Omid Pouya

UK deproscription offers lifeline to cult victims

The Consequence of the Terrorist Tag Removed

Regardless of MKO’s hysteric propaganda reactions following the UK Court of Appeal’s ruling to remove its terrorist tag, the issue can be viewed from a different angle. Some opponents may condemn the move by the UK while advocates appraise it praiseworthy but there is a third view as well. It has to be pointed out that nothing changes MKO’s natural inclination towards terrorism; still it is of significance that what might be the consequences of the move by the UK and its impacts on the structure of the organization and the captivated members in Camp Ashraf.

Against all baseless claims made by the organization, there exist obstacles that deter the process of transferring the detached members of Camp Ashraf to other countries or deprive them of benefiting asylum-seeking rights. Many countries, including the UK, disallow the entry of these members on the grounds of terrorism and especially because of the terrorist tag the organization carries. Removal of the group from the UK terrorist list at least implies that these members will face no more obstacles in future to cross the borders of this country. Furthermore, the British advocates of the organization claim to be the most enthusiastic supporters of it for humanitarian causes; the words are so promising for the members now facing an uncertain destiny.

In other words, the terrorist tag the group considers to have discouraged the struggle is now benefiting dissatisfied members if removed since all limitations they would face when seeking asylum are eliminated. The removal of the terror tag is one of those supposed solutions that, as once said, can decide the destiny of the Camp Ashraf residents and grant them the opportunity of leaving the organization on free-will and start a new life in whatever country they desire. They will be no wanderers in Iraqi soil if they leave Camp Ashraf because the main problem following the release from the bonds of the high walls is falling into the pit of eternal wandering which is even worse than their earlier condition.

In the past MKO has done its best to deprive the dissident members taking advantage of the given opportunities. In many cases the organization has utilized legal levers to impede the process of these members’ asylum-seeking in Western countries and in England in particular. Incredible as it may seem, once MKO claimed that Iranian refugees in Western countries held any recognition of legitimacy because of MKO and that, no country would grant them asylum if it was not for the group. And some came to surrender to MKO and submitted to be at its service far from home since they thought they had no other choice if they preferred living in exile to expulsion.

After the relocation of its HQ from France to Iraq, MKO kept on with the tactic but in more aggressive and harsh manner. Now, no dissident was allowed to leave the organization unless he dared to experience the horrible Abu-Ghuraib prison for a few years; hardly anybody could leave the notorious prison alive or preserving a healthy body to live on. Anybody who announced separation from the organization had to face the consequences of his decision personally, that is to say, he had to face allegations of illegal entry into Iraqi territories because he was no more under the protection of the organization that was granted a legal stay in Iraq. However, the evidences indicate that MKO has the potentiality of erecting a variety of obstacles, being familiar with the gaps in laws and security measures, in the way of its dissident members to be granted a place of safety in western countries.

Being removed from the terror list of England, and other lists as well, leads the organization, concerning the condition of dissident members, to a self-destruction abyss. MKO insists not to let any dissident and detached member enter the UK and will do anything to stop any attempt. Its future reaction depends on the support it will receive from its parliamentarian advocates following its removal from the list and the degree of granted freedom activities. It has to be noted that the ruling will impose heavy costs on the UK government as well. But the truth is that, in spite of all these costs, not MKO but the dissidents are the real winners who will benefit the most.

Omid Pouya, Mogahedin.ws, July 4, 2008

July 7, 2008 0 comment

The Ideology of the MEK

Iranian Opposition and the Tremulous State of the Alternative

The relation of MKO and other opposition groups is one of the main challenges Mojahedin have been faced with from the beginning of their formation. Despite all the efforts made during the last three decades, not only such a problem has not been solved but also the existing crises have been intensified. The main elements leading to the friction can be viewed from different angles. However, it has to be pointed out that the main factor is mental and political structure and ideology of Mojahedin. A brief look at the charter of the National Council of Resistance (NCR) and the borderlines drawn between Mojahedin and other opposition groups may easily get to the bottom of frictions.

The fact is that disregarding all political disagreements and strategic deviations, the ideological orientation of Mojahedin is the major barrier in the way of their interaction, sympathy and cooperation with other oppositions. The hegemonic nature of the organization is another reason that prevents other political allies to have any active cooperation and engage in any criticism of the decision-makings and tactics adopted by the organization. Mojahedin’s intrinsic totalitarian spirit has already resulted in the separation of early allies of NCR. It has to be pointed out that the given reasons by all ex-members of NCR for their separation are the already mentioned totalitarianism and monopolistic feature of Mojahedin in general and Masoud Rajavi in particular rather than political disparities which are known to be a common phenomenon in collective political activities. As such, NCR has suffered a great qualitative and quantitative loss in recent years.

