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The MEK; Baath Party Accomplice

Saddam Paid MKO’s Costs

With the trial of Saddam Hussein, Iraqi newspaper Al-Adalah presented some documents and evidences and asked for the execution of Saddam Hussein. In part of its article, Al-Adalah pointed to the staggering costs of Saddam’s propaganda and wrote:

"Saddam’s regime allocated 50% of its budget to propaganda and had ties with many Arab and non-Arab terrorist groups; for instance, it had established close ties with the MKO (Mojahedin-e Khalq organization) and in return, took advantage of this group. There’s no doubt that Saddam’s propaganda had a huge impact on many countries including Arab nations, particularly those countries with higher rates of illiteracy and poverty (such as Mauritania, Yemen, and Somalia)."

 Irandidban – 2006/09/14

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Mujahedin Khalq 's Terrorism

A Revolutionary Diplomacy; the Costs and Achievements

Nobody could imagine that Massoud Rajavi’s meeting with Iraq’s Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, on 9 January 1983 in France would develop into a strategic alliance entwining the destiny of both Mojahedi Khalq and Saddam together. The meeting opened a new chapter in Mojahedin’s history. The meeting was in fact the product of accepting defeat in urban guerrilla warfare favored by Mojahedin as an effective tactic. Although Mojahedin had anticipated that the meeting would bring about inevitable consequences, but the process of the alliance led them to encounter unanticipated situations and conditions.

At the beginning of their declared armed struggle that resulted in killing of tens of ranking Iranian statesmen, Mojahedin’s claim of toppling the regime in short-term confronted the group with challenges from the side of other opposition and the forces active inside the country. Bijan Nyabati, a left member of NCRI, in respect to this issue states:

The severity and extremity of Mojahedin’s military blows especially struck at the regime’s top put the Iranian political forces as well as many other foreign communities under the illusion of the possible overthrow of Iran’s regime in short-term. Mojahedin were also under the same illusion. [1]

In October 1982, Rajavi in summing up the year-long military phase justified the group’s 20th June uprising as an inevitable event and strategic decision for the group to have been taken. But he alluded to two uncalculated external and internal factors that he claimed to have prevented the regime’s downfall; the Syria’s aid and restraining and disintegrating the terror cells inside Iran.

It was in no way the miscalculations that thwarted “the abrupt downfall”, the initiation of the 20th June uprising in itself was a blind and absurd act:

The strategy of a widespread and national-wide armed struggle was nothing more than declining a massive public uprising into the level of a limited militia struggle with no prospect. [2]

Rajavi claimed that unlooked-for suppression of Mojahedin forces by the regime hampered the downfall but Nyabati, depicting a truer image of the conditions, believes that Mojahedin’s expected response by the “social factor”, people’s general response to Mojahedin’s call for mass uprising, not only disproves to be productive for the organization but also turns to be utilized as a deterring force against Mojahedin. That is to say, the “social factor” turns to be an element of hindering and controlling Mojahedin. Bothe Rajavi and Nyabati say the same words; rajavi says that suppression of Mojahedin by the regime hampered the downfall while Nyabati believes that it was people who thwarted Mojahedin’s supposed threat:

From mid-August 1981 Mojahedin initiated armed rallies to provoke people into the arena. The rallies reaching their climax on 27 September 1981 [Rajavi’s ordered armed march in Tehran to provoke people join Mojahedin to initiate an armed uprising], the “social factor” provides a negative response. [3]

He assumes that even long before, Mojahedin had lost their hope in the utility of the so called “resistance cells”, Mojahedin combatants active inside Iran, and Mojahedin’s strategic tactic had proved to be nothing but a great failure:

The strategic blow on 8 February 1982 [killing of 20 members of Mojahedin including Musa Khyabani, MKO’ commander inside Iran after Rajavi’s escape to France, and Ashraf Rabiee, Rajavi’s first wife] was an end to the accuracy of the urban guerilla warfare. [4]

But it was not the last blow and another crushing blow over the body of Mojahedin in nearly 6 month later absolutely disappointed them coming to believe that they could neither relay on the “resistance cells” nor on the positive response and presence of the masses:

The blow on the first August 1982 [annihilation of another Mojahedin-run team-house, under the command of Syavash Seifi, and a number of other combatants by Iranian security forces] caused urban guerilla warfare that had faced a dead-end on 8 February 1982, reach its climax. [5]

