful than any other. In addressing this contention, we begin with our earlier holding in this action. In NCRI, we concluded &#x2014; based on the record then presented to us &#x2014; that the Secretary’s designation of NCRI as an alias of MEK "does not lack substantial support and … is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor otherwise not in accordance with law." 251 F.3d at 199. Although that decision is obviously not determinative of the question before us today &#x2014; we are now reviewing a record that has since been supplemented both by the Government and NCRI &#x2014; its holding must nevertheless inform our decision here. Logically, NCRI’s challenge can succeed only if the new record materials establish its independence from MEK so that we can no longer affirm that "the Secretary, on the face of things, had enough information before [him] to come to the conclusion" that NCRI is an alias of MEK. Id. Having reviewed the supplemented administrative record as a whole and the classified information appended to it, we conclude that NCRI has not met this burden.

16 To explain our decision, we must first review what it means &#x2014; in the very particular context of AEDPA &#x2014; for one organization to be an alias of another. On its previous appeal, NCRI argued that the Secretary lacked authority under AEDPA to designate an entity an FTO based on a finding that it was an alias of another designated FTO. See id. at 200. We rejected that contention, finding that the grant of authority to designate FTOs "implies the authority to so designate an entity that commits the necessary terrorist acts under some other name." Id. In so doing, we used a mathematics metaphor &#x2014; specifically, the transitive property &#x2014; to describe the alias concept: "Logically, indeed mathematically, if A equals B and B equals C, it follows that A equals C. If the NCRI is the [MEK], and if the [MEK] is a foreign terrorist organization, then the NCRI is a foreign terrorist organization also." Id.; see also id. ("If the Secretary has the power to work those dire consequences on an entity calling itself `Organization A,’ the Secretary must be able to work the same consequences on the same entity while it calls itself `Organization B.’"). Seizing upon our earlier invocation of the transitive property, NCRI now argues that the administrative record does not demonstrate that "A equals B" &#x2014; that is, that NCRI equals MEK &#x2014; and therefore NCRI cannot be an alias of MEK. Indeed, NCRI rightly points out that even the State Department acknowledges that NCRI and MEK are not " one and the same." See Pet. Reply Br. 4-6.

17 Implicit in NCRI’s argument, however, is a mistaken assumption that the alias concept, under AEDPA, is bounded by the transitive property. This reads too much into our mathematical metaphor in NCRI. See Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 94, 155 N.E. 58 (1926) (Cardozo, J.) ("Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it."). While it is certainly correct to use the term alias to describe scenarios where a single entity is known by more than one name &#x2014; for instance, Mojahedin-e Khalq is an alias for People’s Mojahedin, two names for the same organization, one Farsi, the other English &#x2014; nothing in AEDPA or any more general rule of logic or language requires that the application of the alias concept be strictly limited to such circumstances.

18 To the contrary, our citation in NCRI to First National City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 103 S.Ct. 2591, 77 L.Ed.2d 46 (1983), indicates that we intended the alias concept to have a sweep beyond the transitive. In that case, which concerned a suit brought by Banco Para El Comercio Exterior (BPECE) against First National City Bank for performance under a letter of credit, the Supreme Court held that First National could counterclaim for setoff of the value of its assets that had been seized and nationalized by the Cuban government, notwithstanding the fact that BPECE had been established by the Cuban government as a juridical entity separate from the government. See id. at 623-34, 103 S.Ct. at 2598-2603. Acknowledging a presumption that "government instrumentalities established as juridical entities distinct and independent from their sovereign should normally be treated as such," id. at 626-27, 103 S.Ct. at 2599, the Court nevertheless concluded that the normally separate juridical status had to be set aside where the Cuban government was the real party in interest behind BPECE’s letter of credit claim, id. at 632, 103 S.Ct. at 2602. The Court, in reaching its conclusion, looked to ordinary principles of agency law, noting that "where a corporate entity is so extensively controlled by its owner that a relationship of principal and agent is created, we have held that one may be held liable for the actions of the other." Id. at 629, 103 S.Ct. at 2600 (citing NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc., 361 U.S. 398, 402-04, 80 S.Ct. 441, 442, 4 L.Ed.2d 400 (1960)). We think those same ordinary principles of agency law are fairly encompassed by the alias concept under AEDPA. When one entity so dominates and controls another that they must be considered principal and agent, it is appropriate, under AEDPA, to look past their separate juridical identities and to treat them as aliases.