The book The ups and downs of the National Council of Resistance contains numerous statements and testimonies made by former MKO members all clarifying the causes of the failure of council and its splinter. Although Mojahedin continuously try to recruit new members, the prerequisites for joining are so strict that hardly anybody is interested in joining. Such a disinterest was augmented due to anti-nationalistic actions of Mojahedin to the point that opposition groups began to criticize MKO as traitors who have betrayed Iranian people and the national interests.

Beside ideological dogmatism and hegemonic idealism, Mojahedin in two phases acted reprehensibly to the point that led to the withdrawal of NCR’s main alliances. Mojahedin’s collaboration with Saddam, a corrupt invader who attacked Iran dreaming to annex the main Iranian Khuzestan Province, resulted in pushing the organization to isolation with none of other opposition groups daring to play the role of co-conspirator. But even the fall of Saddam failed to convince MKO to take a different strategy and follow a logical way. Being deprived of using the Iraqi soil and its logistics, Mojahedin have resolved to rely on a new version of dependence on foreign levers all around the world. Now the globally proscribed terrorists began to feel worry about the global peace by alleging that Iran’s nuclear projects proliferated nuclear weapons for military causes. The least objective was to intensify the already existing tension between Iran and the West and the U.S. in particular to ignite the fire of a new war in the region. The position taken by other opposition parties concerning the nuclear activities of Iran was a hint to the fact that they were in full disagreement with Mojahedin who once more proved to have made a conspicuous folly acting as mercenaries for the aliens rather than taking the nation’s side.

Mehdi Khanbaba Tehrani, the most radical and left activist and one of the early members of NCR, not only blamed Mojahedin and accused them of being traitors but also stated that in case of any U.S. invasion, he considered it a patriotic duty to defend the integrity of Iranian soil regardless of political differences. Mojahedin’s political campaign mainly rides on escalating tensions between the US and Iran in a hope to encourage military conflict. Nominating itself as the sole resistance force, MKO supposes that its violent policy-making has to be submitted by all other opposition groups. Therefore, it is evident that any opposition group reluctant to surrender to the hegemony of Mojahedin has to acknowledge its political defeat and withdraw from the preferably recommended armed struggle long led by MKO to topple Iranian regime.

When all approaches prove to be unproductive, the last option is armed struggle and none of the detached alliances from MKO can ever find another alternative the same as MKO to join. The fact is that opposition groups cannot adapt themselves to the ideological teachings of Mojahedin. Beside Mojahedin’s anti-nationalist nature, even their pretentious leftist inclination to attract leftist allies is an issue of great hypocrisy. The contradictions are due to deep political and ideological gaps between Mojahedin and other opposition groups and also result from the orientation of Mojahedin toward anti-democratic and cultist relations. Fada’ian-e Khalq guerillas dismiss Mojahedin as a cult that utilizes whatever suppressive measures against opponents:

Regarding democratic freedom, the cult recognizes no other identity and ideology but that of itself. In the narrow world of the cult and its international relations, everything is ready to punish dissidents. It uses prison, torture, hidden executions, and other aggressive actions against its ideological dissenters. Now the twentieth century nearing its end, it is a blemish on humanity.

Mojahedin cannot tolerate Monarchists and republicans as well as leftist opposition that repel them. But they keep at a borderline not to look hostile so they will keep their controlling hegemony if other oppositions succeeded in overthrowing the Iranian regime. In the past two years, the least possibility of forming alliance with other oppositions has sank to zero as Mojahedin’s hostile siding with the US against Iran has soared to a critical point.

Mojajedin’s efforts in making an instrumental use of the U.S. resulted in the separation of all their allies and now they have to undergo an all-out and shameful isolation. The lack of social support on the one hand and their passivity amongst oppositions on the other hand followed by prudence on the part of the U.S. to reconsider invasion to Iran has confronted Mojahedin with ever-increasingly crises. Regarding their present conditions, it is clear that such challenges are to be continued. Now MKO’s claim of being the sole democratic alternative is nothing beyond pointless advertisements listened to only by a trivial number of misled sympathizers.