To find a way out of this strategic cul-de-sac, Rajavi eagerly accented to meet Tariq Aziz on 9 January 1983; it was a reaction against people’s retreat from Mojahedin’s violent tactic and gave Mojahedin an opportunity to prepare the background to conduct a struggle from abroad and from a foreign soil and expand it into a global concern. Although Rajavi referred to the meeting as a joint effort to find a solution for a cease-fire between Iran and Iraq to end the devastating war, but it was a de facto recognition of each other’s interests in case of forming a joint alliance:

The Iraqi government was ready to provide Mojahedin with so convenient a facility (Iraqi soil), for the simple cause that Iraq needed to open a new potential front to crush its enemy’s war machine. [6]

However, the meeting had a decisive effect on the National Council of Resistance and its members; a gradual detachment of the old members, each credited as weighty veterans, from the NCRI could speed up depreciating legitimacy of an assumed alternative.

The later consequence of the event was Mojahedin’s ideological transition that aimed at certain ends and could tip the scale in Mojahedin’s favor. The meeting convinced the NCRI’s members that Rajavi was utilizing them as instruments to obtain further legitimacy. Many separated members of MKO and NCRI attributed Rajavi’s ideological revolution to an outcome his negotiation with Tariq Aziz to contrive move into Iraq. Talking of the link between the ideological revolution and move to Iraq, Khan Baba Tehrani, a separated left member of NCRI, states

The ideological revolution was a maneuver masterminded by Rajavi in order to restructure the organization, purge the dissidents, and recruit anew. It was the point where the forces like us had to separate. Because the ideological revolution was a ploy to prepare for the organization and Rajavi’s move to Iraq, to be dependent on Iraq, and play a role in a war that was initiated after Iraq’s aggression against Iran and we saw that the organization fought beside Iraq against Iran. The move to Iraq was the outcome of Mojahedin’s failure in their armed strategy and Rajavi’s jugglery framed as the ideological revolution to arrive a new phase of the revolution worked in no way but transition of the organization into a pseudo-religious closed sect. there are a great number of these religious sect around the world. [7]

Never has Rajavi disclosed the contents of his meeting. To escape further allegations and making excuses, he called it an accidental occurrence. The coming events and incidents proved, however, that what they exchanged in their meeting was much more strategic and fateful than expected. Even the most pessimistic critics could have never anticipated the outcome we broadly witness today. At least we can discern a message that MKO at the present neither relays on people nor on the residue of its potentialities but on a surfing strategy to survive on.

Notes

[1]. Nyabati Bijan; “A distinct look at Mojahedin’s internal revolution, slightly from inside, slightly from outside”, pp.13-14.

[2]. Ibid.

[3]. Ibid.

[4]. Ibid.

[5]. Ibid, 15.

[6]. Ibid, 62.

[7]. An internal look at the left move in Iran; Hamid Shokat’s interview with Khan Baba Tehrani.

 

Mojahedin.ws – Bahar Irani – September 12, 2006

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The MEK; Baath Party Accomplice

Chemical Ali Ordered MKO to Kill Kurds

In an article in PUK-backed newspaper "Al-Ettehad", Shahab Al-Ghare Losi published documents on Chemical Ali and pointed to the role of MKO in massacring Iraqi Kurds.

Shahab Al-Ghare Losi writes:

"Ten audio tapes have been obtained from the house of Ali Hassan Al-Majid- known as Chemical Ali- on the operation of Anfal against Kurds and also on the suppression of 1991’s uprising. These tapes are about the meetings of Chemical Ali on the issue of Kurdistan."

In one of the tapes, dated April 15, 1988, Chemical Ali says:

"None of the villages should remain in this region until the next summer. We should transfer the people to townships and camps and control them. Their transfer from the villages to the North of Iraq is inevitable. From now on, I cut their water, electricity, oil, sugar, flour. Why should we let them live like donkeys and understand nothing? For their wheat? Well, I don’t want their wheat. We have been importing the wheat since 20 years ago and we can do it for more 5 years."

In the meeting, Chemical Ali stresses the need for evacuation of villages and says: "their homes should be destroyed completely. The people should be taken to labor camps and no one of them should be allowed to return."

In another meeting with the officials of sovereign provinces (as written on the tapes) on March 26, 1988, Chemical Ali emphasizes that Kurds should be forced to immigrate. He questions the ability of the army and Baath officials for doing this and brings their attention to the possible forces the army can take advantage of. "After all these years, why are the saboteurs still at large? They are looking at the way we function. Our orders and functions are not powerful enough".