19 The inclusion of these fundamental precepts of agency law within AEDPA’s alias concept is entirely consistent with &#x2014; indeed, necessary to &#x2014; the effective pursuit of the statute’s objective of denying support in and from the United States to terrorist organizations. Just as it is silly to suppose "that Congress empowered the Secretary to designate a terrorist organization… only for such periods of time as it took such organization to give itself a new name, and then let it happily resume the same status it would have enjoyed had it never been designated," NCRI, 251 F.3d at 200, so too it is implausible to think that Congress permitted the Secretary to designate an FTO to cut off its support in and from the United States, but did not authorize the Secretary to prevent that FTO from marshaling all the same support via juridically separate agents subject to its control. For instance, under NCRI’s conception, the Government could designate XYZ organization as an FTO in an effort to block United States support to that organization, but could not, without a separate FTO designation, ban the transfer of material support to XYZ’s fundraising affiliate, FTO Fundraiser, Inc. The crabbed view of alias status advanced by NCRI is at war not only with the antiterrorism objective of AEDPA, but common sense as well.

20 We need not plumb all the complexities of agency law to determine when an agent, under AEDPA, is the alias of its principal. It is sufficient for our purposes to note that the requisite relationship for alias status is established at least when one organization so dominates and controls another that the latter can no longer be considered meaningfully independent from the former. See, e.g., NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc., 361 U.S. 398, 403, 80 S.Ct. 441, 443, 4 L.Ed.2d 400 (1960) ("`Dominion may be so complete, interference so obtrusive, that by the general rules of agency the parent will be a principal and the subsidiary an agent.’") (quoting Berkey, 244 N.Y. at 95, 155 N.E. 58); Casino Ready Mix, Inc. v. NLRB, 321 F.3d 1190, 1196 (D.C.Cir.2003) ("`agent’ is one who agrees to act `subject to [a principal’s] control’") (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1, cmt. a (1958)); cf. Transamerica Leasing, Inc. v. La Republica de Venezuela, 200 F.3d 843, 848 (D.C.Cir.2000) ("A sovereign is amenable to suit based upon the actions of an instrumentality it dominates because the sovereign and the instrumentality are in those circumstances not meaningfully distinct entities; they act as one.").

21 We thus frame our inquiry here as whether "the Secretary, on the face of things, had enough information before [him] to come to the conclusion" that NCRI was dominated and controlled by MEK. PMOI I, 182 F.3d at 25. Based on our review of the entire administrative record and the classified materials appended thereto, we find that the Secretary did have an adequate basis for his conclusion. While our determination is buttressed by classified information provided to us on an ex parte and in camera basis &#x2014; the contents of which we cannot discuss &#x2014; the voluminous unclassified materials contained in the administrative record by themselves and by a comfortable margin provide sufficient support for the Secretary’s conclusion, given the standard of review. It would serve little purpose to catalogue all the material in the administrative record supporting the conclusion that NCRI is dominated and controlled by MEK, but we will set out below a few of the pieces of information we found to be most compelling. As we do so, it bears repeating that AEDPA does not permit us, in exercising our limited judicial review, to make any "judgment whatsoever regarding whether the material before the Secretary is or is not true," but allows us to inquire only whether the Secretary "had enough information before [him] to come to the conclusion" that NCRI is dominated and controlled by MEK. Id.

22 After an extensive investigation of MEK and NCRI, the FBI reported to the State Department that "[i]t is the unanimous view of the FBI personnel who are involved in and familiar with the FBI’s investigation of the [MEK] that the NCRI is not a separate organization, but is instead, and has been, an integral part of the MEK at all relevant times." Letter of Charles Frahm, Section Chief, International Terrorism Operations Section II, at 1 (Aug. 28, 2002). Contrary to NCRI’s portrayal of itself as an umbrella organization, of which the MEK was just one member, the FBI concluded that it is NCRI that is "the political branch" of the MEK. Id. Attach. at 1.

23 This conclusion was based in large part on evidence gathered from the search &#x2014; executed in December 2001 pursuant to a valid warrant &#x2014; of a house in Falls Church, Virginia apparently used as office space by both NCRI and MEK. There, the FBI discovered NCRI and MEK materials "commingled together, and not separated," including bank records, signed blank checks, MEK propaganda, NCRI publications, travel documents, and letterhead which listed the same French address for each organization. Id. Attach. at 2-4. Crucially, among the recovered documents was a schematic breakdown of the "Iranian Resistance," which described NCRI as "The Political Branch" of the movement. Id. at Tab 6.

24 Additionally, earlier investigations of MEK and NCRI had revealed that the two organizations shared an essentially unitary leadership structure. The overall head of MEK, Massoud Rajavi, also leads NCRI. And Rajavi’s wife, Maryam Rajavi, was selected by NCRI to be Iran’s President-inExile. Id. Attach. at 2; see also id. Attach. at 4 ("The leadership of [MEK] and NCRI is intermixed, and the entities operate in a day-to-day way as a single unit."). These facts corroborated the FBI’s earlier conclusion prior to the 2001 designation of NCRI as an FTO that "the NCR/NCRI is in fact controlled by and inseparable from the MEK." Decl. of Agent Michael Rolince (quoted in Action Mem., Tab 2 at 11).