February 26, 2008 0 comment

MKO and the Aftermath of Recognizing POAC’s Judgment (2)

As stated in the previous article, if MKO insists to recognize the POAC’s judgment and is standing resolute against the renunciation of terrorism as it claims, at least it must revise its previously adopted principles to prove the earnestness in its decision. Notably, a series of the organization’s early pamphlets, designed to provide the basis for its general aspirations and systematic world-outlook, explicitly theorize and advocate the violent strategy of armed struggle. In fact, the cornerstone of its struggle when emerged as an opposition was partly the Machiavellian doctrine of the ‘end justifying the means’.

A specified catalogue of these early booklets and pamphlets that were drafted by a selected ideological team to manifest the organizational ideology and policy are still strongly valued as practicable. The specific series are entitled Takamol (Evolution), Shenakht (Epistemology), Cheguneh Quran biamuzim (How to study the Koran), Rah-e anbiya rah-e bashar (The way of the prophets: the way of humanity) and finally a book entitled An account of the formation and short history of Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization from 1965 to 1975.

Explicitly stated in these works, MKO reveals the reasons for its adopted strategy of armed struggle based on Marxist-Islamic eclecticism. Mojahedin were on the belief that armed struggle was an inevitable consequent of a historical determinism; any intransigent attitude would be equal to that of a reactionary. Although at first it was hard for the Westerners to comprehend what was lying behind Mojahedin’s ideology, but some later made references indicate that they were developing a real understanding of Mojahedin’s ideological infrastructure and methodology. They are well aware of the fact that the merely stated words put no bonds upon Mojahedin that hardly respect obligations whenever an opportunity is grabbed at. As stated in POAC’s ruling, in a draft refusal letter dated September 1, 2006, the Secretary of State clearly declares his doubt on Mojahedin’s renunciation of terrorism:

Mere cessation of terrorist acts do not amount to renunciation of terrorism. Without a clear and publicly available renunciation of terrorism by the PMOI, I am entitled to fear that terrorist activity that has been suspended for pragmatic reasons will be resumed in the future. [1]

The duplicity of Mojahedin is a fact that is also referred to in the US State Department’s report. To expect Mojahedin forswear terrorism for ever is like expecting a leopard change its spots. The group’s abandonment of terrorist acts is temporal and might be retained if circumstances deem them necessary. In paragraph 46 of the POAC’s ruling we read:

However, at the heart of his submission lay the contention that the Secretary of State was entitled to conclude that the PMOI was “otherwise concerned in terrorism” within the meaning of sub-paragraph (d) of Section 3(5) of the 2000 Act because, although it was not actually committing acts of terrorism, it retained a future will to do so. In effect the Secretary of State’s case was that Section 3(5)(d) covers the category of situations such as the present, where the Secretary of State concludes that an organisation that for whatever reason is not actually committing acts of terrorism retains a future will to re-engage in future acts of terrorism if or when future circumstances permit. [2]

The conclusion by the Secretary of State asserts that MKO’s resort to militarism is not the outcome of a deliberate decision but innate in its methodology of struggle, its world-outlook and a dialectical process leading eventually to the establishment of a classless society. As Abrishamchi has point out:

We are not the ones to decide the necessity of an organized or aggressive struggle; we are not the ones to decide where to an organized or unorganized struggle leads us. It is not our mentality to decide the necessity of an armed struggle. [3]

The Organization, formed as a political group with militarist bent, naturally opposes any criticism of strategy and resists urges of modifications in general ideology and uses a variety of labels for the dissidents. They are dim-witted who cannot grasp the necessity of laws ruling over the phenomena:

To make any change in any phenomenon, one has to develop a comprehensive recognition of it. In respect to society and social movement and struggle, the recognition is of great significance because of their complexity. Thus, any change within a phenomenon, society and social movement requires recognition of the laws controlling them. [4]

Relatively, if any change is to happen within MKO concerning disavowal of terrorism, the ideological principles recognizing aggressive conduct has to be removed from its methodology of struggle, otherwise, it is hard to believe that it will be unwavering in its renunciation of terrorism. Armed strategy is the effect of the group’s principal ideological cause and source and its renunciation is totally out of question if the cause remains intact.

The change in principles is a move of such great significance that even Mojahedin themselves cannot ensure to what degree it is feasible and practical. As a testament in POAC’s ruling, the organisation states that it had to exercise extreme prudence before officially publicizing its decision since all those who had up to that point been involved in military operations or assisted the operational units, had to be fully informed of and convinced about the reasons and wisdom of the decision made by the organisation’s leadership. Not in a single occasion has the organization tried to convince the insiders that it intends to actualize the will to stop military and terrorist activities.