He also says: "Jalal Talabani asked me to open a dialog channel with him. That night, I went to Suleimanieh and targeted them with special weapons." By special weapons, he meant "chemical weapons". He adds: "I won’t talk with Talabani and won’t stop the forced immigration plan unless the war has ended with Iran and Iranian troops have left the regions they captured. When the plan ends, we will start a large scale war against them and will try to recapture one-third of the lands. We will surround them in the valleys and then target them with chemical weapons. This chemical attack will last for 15 days. I don’t name these chemical weapons because it’s banned but I declare that we will defeat them with these new destructive weapons. We will follow them up to Iranian borders and then we will order the MKO to attack them there."

AlIttihad – IranDidban translation –  2006/09/02

http://www.alitthad.com/paper.php?name=News&file=article&sid=18831

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The MEK; Baath Party Accomplice

Saddam’s Trial and Evidences on His Accomplices

The new round of Saddam’s trial on charges of killing thousands of Iraqi Kurds in a series of events under the code name of Anfal has already started. It is the second file of Saddam’s atrocities against the innocent Iraqi people. His previous file accused him and a number of his regime’s official of slaughtering about 148 Shiits of Dejil in 1982. The second file accuses Saddam and other defendants of destroying hundreds of Kurd-residing villages and killing the inhabitants using mass destruction chemical weapons.

A rereading of Saddam’s crimes against the Iraqi Kurds will reveals facts on Mojahedin Khalq (MKO) whose hands are dabbled with the blood of the Kurds. As mercenaries of Saddam, in cases they have referred to their role in these crimes and have tried to make justifications over them. The coalition forces that attacked Iraq to end, as they state, Saddam’s rule of tyranny and free the nation have to be faithful in their claims and let the truth on Saddam’s crimes and Iraqi Baath Party be exposed.

The US state Department is now facing a paradoxical state because in 1994 it published, required by the Congress, a documentary report of the group’s terrorist evidences. The report contained minute details on the group’s terrorist activities and its share in Saddam’s brutal repression of the Kurdish rebellion that consolidated its position and other aliases in the State Department’s list of terrorist groups in 1997. The unassailable facts in the report corroborate reciprocal dealings between MKO and Saddam. In a part we read:

In return for weapons and the use of approximately 232 square miles of Iraqi territory, the Mojahedin provide Iraq with political support. Disregarding the casualties inflicted upon Iran after Saddam’s 1980 invasion and overlooking his 1990 assault of Kuwait, the Mojahedin remain staunch supporters of Saddam Hussein. *

Quoting the Iraqi media revealing facts on Saddam-Rajavi contact, it states:

Government-controlled Iraqi media accounts of recent Saddam-Rajavi contacts provide further insights into the MKO’s current relationship with Baghdad. Meeting between the two are announced to buttress Saddam’s isolated position…

In respect to MKO’s assistance in suppression of the Iraqi Kurds and insurgents the report elaborated:

The Iraqi Kurds also claimed the Mojahedin had assisted the Iraqi army in its suppression of the Kurds, a claim-substantiated by refugees who fled near the Iranian border. The leader of the patriotic Union of Kurdistan of Iraq, Jalal Talabani, told reporters that "5,000 Iranian Mojahedin joined Saddam’s forces in the battle for Kirkuk”.

Quoting a Wall Street Journal report, the report exposes more information on Mojahedin’s Liberation Army wholly equipped and financed by Saddam:

A recent Wall Street Journal report stated that the NLA’s "only major offensive in the past six years came in 1991, just after the Gulf War, when Saddam Hussein ordered Mr. Rajavi to help quell a Kurdish revolt in northern Iraq, participants in that operation say."

Rajavi’s insolent collaboration in slaughtering the Kurds evolved as a cause for many members to separate from the organization:

A former MKO member who was in Iraq said his trouble with the Mojahedin leadership, began when he questioned the MKO’s operation against the Kurds.

Too sure of Mojahedin’s terrorist nature, the report makes it clear that no other state in the world could support such a terrorist entity unless it advocated violence and terror. The presence of the group in Iraq well defined the true nature of the Iraqi regime:

It is no coincidence that the only government in the world that supports the Mojahedin politically and financially is the totalitarian regime of Saddam Hussein.

No doubt, so close joint cooperation between Saddam and terrorist Mojahedin has never been alluded to by the coalition forces after Saddam’s fall. It has to be noted that all these allegations is attributed to Mojahedin by no other country but the US State Department. The organization has also implicitly accepted the allegations for it took not more than one year to publish a 384-page book entitled Democracy Betrayed as a response to the US State Department’s report.