25 The State Department acknowledged that "NCRI has submitted numerous affidavits purporting to show that it is not controlled by the MEK and is not an MEK front," and even credited some of NCRI’s "subsidiary points." Action Mem., Tab 2 at 12, 9. The agency, however, concluded that "the evidence developed by the FBI is convincingly to the contrary." Id. Tab 2 at 12. It may be true that the State Department relied very heavily on the conclusions of the counterterrorism experts of the FBI. As noted above, though, under the narrow powers of judicial review Congress has accorded to us under AEDPA, it is emphatically not our province to second-guess the Secretary’s judgment as to which affidavits to credit and upon whose conclusions to rely. We are to judge only whether the "support" marshaled for the Secretary’s designation was "substantial." 8 U.S.C. § 1189(b)(3)(D). We conclude that the support for the Secretary’s conclusion that NCRI was dominated and controlled by, and thus was an alias of, MEK was indeed substantial, and we therefore reject NCRI’s statutory challenge to its designation as an FTO.

26 This leaves only NCRI’s constitutional challenges to certain procedures employed in making that designation. Specifically, NCRI argues that due process requires that (1) it be provided access to any classified materials that the Secretary relied upon in making the designation, and (2) it have an adversary hearing before the agency at which it could confront witnesses against it. Both these arguments are foreclosed by our earlier decisions in NCRI and PMOI II. See 251 F.3d at 208-09, 327 F.3d at 1242-43. Concerning NCRI’s claim that it is entitled to review classified materials, in NCRI we wrote that the government "need not disclose the classified information to be presented in camera and ex parte to the court under the statute." 251 F.3d at 208. In PMOI II, addressing the same claim, this time brought by MEK, we were even more emphatic: "We reject this contention…. We already decided in [NCRI] that due process required the disclosure of only the unclassified portions of the administrative record." 327 F.3d at 1242. PMOI II also disposes of NCRI’s claim for an adversary hearing. There, we held that NCRI established the constitutional baseline for fair process and, the Government having complied with those commands on remand, that "nothing further is due." Id. at 1243. We reach the same conclusion with regard to NCRI.

1

The Mojahedin-e Khalq translates into English as People’s Mojahedin. [AR268] The Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK) is known in English as the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI). Our prior decisions have variously referred to the Mojahedin-e Khalq as MEK, People’s Mojahedin of Iran, and PMOICompare PMOI I, 182 F.3d at 20 ("the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran &#x2014; the MEK, for short"), with NCRI, 251 F.3d at 197 ("petitioner People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (`PMOI’)"). To limit confusion, wherever possible we will use the terms Mojahedin-e Khalq and MEK, and, except in case names, not the terms People’s Mojahedin or PMOI. We adopt this convention because it is the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization that the Secretary has designated as a foreign terrorist organization. See Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 62 Fed.Reg. 52,650 (Oct. 8, 1997) (1997 Designation); Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 64 Fed.Reg. 55,112 (Oct. 8, 1999) (1999 Designation); Redesignation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 66 Fed.Reg. 51,088, 51,089 (Oct. 5, 2001) (2001 Redesignation); Redesignation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 68 Fed.Reg. 56,860, 56,861 (Oct. 2, 2003) (2003 Redesignation).

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Mujahedin Khalq; A proxy force

The US, MKO, and the Global War on Terrorism

In a research report by Margaret D. Stock published in Refugee Council USA (RCUSA) in 2006, she has explored one of the stranger and more embarrassing legal conundrums arising out of efforts by the US Congress to tighten the immigration and criminal laws relating to terrorism. The case she delved into is the terrorist organization (MKO, MEK, PMOI, NCR, NLA) that since 1997 the Secretary of State Madeleine Albright designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), a group that has since remained on the list.

As The Department of Justice has been prosecuting and deporting persons who provide material support to MKO, at the same time, the Department of Defense has designated Iraq-based members of the group as “protected persons” under the Fourth Geneva Convention, and is maintaining its members at Camp Ashraf in Iraq, where in full awareness of its designation as a FTO the U.S. military personnel provide “material support” to the group.

Although four years old, the research report gives especial attention to the existing internal conflict in the administration wherein some party equivocate about the nature and the status of the organization for certain political interests. And MKO has long survived in Washington policy crevices and has been rallying support from conflicting factions to challenge its designation on the list. Cunning seizers of opportunity as MKO is, it knows when to take advantage of a created political gap between the administration and the group’s adversary in the political arena. As Ervand Abrahamian, a history professor at Baruch College in New York asserts about MKO,”They have a lot of money. They have spokesmen who know how to deal with congressmen and the press. But people who sign their petitions don’t know anything about the mujahedeen. […] It’s hypocritical. If we are running a war against terrorism and one day we define a group as terrorists and the next day they cease to be terrorists, that undermines U.S. credibility.”

Link to the main text (pdf)

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