[1]. PROSCRIBED ORGANISATIONS APPEAL COMMISSION, Appeal No: PC/02/2006, p. 10.

[2]. ibid, P. 13.

[3]. Mehdi Abrishamchi’s lecture delivered on the ideological revolution for the sympathizers in Norway.

[4]. An account of the formation and short history of Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization from 1965 to 1975 (originally in Persian), p. 17.

Omid Pouya, Mojahedin.ws, January 8, 2008

January 13, 2008 0 comment

Mojahedin Khalq (Rajavi cult) and the Aftermath of Recognizing POAC’s Judgment

Regardless of many contradictions in POAC’s judgment and remaining of MKO on the list of the proscribed organizations, MKO’s insistence to recognize the judgment necessitates its compliance with some rules. Granted that MKO has forsworn terrorism since June 2001, as it has claimed and is stated in the POAC’s judgment, the group has to present proven evidences to justify its claim of renunciation of terrorism. It has to be noted that MKO in its early adopted principles strongly advocated armed warfare as its strategy of struggle and assumed it a prerequisite for volunteers to be recruited in the National Council of Resistance (NCR). In effect, a sincere renunciation of terrorism requires a public announcement and making amendments to its adopted principles.

In spite of the fact that Mehdi Barai’s witness statement explained why it was not possible to make public the decision made in 2001 to put an end to the group’s military action, no barrier seems to be barring the group at the present. The reasons presented for not making the decision public are mere political justifications rather that prima facie evidences. He states, for instance, that the public announcement of the decision to end military operations would result in consequences:

– The decision would have a very considerable impact on the organisation, its members and sympathisers.

– The organisation had to exercise extreme prudence to pre-empt and prevent any political, social, security and organisational fall-out resulting from that decision.

– A premature announcement would have provided the regime with an enormous source of propaganda, not only to boost the morale of its own forces but also to demoralise the Iranian people in general and PMOI sympathisers in particulars.

– It might well have led to undesirable and imprudent reactions from certain units or individuals that risked creating several splinter groups which continued the military activities.

– The Iranian regime could also have capitalised on these potential splits through misinformation campaigns by for example setting up organisations claiming to be the PMOI and have them do and say whatever they want. [1]

Although the group announces its preparedness to exchange information with any concerned legal institution about MKO’s activities in the UK, Iran and Iraq, it is of great significance to announce if it has ever arranged to revise and make changes to its so far practicable organizational principles both within MKO and NCRI. To convince the Western parts, the group also has to certainly make changes to its long history of engagement in terrorism and clean a big bulk of it. How MKO can claim it has forsworn terrorism white in its still practicable charter of NCR, as a prerequisite to recruit members, it says:

It is prerequisite for any recruited member in the council to recognize the charts of the council, the provisional government and its bond duties as well as other made resolutions by the council. [2]

And consequently points to armed warfare as one of recognized paragraphs within the chart of NCR:

Any criticism of MKO’s strategy of widespread armed struggle adopted in military phase that may deny necessity of armed resistance is deemed absolutely illegitimate. [3]

Any silence from the part of MKO that shows it is reluctant to deal with the stated issues indicate that it is in no way sincere in abjuration of terrorism:

The prerequisite paragraph recognizing armed struggle should be officially denied by the NCR.

Other necessary amendments in NCR’s chart should be made.

The NCR’s recruits, if there will be any, should not be forced to submit to the paragraph.

MKO should openly announce that all those members expelled or separated for opposing or criticizing the policy of armed struggle can rejoin MKO or NCR if they will.

Like the early stated causes behind the decision to resort to armed struggle, MKO should justify the taken decision to end terrorism both in political and ideological aspects.

In many instances, MKO has maintained the legitimacy of self-defence in agreement with its strategy of armed warfare. MKO should explain how it can possibly justify two contradictory statements. Does the legitimate defence mean the same previously perpetrated terrorist activities? If true, so it has implicitly consented to have been engaged in terrorism before forswearing it and thus, it has nothing to do with claimed defence.

Finally, criticism of the armed warfare, strategically and theoretically, seems to be an absolutely deemed necessary procedure at the present by MKO.

If MKO is standing resolute against the renunciation of terrorism as it claims, at least a review of its previously adopted resolutions, some of which were mentioned, will imply the earnestness of its decision.

Notes:

[1]. PROSCRIBED ORGANISATIONS APPEAL COMMISSION, Appeal No: PC/02/2006.