In spite of many controversies among the Congressmen, the State Department, and other politicians about the group’s future, one fact should never be overlooked; Saddam committed crimes against the Kurds with the connivance of Mojahedin. Now Saddam’s second round of trial is a good opportunity for the US to prove the degree of its sincerity in recognizing MKO sharing crimes with Saddam. A restudy of the State Department’s report as a reliable evidence at the present will shed light on other accomplices who have the blood of the massacred Kurds on their hands.

 

*. All quotes are excerpts from the US State Department’s report on The People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran; Library of Congress, Doc. call no.: M-U 42953-1 no.92-824F.

Mojahedin.ws – Omid Pouya – August 28, 2006

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The MEK; Baath Party Accomplice

MEK applied for logistical equipments and facilities and Oil

Translated version of the document

No. 408/2/2/2/140      

 Date. 3/27/1997      

                                                 

 Republic of Iraq

President of Republic

Intelligent Service (Mukhabirat)

 

Presidential Office

Subject: Mujahedin-e-Khalq Organization

On 1997/3/2 a meeting was held with Masud Rajavi the chief of National Council of Resistance of Iran, on his own request. He described the situation of the organization and National Liberation Army on the scene. Below, the protocol and important items presented in the meeting are provided:

1- political aspect

    A) Mr. Masud Rajavi requested to meet president.

    B) Explaining political condition of Iran and asking about the dimension of progress of relations with Iranian regime.

2- Military progress

   A) Request to meet Defense Minister in order to negotiate on the issue of NLA and acceleration of providing the equipments on which the two sides have agreed, especially training equipments and repair of telecommunication systems, the return of weapons that Defense Ministry have seized in 1990. In case of any problem NLA could be given rebuilded and repaired tanks which are useful to get armed.

   B) Request for training the air force of the organization, allocation of a piece of land to them and providing basic equipments for the money they owned in order to extend their buildings reinforcing the protection of their headquarter.

3- Publicity Aspect

    Request for a meeting with Culture and Publicity Minister in order to discuss the issue of special satellite and antenna to broadcast radio programs and increasing the time for T.V program from half an hour to one hour, providing two reporters in order to manage the program.

4- Financial Situation

   Describing the problems facing the organization financially, they suggest the allocation of 50,000 its 100,000 tones crude oil gratuitously in order to export through merchants and the import of Iranian carpet through their supporters in Iran.

5- Special Operation

    The organization declares its preparation to arrange any especial operation against security and military aims in frontier provinces of Iran.

6- Headquarters of the Organization

    Considering the phone contact by the manager of presidential office about the location of their current headquarter, through which he suggested a new headquarter  since the current one is placed in Andelis region of Baqdad, a business area, which is difficult to be protected perfectly, They express that their transfer from this headquarter to another one is considered as military attitude, which is a heavy and great stroke for the organization. The issue endangers their credit and honor .they express that they are ready to pay any expense except leaving this headquarter.

     

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The MEK; Baath Party Accomplice

Expulsion of Terrorist MKO, an Honor for Iraq

Mr. Nuri Al-Maliki, the prime minister of Iraq, announced that he will soon order the expulsion of MKO members from Iraq.

This organization has nearly 4000 members, based in Camp Ashraf north of Baghdad. A group of MKO leaders left Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein and some others returned to Iran following the issue of public pardon for them. Those who couldn’t go to Iran or Europe have remained in this camp, banned from entering the US or a European country because the group has been on terror list for years and everyone knows the members of the group as "terrorists".

After the fall of Saddam and during past 3 years, Iraqi governments were formed and all pushed coalition forces to expel this group from Iraq because they believe that the presence of these people in Iraq causes the anger of Iraqis. This organization was involved and played a murderous role in suppressing the uprising of Sha’baniah in the south and Kurds uprising in the north. Moreover, new Iraqi government believes that the MKO has close ties with the secret services of the former regime; in this regard, Iraqi officials have presented undeniable documents to coalition forces. Saddam’s secret service (Estekhbarat) used this group as a mercenary force to interfere in Iran’s internal affairs and launched terrorist attacks inside and outside Iran against the interests of this country.

Government has informed the coalition forces that the presence of this organization in Iraq has negative impact on the relations of Iran-Iraq and that "it’s hard to ask Iran to establish broader political-security cooperation with Iran while Iraq hosts the terrorist group of MKO. This terrorist group is still conducting terrorist activities and, by its radio and TV programs, tires to present an unreal image of Iran. However, during past 3 years and after the fall of Saddam, none of Iraqi officials have responded positively to the requests of this terrorist group for staying in Iraq. They all emphasize that its presence in Iraq has a negative effect on two side’s relations.

This organization had an active role in killing Kurds and destroying Kurdistan and some central and southern provinces during 90s and lawyers believe that the leaders and commanders of this terrorist group should be tried in Iraqi courts for the crimes they have committed against Iraqis.

Announcing the decision to expel these terrorist from Iraq, by the Iraqi PM, is turning point in securing stability in Iraq because giving shelter to the groups that have killed the children of this country, those who have destroyed the cities and villages of this country, seems illogical. It’s illogical to ask our neighbors to help us and be good neighbors while we provide shelter for the elements of a terrorist organization that’s plotting against them.

Perhaps one of the main concerns of Iraqi security officials is that the members of this group have formed a joint militia with some Baathist to kill Iraqi citizens and destroy the infrastructure of Iraq. It’s really surprising that Iraqi governments, before that of Mr. Maliki, didn’t expel this group from Iraq.

Some reports indicate that since the fall of Saddam, MKO has been giving secret information to Baathist forces to be used in order to assassinate Iraqi leaders.

Some of officials, from security services, report of MKO’s involvement in terrorist operations, the examples of which are the invasion on "Abu Hanifa Al-Naaman Mosque" in Azamiah district as well as raid on "Al-Sadeq mosque" in "Aur" district a few months ago; these operations were conducted in order to create religious and ethnic differences. During the raid on Abu Hanifa mosque, a number of these terrorist were arrested by the guards of the mosque and when identified as the members of MKO they were handed over to coalition forces before being released by them.

Since the MKO has been (before the fall of Saddam) and still is a threat for Iraqis and its presence in Iraq is interpreted as interfering in the internal affairs of neighboring countries, we believe that the decision of Prime Minister al-Maliki is exactly what Iraqis want and that, this decision before benefiting neighbors is beneficial for Iraq and Iraqis.

Ali Hussein Ali/Sotal Iraq

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Duplicity of the MEK nature

Saddam Devotees Hail Community of Strategy with Iraqis

It is common in political sphere for two political currents to concur in a community of strategy when they have mutual political axes to grind. The alliance does not necessarily mean that they have to reconcile with each other’s different ideologies. Years before the Islamic revolution, for instance, Mojahedin Khalq Organization (MKO) and People’s Fedayan Militia, two ideologically different campaigning anti-monarchical movements, formed an alliance against Shah’s regime and the US imperialism.

Iraqi people in general, regardless of being Kurds, Shiite and Sunni, advocated a community of strategy in their struggle to topple Saddam’s regime. Even the pro-Saddam factions in creating post-Saddam disorders moved on a line of consensus strategy.

With these preliminaries in mind, it was shocking to hear Dowlat Nowrouzi, the MKO’s representative in UK, saying “Mojahedin-e Khalq have a community of strategy with Iraqi people”. Before going any further, it should be noted that MKO have developed a comprehension of the magic role the numbers and statistics play in today’s political world and the adopted Western policies according to these figures. As a result, MKO have developed a talent of digging statistics out of any performed tasks. The significance lays in the fact that rarely the tally of these figures, being multiplied by a favored coefficient, are reliable as authentic. That is to say, the promulgated figures are too much exaggerated to be accepted.

MKO has been on this path from the beginning. Once, soon after the Islamic revolution, they announced that more than 150,000 rallied in Amjadieh soccer stadium in Tehran. The stadium in full capacity, according to mathematical evaluations, could entertain a crowd of not exceeding 30,000. Later, on the anniversary of the 20 June event, MKO’ TV reported a rally of 200,000 in the same place. Even on the 20 June 1981, the day MKO organized a protesting rally in different Iranian cities, MKO announced a swarm of 500,000 sympathizers in Tehran’s streets never thinking of the destructive potentialities of such a crowd if they really existed; demonstrators were easily dispersed and the irritated MKO announced armed struggle against the Islamic Republic.

Last year, MKO reported the declaration of 2,800,000 Iraqi people issued in support of MKO. This year, the number has increased to 5,200,000. Regardless of the authenticity of so big a figure, the Iraqi supporters of MKO are nearly multiplied, that is to say, a nearly 100 percent increase. More above that, according to reports broadcasted on 8 July by the group’s TV, as any single vote of this big figure represents an Iraqi family of five, consequently, it can be multiplied by 5 to reach a total figure of 26,000,000 supporters.