[2]. Mehdi Khodai Sefat; Recognition of NCR.

[3]. Bijan Niyabati; A Different Look at the Ideological Revolution within MKO, p. 10.

Omid Pouya, Mojahedin.ws, December 23, 2007

December 25, 2007 0 comment

The MEK Expulsion from Iraq

The US Achilles’ heel in War on Terrorism

The analyses concerning the US-Iran upcoming negotiations in Iraq in an attempt to find solutions to stabilize the country unanimously conclude that expulsion of Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO) from Iraq and a demand to stop the US’s protection of the group will be on the table. The idea conjures at a time when Americans insist to accuse Iran of advocating Iraqi insurgents and escalating disorder in Iraq and believe that a total uproot of terrorism is the decisive solution to end disorder in Iraq. Regardless of Iranians’ rejecting of giving any aid to insurgents, to be optimistic, a decisive decision about MKO in itself helps to restore peace and order to Iraq.

Indeed, the US has to shift its paradoxically dual position in dealing with MKO which has nothing to do with the two sides’ supposed interests. If the US has concluded that Iraq’s problems can partly be solved on condition the terrorism is uprooted, then, before anything, what Americans can best do is to take a clear position in dealing with a terrorist group that occupies a long-existing position on the State Department’s terror list as well as other European countries.

The US protection of MKO at the present implies that the US follows a double-standard policy in confronting terrorism. It is hard to believe that MKO are encompassed within Camp Ashraf and play ineffective role in Iraqi domestic tensions. Although the group’s stay in Iraq is tried to be justified according to international conventions, its approach in position takings against the Iraqi government and provoking the dissident insurgents are in no way a permitted right. The US has to assert that MKO, besides other pressing insurgents, take the best advantage of the persisting disorder in Iraq. Advertising to be political refugees, MKO‘s nearly two-decade past history of residence in Iraq and its close collaboration with Saddam and Ba’ath Party well indicate that it is not a legal demand incorporated in the framework of international conventions.

Nonobservance to drag MKO’s activities in Iraq into the process, including collaboration to suppress insurgencies against Saddam, has emboldened the group to demand rights even far beyond the political asylum. Even more, the US control and protection has further granted MKO a dear opportunity to impede restoration of order to Iraq and to undermine establishment of collective confidence in any negotiation. It does not necessarily mean that MKO is of any weight to influence the regional relations, but indeed it is the US Achilles’ heel in its declared war on terrorism, that is to say, MKO in Iraq symbolize the protected terrorism.

Surrounded by much ambiguous an atmosphere as how to deal with the issue of MKO, the upcoming talks between the US-Iran will decisively resolve a comprehensive agreement on war against terrorism in Iraq specifically and in the region in general. Supposing that Iran never touches the issue of MKO in its talks, no doubt, any decision concerning restoration of tranquility and peace in Iraq will inevitably decides the presence of MKO in Iraq.

May 26, 2004

May 28, 2007 0 comment

Iraq

MKO, the Invisible Occupiers

MKO as well as its critics and its ex-members acknowledge the fact that Camp Ashraf, symbolizing MKO’s ideological capacity, is of a high strategic significance. The insistence of MKO on its stay in Iraq needs more time to be reflected upon. MKO does not submit to departure from Iraq for two main reasons:

1. Any change of location inevitably makes internal relation of the organization to be broken off. It is a fact that MKO can not bear its existing relations anywhere but in the city of Ashraf in Iraq now turned into an ideological and strategic fortress. Any circumstantial replacement on the part of the organization takes a considerable amount of time to establish a second Ashraf. Moreover, the prerequisite of their admission to other countries is the individual asylum of members so the organization can not preserve its cohesion by means of psychological levers anywhere but in Iraq. Camp Ashraf, considered similar to Alamout of Hassan Sabbah Assassins, is indeed a fortress.

2. Another reason is their strategic position on Iraqi soil. Maryam Rajavi has repeatedly drawn the attention of the Americans to the fact that they can take advantage of MKO’s so-called Liberation Army for any move against the Iranian soil is. MKO convince its members residing in Camp Ashraf that their stay in Iraq is the sole possible solution of overthrowing Iranian regime. They insist on saying that such a supposition is unlikely to come true unless they remain in Iraq.