On 20 June, MKO reported that 300,000 French citizens had urged support for Maryam Rajavi. Then, they concluded that as any single vote of these French citizens represented a French family of three, so the number of supporters reached a total 900,000.

At the present, MKO claims the Islamic Republic has so far executed 120,000 members of the group. The number of the executed in 1987, the year they settled in Iraq, did not exceeded 20,000. It is not amazing to see the number jumping to such an extent because the “martyrs” have gone through the coefficient system of the organization. In another instance, Ebrahim Khodabandeh, a high-ranking separated member, admitted that once in a meeting of the European parliamentarians he had claimed, as was dictated by the organization, that about 300,000 political prisoners were under regular and daily torture in Iranian prisons. As he said, he never thought of a simple fact that if any of these prisoners were to be tortured by nothing more than a quick slap, what a great number of guards and torturers had to be provided! There are more and more examples of these kinds.

Accordingly, depending on case and place, they make the most of the words rather than the numbers. Seemingly suffering hypomnesis to remember what they have stated or done earlier, or maybe they think people are inattentive and unmindful, MKO expatiate on something they had controverted before. An organization commonly known to have formed a close alliance with Saddam, leaps forward to proclaim they “have a community of strategy with Iraqi people”. The words indicate that they have been in the same front along with Iraqi people in their struggle against the ousted dictator! That they too were victimized and oppressed under the tyranny of Saddam and the Baathists! That they are naturally democratic and advocates of freedom!

If uncertain about anything of Mojahedin’s past, the world vows that MKO was the most enthusiastic, strategic alliance of Saddam. The evidence? They were given land to establish a “city” of their own. With Saddam’s donated dollars in their pockets, armed with Iraqi weapons, and trained under Iraqi officers they recurrently violated Iranian borders at a time when Iranian were busy dealing with Saddam’s assault. Any body in doubt? They were the most trustworthy forces cooperating with the terrible Iraqi intelligence system. They had the permission to freely move around Iraq carrying arms. They gladly accepted the mission to have a key role in suppressing the insurgent Iraqi Kurds. They put their unsatisfied insiders in the same gruesome, terrific cells of the notorious Abu-Ghorib prison where the dissidents of Saddam’s regime had been consigned to oblivion. A look at videotaped secret meetings of Saddam’s high-ranking officers with MKO’s heads seems to suffice.

To “have a community of strategy with Iraqi people”, Mojahedin have to prove they have been their brothers in hardship. They proved it, not for people, but for Saddam. They were ready to sacrifice their life for Saddam. Once Maryam Rajavi announced that all girls and women under her command were ready to fight shoulder to shoulder with Iraqi forces to die for the great leader Saddam Hussein as she did.* Of course, no body can blame them for what they fail to remember!

To achieve their objectives, Mojahedin never care whose body they crush under their feet. The advocates of Machiavellianism deny the relevance of morality in political approaches and strictly hold that collusion, treachery and deceit are justified in pursuing and maintaining political objectives. They needed and need to survive. Once they colluded with Saddam and today they move on a treacherous line to deceit Iraqi people. The fact is that they have no community of strategy with anyone.

*. Daily Mail, England, August 17, 1990.

Omid Pouya, July 10, 2006

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The MEK; Baath Party Accomplice

A Ba’ath Party Replica

Mojahedin Khalq Organization (MKO) left France to settle in Iraq with the aim to utilize Saddam and Baath Party’s potentialities to form an alliance against Iran. Saddam, too, had the same idea in mind and could venture on MKO in its war with Iran. The close strategic, political collaboration furthered a brotherhood between Saddam and Rajavi; it may explain why MKO yet avoid taking any clear position against Saddam and his crimes. As a proof of their loyalty, MKO sided with Saddam in suppression of Iraqi insurgents in 1991. They had to because, as Rajavi made it clear in his meeting with Iraqi generals, they moved on the same line of interest with Saddam:

As far as we are concerned I have only one thing to say. In my mind and in my heart, I cannot separate the account of our interests from your interests. They are exactly matching each other. [1]

In the same meeting, General Saber, the Head of Saddam’s Intelligence Services, appreciated MKO’ worthwhile assistance the same as brothers’:

We feel ashamed in front of your speech. And in front of your leadership and your organisation,and you and your army and your fighters and your political stands. Exactly in a situation that a common danger was threatening us and this common danger has put us in the same line of defence. We have an Arabic proverb that says: Brothers show themselves in hardship. You supported us with the bodies of your fighters. [2]

General Saber unequivocally points to MKO’s hand in glove with Iraqi forces’ crackdown on insurgent Iraqis:

Also many thanks to the brothers in the National Liberation Army and their big role in the process of the past uprisings and revolts… The other issue is that during these uprisings that we faced and what we fought against together and defeated… and that was the second phase of the attack and the programs and the plans and plots in this respect. [3]

Regardless of all these corroborated evidences on MKO and Saddm’s close collaboration to secure mutual interests, what really augmented the alliance were the shared political, organizational, and ideological tenets projecting in both MKO and Iraqi Baath Party. The first remarkable and dominant feature in both is the leadership hegemony. Both Saddam and Rajavi were the predominant influence atop occupying a permanent leading seat. Far above a leadership position, they both besought a highly acclaimed position with the potentialities far above those of earthly men and were indulged in practice of discrimination against people and insiders on the grounds of the Party and group’s ideological priority.

Iraq’s political-social state structure, under Baath Party’s hegemony, heavily influenced by Stalinist Parties, was running under Sadam’s hegemony. The bloody internal clearance, the commonly practiced method in Stalinist Parties, emboldened Saddam as the authoritative state power in perpetrating covert group slaughters and blood bathes. It was also so celebrated an idea in MKO with the exception that the authority was limited in the framework of an organization perpetrating atrocities against the insiders and staging violent and terrorist acts against the outsiders. Of course, it projected a future Iran should it succeed to power. In fact, MKO in Iraq were practically testing an ideology they were to administer once in power. Bijan Nyabati, a MKO left element, believes:

MKO’s strategy being stabilized in Iraq, they got the opportunity to test their revolutionary theory in the laboratory of their self-controlled community far from the outside influential magnetic field of ruling systems. [4]

In other words, the Iraqi soil, because of Saddam’s totalitarian and hegemonic control over all aspects of Iraqi people, served to form a microcosm of future Iran:

The formed microcosm had to contain all the political features of a real society. A legal state with a president atop, a parliament in exile, army and police forces, judiciary and prison, a state-run TV-radio station as well as media and news agency, diplomatic bodies, extensive financial institutions and logistics to feed was all the component elements of the microcosm. [5]

There are more fundamental elements shared by MKO and Baath Party. Both justify their hegemonic leadership to survive. The difference lies in geographical and political conditions. The Baath Party and Saddam justify their existence and leading potentialities according to blood and tribal relations. Above that, in a broader extent of advocating nationalism, they chanted slogans of creating a Great Iraq to further the authoritative hegemony. That is in this way that the party mesmerized peoples and exploited peoples’ soul and body to serve its interests; there immerged Saddam Devotees Squads who are ready for suicidal operations on the master’s order.

Somehow the devotedness may seem to be a result of apprehension of punishment for disobedience. Saddam’s inter-Party executions are more disobedience punishments rather than having political and national causes. In MKO, first it is the ideology and then patriotism that serve recruit sympathizers to preserve the organization. The ideology in MKO does the same influential factor of blood and tribal relations in Baath Party. That is the ideology that compels devotees to commit self-destruction operations as ordered. The same as Baath Party, MKO insiders are under the illusion of being led by a heavenly blessed guide. The similarity between MKO and Baath Party is emphasized by Rajavi addressing General Saber in this way:

I think that the relations between us and you and Iraq, being the government of Iraq or the Baath Party and at the top of it Mr President [Saddam], and on the other side, the Iranian Resistance and the Mojahedin and the National Liberation, is not a purely political relation and one cannot interpret our relations like that any more. I think that the brotherhood relation has been completed. Such brothers that would not come short of anything for each other…. And that was how our fates were tied together. Our fates have become one and our bloods have been mixed together. And you know that there is no exaggeration in this. [6]

Thus, whatever threatens the Baath Party might be a threat to MKO as well, that is to say, any democratic and freedom movement could sounded the alarm. That is a fact Rajavi admitted:

Whatever is against you, it is obviously against us, and visa versa. Our security is one. When we receive a blow, it is to both of us. And when there is progress, it affects us both. [7]

Moreover, the alliance between MKO and Baath’s Party before being a pragmatic and tactical one was based on cult-like similarities. Both attempted to develop a community that evolved the ideological tendencies of the party and the cult. The core of all these ideological teachings was expansion of an absolute totalitarian influence on society and insiders under a hegemonic leadership. Elaborating on the importance of these ideological teachings Nyabaty states:

The final solution to the issue of leadership that could put an end to a problem known to be the Achilles’ heel in most contemporary revolutions and movements was only evolution of a stabilized theory of imamate inside the organization that could lead the new revolution. [8]

The mere difference between the two was that MKO had succeeded to assume a classified order of these ideological teachings, a task that Saddam failed to accomplish because of tribal and historical infrastructures. In practice, however, the Baath Party was moving in the same line with MKO.