Mojahedin have to make their destiny tied with their stay in Iraq. However, the insistence of Iraqi government to expel MKO for its interference in internal affairs and its link with questionable groups indicates that MKO’s present stay in Iraq is indebted to the Iraq’s instable situation. The comments of Shirvan al-Vaeli, Iraq’s security minister published in ‘Al-Hayat’ newspaper in London indicates that "Initial agreements have been reached between Iraqi government and the US” concerning the situating of MKO in Iraq. He urged once more for the expulsion of MKO from Iraq declaring that some European countries have announced preparedness to accept MKO members. Although MKO transfer from Iraq is costly, it gives members an opportunity to make their mind for their future far from any threat or enticing. The present position of MKO implies that they are not going to exit Iraq under any condition. They have even threatened Iraqi and the U.S. authorities that they would strongly resist against any decision of the kind.

Comments of Iraq’s security minister maintain Iraq’s decision to expel MKO. Now, the confrontation of Iraqi government and MKO has entered a critical phase. It seems that MKO would persistently resist the made decision and reject the facilities provided by the US for their settlement in another country. MKO’s offensive and even threatening position toward the EU and the others is a good example of its indifference to and disobedience of international statements and regulations. Likewise, their current position in Iraq confirms the fact that MKO is not a legally granted asylum in Iraq, rather it is an invisible occupier, disregarding the heavy costs it impose on Iraqi people.

Omid Pouya – Mojahedin.ws – May 13, 2007

May 14, 2007 0 comment

Mujahedin Khalq 's Function

MKO Disparages International Approaches

The UN Human Rights Council decision to discontinue the human rights situation in Iran drew abrupt reaction by MKO and its alias, the National Council of Resistance. It is not the first time that MKO and its aliases take position against the decisions of the Human Rights bodies and attack them in their media propaganda machines. Similarly, two years ago and in reaction to the HRW’s report disclosing human rights violations inside MKO, the group started a propaganda blitz condemning the HRW to be in secret collusion with Iran against MKO. Mojahedin’s outrageous language in recent years to confront any decision contrasting the group’s interests well approves that the insular Mojahedin, in contrast to the blatant claims of pro-democracy, hardly respect ethics in conducts. The NCRI’s statement protesting the decision taken by the UN Human Rights Council is an instance of disregarding the authoritative independency of a high international body in its conclusion. The statement flagrantly condemns the Council being dominated by external influence:

The Iranian Resistance strongly condemns the decision by the U.N. Human Rights Council not to monitor the systematic and flagrant violation of human rights by a regime which is the world’s record holder of execution in Iran. The decision is the disgraceful domination of the Council by the countries which are themselves notorious violators of human rights and it is a catastrophe for human rights.

The reaction in itself a token of MKO’s intolerance, above all challenges the position of a globally active body. To keep silent over such blatant disregard of a legitimate international office and taking offensive position against its decision portents sectarian and terrorist threats against the democratic approaches of the West. Mojahedin’s flagrant offense speaks for the fact that the group tolerates no other thought and idea rather than its own one-sided sectarian mentality. That is to say, Mojahedin believe to be the benchmark of any legitimate and legal global move and decision. Such a dogmatic insight builds Mojahedin’s political and ideological infrastructures within the group itself and its outward internationally higher echelon conducts.

The allegations condemning the international bodies, in this case the UN Human Rights Council, to be under the influence and domination of Iran, thus sacrificing the Iranian people’s primary rights for political demands, is not so insignificant an allegation. Negligence of other international offices to face unorthodox move by MKO above all seriously threatens and questions the prestige and principle validity of the offices themselves and might imply the approval of the allegations. Such allegations posed by an organization blacklisted as a terrorist group by the US, the EU, and many other countries wherein whose activities are banned is an absolutely barefaced violation of international standards.

At least, some explanations by the UN Human Rights Council for the global audience could maintain its repute and stance against the allegations of a terrorist group. It does not necessarily mean to fancy any weight for a terrorist organization but rather safeguarding a universally accredited legacy.

To remain a passive observer of a blacklisted terrorist group’s propaganda blitz would grant it much opportunity to ridicule and disparage all bases of international approaches.