 

Notes

 

[1]. “To be Judged in History”; English Transcript of Videotaped Meetings Between Massoud Rajavi and the Head of Saddam’s Intelligence Services, Iran-interlinl.com.

[2]. ibid.

[3]. ibid.

[4]. Nyabati Bijan; “A distinct look at Mojahedin’s internal revolution, slightly from inside, slightly from outside”,109.

[5]. ibid.

[6]. “To be Judged in History”; English Transcript of Videotaped Meetings Between Massoud Rajavi and the Head of Saddam’s Intelligence Services, Iran-interlinl.com.

[7]. ibid.

[8]. Nyabati Bijan; “A distinct look at Mojahedin’s internal revolution, slightly from inside, slightly from outside”, 90.

 

By Omid Pouya, –  Mojahedin.ws, July 5, 2006

 

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Mujahedin Khalq 's Terrorism

MKO and Massacre of Kurd and Turkmen Iraqis

In our region, most of those who celebrated the liberation of Kefri city (from Baathists’ occupation) on March 11, 1991, were our Turkmen neighbors. I can remember well that Peshmerg forces were welcomed by the citizens and everyone was happy. People shouted "down with dictatorship" and didn’t know how to express their happiness. Unfortunately, this happiness didn’t last long in Kefri because the mercenaries of the MKO, backed by the bombardment by Baathists, entered the city and suppressed the happiness of people.

The city resisted against the MKO mercenaries for a long time and many achieved martyrdom but finally these mercenaries and the forces of Saddam occupied the city and Kurd and Turkmen citizens started moving toward the borders of Iran; the army of Saddam started plundering the properties of people and set fire on the library…

Shilan Talibani

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The MEK; Baath Party Accomplice

Fifth Column

MKO started serving as the fifth column for Saddam Hussein when it was in urgent need for weapons, equipments and money.

Rajavi, the head of MKO, said to Saddam that "we were first in war fronts and fought against you"; however inside the organization he put it this way: "While in war fronts, Mojahedin had a particular goal and since they knew that regime will not give any share to them, Mojahedin were self-containing" (he means that they were gathering weapons and making intelligence contact with Saddam to insurance the future).

This was the first time the MKO felt it needed the support of a foreign country to continue armed strategy; when the MKO experienced the good taste of free weapons and financial support accepted it as a rational strategy.

Regarding the acceptance of being mercenary and unreal justifications given for it, Mojahedin crossed the red lines and there were no longer any obstacles; therefore, the MKO’s leadership entered a project as follows:

 

– several sophisticated MKO units were trained by Iraq’s Estekhbarat (former secret service) and were deployed to Iran; they gave intelligence to Iraq’s artillery and air force. A number of such units were identified and destroyed, including:

a. In Kermanshah, MKO spies had given information on a shelter in Park-e Shirin to Iraqis and had corrected their information while Iraqis bombed the area. This led to the killing of many innocent people. People identified MKO spies and arrested them.

b. In Ilam province, Rajavi’s spies gave information on a radio transmitter to Iraqi air force. They were arrested.

c. Some units of MKO were taking films from Iran war fronts to send for Iraqis. They were arrested at the scene and admitted to their purpose.

d. Mojahedin members established contacts with tribal people living across the border and used their livestock to send intelligence to Iraqi army. In this regard, a number of their teams were identified and arrested in Dehloran, Dasht-e Abbas and South.

e. Several MKO teams working in Dehloran, Saleh Abad, and Kurdistan borders under the supervision of Iraqi intelligence service captured military personnel and even civilians; in most of the cases, they killed the people and asked for money.

f. Mojahedin had fixed stations beside Iraqi headquarters and a team of intelligence officers of MKO were interrogating Iranian prisoners. In this regard, many of MKO members who had criticized the MKO for this issue were later tried by MKO leaders.

theblackfile.com

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