Mojahedin.ws – Omid Pouya – April 3, 2007

April 5, 2007 0 comment

The Ideology of the MEK

An Autopsy of the Ideological Media in Mojahedin Cult (2)

A remarkable complementary task in applying the news as working propaganda instruments is employment of the sponsored or paid newspapers, especially those circulated in Iraq. At the present, a number of Iraqi newspapers are directly and indirectly supported by MKO. The papers publish selected or exclusive news reports which in turn serve as sources of reference for MKO propaganda machine. That is to say, a single piece of news is repeated again and again with the difference that each time it is quoted from a different paper with a deliberate display of the front page. As an evidence of MKO’s trick of reporting news more than once but from different angles, Rassul Mohammadnejad, an ex-member, stated:

I remember the years when I was with Mojahedin in Iraq. One of the issues of my falling-out was why we announced a single move as many and even as hundreds. For instance, we launched a small operation ourselves but we saw that the media coverage of the same operation demonstrated as if many teams at different time ad places had carried out many operations. We knew well that they developed many phases of a single operation as fully accomplished operations to pose as a potential force capable of planning many operations every day.*

This news making method is actually applied in all other programs such as interviews, meetings, and so. We see that a matter and event of significance becomes the subject matter of many programs for the extent of many days and each time presented as if a fresh subject.

At times, the airing of the news projects the group’s strategy. In none of the aired reports concerning the US – Iran dispute over the nuclear file you may end up with a peaceful conclusion. The audiences regularly encounter an escalated tension on the horizon. No promising diplomatic and peaceful solution to the file is ever anticipated and the attempts are made to fan the existing dispute to reach a stalemate where the sole outlet would a military option.

In the case of Saddam’s execution, the reports are prepared so crafty that you come to believe that no body consents his hanging and that the executioners have to be prosecuted. Saddam’s being exonerated of all charges might depict a positive effect on the minds that the group’s past collaboration wit the dictator revolved on an axis of goodwill. Thus, when a dictator can be made into a hero, the terrorists can also be taken as pro-democrats.

Mojahedin are fond of being mentioned in the media for whatever cause, even if they are referred to as mercenaries and spies. Although revelation of Iran’s nuclear programs might be considered as an act of espionage rather than a political campaign, they recurrently and in any occasion advert to be the first to have disclosed the veiled activities.

Of course, many aired and published reports of events from inside Iran are merely distorted and exaggerated news and reports. A commonplace gathering of people before state-run or NGO offices is publicized as a big demonstration of dissidents and advocates of Mojahedin in Iran. The national and traditional events and celebrations, especially when the youths swarm into the streets, are reported as rebellions against the regime. Even in the case of quoting Iranian authorities, parts of speeches and comments are left out and are paraphrased so new subjects are formed to maneuver on.

To learn for yourself, have a look over Mojahedin’s TV programs and publications.

Omid Pouya – February 7, 2007

February 13, 2007 0 comment

The Ideology of the MEK

An Autopsy of the Ideological Media in Mojahedin Cult

The MKO-run media and websites quantitatively rise to a big number which, compared with the group’s insignificant political weight and modest structure, indicate they are means merely utilized to accomplish the cult’s objectives.

Exploited beyond their main purpose, the media are practical instruments to fulfill MKO’s ambitions. Besides their utilization to augment psychological warfare and propaganda blitz, the media are turned into the means of diffusing ideological teachings directly and indirectly. The TV affording many privileges, the psychological impacts and popularity to count, plays the front role for Mojahedin to control the members held in Camp Ashraf and bias them in favor of the ideology and political line of the cult.

Mojahedin’s TV principally addresses two groups of audiences; the first are Ashraf residents whose chief means of receiving information from the outside is through TV. The aired biased programs also work to have a complete control over the members’ psychological conducts and even the entertainment. It would be discussed later.

The second group is the cult’s sympathizers living in the Western countries and who, according to the group’s teachings and orders, have to look upon Mojahedin TV as a source of receiving the information. Such a channeled source for the Western activists of the group well reveals the complicated sect-like infrastructure teachings of the organization that need to be fully analyzed.

The chief infrastructure parameter on which Mojahedin TV operates is the group’s ideology that is infused in all its programs and which is the main factor to delimit the network compared with many other networks. One might identify it with the Bolshevik daily newspaper Pravda during the Communist era of Lenin and Stalin. Even the news broadcasts that have to necessarily follow an impartial line delineate traces of the ideological teachings. Thus, the news are distorted, censored and the tone of the newsmen is ideologically prejudiced.

The slanted news might remarkably slow down the news broadcasting but sometimes it lasts beyond forty minutes, an over-prolonged tempo that actually violates the conventional standards. Sometimes a single report is prolonged by immoderate repetitions, a trick that simply converts a news-report into a propaganda furor. For instance, Maryam Rajavi’s news of visiting a place is first reported according to Mojahedin’s sources and then repeated references to other media are made to create much elongated news. In general, the news broadcasting follows a regular, systematic order complying with the following observations.

1- Distortion: the news are distorted to comply with the objectives of the group. The news of the Judgment of the Court of the First Instance, for example, was misrepresentation of the truth to concur the proceeding propaganda of Mojahedin in its attempts to be de-proscribed.

2- Repetition: a report is recurrently repeated to justify a distortion. From a psychological point of view, the audiences’ defensive power noticeably shrinks and doubts begin to grow inside them.

3- Modification: the big and hot news and reports that might be challenging are modified to seem as merely simple events lacking any significance.

4- Paraphrasing: reports are paraphrased so the minds of the audiences might deduce desired results. The reports are usually left open to further interpretation by the audiences when the main goal is to grow misgivings that are maintained by later complementary reports.

5- Blending: a report is a combination of alternative sources. The nature of the report resembles that of a distinct one, but in fact, it is a composition of adapted parts to form an ideal outcome.

6- Annexing: the previously released reports might be annexed to the latest ones so the actual ones are hardly distinguished.

7- Censor: a newsworthy report is totally disregarded while it might have received widespread media coverage. It happens when the report antagonizes the interests of the group.

8- Silence: The same as in the censor with the difference that later on the group reacts and takes a position, as in the case of Saddam’s execution.

Mojahedin’s TV news broadcasting program plays an influential role in expounding and generalizing the group’s organizational and political policies. In this process, one sees that Iran’s nuclear file transforms into a pretext for the US military leverage against Iran.

Omid Pouya – February 5, 2007

February 8, 2007 0 comment

Ali Reza Jafarzade

Terrorist Comments in Talk with CNN

In a CNN special report on January 15, Alireza Jafarzadeh joined with Lou Dobbs.in a debate on Iran and the US. Jafarzadeh’s comments contained many notable as well as ambiguous points. Regardless of his stress on encouraging and advocating the US military moves in the region, his justification of such moves somehow indicates that he is anticipating promising results out of the expansion of the US militarism. During the talk, Lou Dobbs made interruptions to react against Jafarzadeh’s baseless comments on Iran’s internal situation and its nuclear program. In answer to Lou Dobbs’ question that "How effective, how significant is U.S. military power in the equation of Iran in its thinking?" Jafarzadeh said:

Well, I think there’s a big difference between Iran and Iraq, not only in terms of the size and the population, but the overall strategy, impact, the population in Iran, the very defiant population that you really didn’t have in the case of Iraq.

In fact, Mr. Jafarzadeh’s answer implies that the US main problem in Iraq is that it is confronting people who reject to disapprove Saddam’s ousted regime while the US might be much successful in respect to Iran because the majority of people there are dissatisfied of the ruling regime that is susceptible to fall. His comments not only exculpate Saddam of his crimes and atrocities done against people and signal a green light to his supporters, but also distinguish between the two Ian-Iraq nations referring to the latter as a "defiant population".

Jafarzadeh intends to say that if the US is caught in Iraq that is because it challenged a legitimate regime much supported by people. He might be criticizing the US for not invading Iran prior to Iraq. That is just what Mohammad Mohadessin referred to in one of his Direct Talk programs aired by Mojahedin’s TV network as he enunciated on the UN Security Council’s resolution issued against Iran. Discussing Iraq’s invasion into Kuwait, he stated that for years they had been reiterating that to have a peaceful Middle-East, the solution was to topple the Islamic Republic. Implicitly he stated that Saddam was following the line of a second attack against Iran, when invaded Kuwait, in an attempt to stabilize the disturbed region.

A remarkable point in Jafarzadeh’s interview is his criticism of the US for not investing on Mojahedin as the main democratic alternative. The crisis in Iraq, he believes, is the outcome of a lack of alternative there while Iranian are not deprived of such an alternative. As a solution to end Mojahedin’s stalemate and the US problems, he said:

The third option, which is reaching out to the Iranian people, empowering the Iranian opposition, who are already calling for regime change in Iran. This is the option the United States needs to pursue. And this is something that has not been done.

Jafarzadeh’s comments contained much more interesting points. Out of the three proposed antidote to restore stability in Iraq, that is to say – an increase in the number of troops there, withdrawal of the troops, and confronting Iran – Mr. Jafarzadeh asserts the last one and forewarns Mr. Bush that the crises in Iraq last forever unless the Islamic Republic is dealt with. He seems to have forgotten that the alternative he is referring to has occupied an everlasting status on the list of the US blacklisted terrorists.

Omid Pouya, Mojahedin.ws, January 24, 2007

January 25, 2007 0 comment

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