Batul Soltani

Preparedness for suicide, a prerequisite for MKO operations

An interview with Batool Soltani on MKO self-immolations – a précis of parts 35-36

Sahar Family Foundation: Let’s continue with the suicide operations carried out following the In general, any thought of compromise was a taboo within MKO; there was no alternate but to kill or be killed. inauguration of a new phase, ‘operations of ultimate’, since the organization began a successive launch of operation in this phase mainly stressing on a strike and escape tactic. Please furnish further explanation in this respect.

Batool Soltani: You know, before the beginning of the mentioned phase which began with the end of Iraq-Iran war, in years after 1987 the organization would dispatch its military teams across the Iranian borders, of course supported by Iraqi forces, for hit and run operations. Then it became bold to carry out bigger operations like that of Aftab, Chelcheragh, and Eternal Light as the last. Soon after the ceasefire, the organization began masterminding ‘operations of ultimate’; the best instances of these operations that ceased just before fall of Saddam are assassination of Sayyad Shirazi, Lajevardi, and widespread mortar attacks. Remarkable in these operations was the score of casualties from among the civilians. I remember that the family of the victims filled complains against the organization in international courts and the organization tried to acquit itself of the charges.

But your concern in these operations is where they tie with the suicide operation. The first important thing about the members of the teams dispatched for the operations was their readiness to venture their life. In fact, they had to prove their readiness to commit suicide to stymie the risk of being arrested alive. Unlike other overt military operations, they were covert operations that had a red-line to consider and no concrete evidence had to be left by the teams to be used against the organization. As a matter of fact, the teams had to pass a test to ensure they would not fail to observe the delineated red-line.

In contrast to regular military operations that the forces had the chance of retreating to their bases back into Iraq, in these operations that the teams penetrated deep into the Iranian soil the risk of capture was very high and retreat was actually impossible if they happened to be traced. The red-line to observe was to frustrate the hope of the regime’s forces to capture teams alive by committing suicide through swallowing cyanides or any other possible means at hand. Thus, the perquisite for the dispatched teams was the degree of their preparedness for committing suicide and they were supposed martyrs before setting off for the operations.

The means of suicide had to be necessarily checked as the first priorities along with other weapons needed for the operations. They were cyanides, hand-grenades, and guns and the teams received special trainings to use them in critical situations. Of course, they received other psychological and security trainings to counteract after-arrest tortures and pressures if they failed to commit suicide and fell into the hands of the regime’s forces. In general, any thought of compromise was a taboo; there was no alternate but to kill or be killed.

They in the organization would say the arrested members had to suffer under the tortures which were one hundred times worse than being killed for once since one might fail to tolerate pressures and would surrender which was equal to an attached stigma. Then they would bring examples of those who had easily assented to cooperate with the regime to be relieved of sufferings and tortures. Thus, the teams became resolute to commit suicide when facing a serious situation that increased the risk of arrest and even the team-mates had orders of killing each other when they would reach an impasse to escape. Here, it was not important who was at the charge, regardless of any organizational ranking, any member of the team had the responsibility of judging the right time for the action, to kill himself/herself or the other mates.

SFF: How long did it take to prepare a member for the operations? Your reference to the nature of trainings indicates that it could take a longer process than the ordinary ones to prepare them.

BS: Naturally, the operation teams were different. One of the factors they deemed necessary for the ‘operations of ultimate’ was not to select the team members from among the old members. Second, the team members had to have nursed a grudge and hatred against the target/s they were dispatched to hit. In fact, the feelings that rose within them had to be spurred on by sheer personal hatred of the targets and thus, the competency and organizational ranking had the second priority. Such motivated teams were much trusted for committing suicide and I can tell you that the one they chose for the assassination of Lajevardi had hardly finished his two years of preliminary training to be accepted as a joined member and to become a veteran. What had motivated him from the very beginning to join the organization was his grudge against Lajevardi and eventually succeeded to convince the organization to be enlisted in the operation team dispatched for his assassination. In fact, the organization was thinking of exploiting new recruits who knew little and so could impart little if arrested alive.

That was one of the reasons behind the policy of replacing new recruits for the old, experienced members in the operation teams; the organization was reluctant to risk the life of the older members for the time and needed them for the influential role they could play. Besides, the confessions of these older members after their arrest could disclose what the organization strived to conceal from the lower ranks to stop them having a low opinion of the organization that could influentially affect their fighting morale.

SFF: What happened in the interim between the teams arrange and their departure?

BS: As soon as the teams were selected and arranged, the members would be lodged in isolation totally cut off from other members and received no more organizational information. In fact, they had no more contact with others and reached a zero point of no updated information. Second, they would form a new profile just like ordinary people with grown beards. There were other physical, medical and psychological tests as well as recurrently going through the details of their operation and practiced them. And then, they came to the stage of going over the methods of committing suicide; how to break and swallow cyanide capsules, use hand-grenades or guns.

They reached the mastery point when they did all things blindfolded. They also sat watching thriller and military movies that kept them morally high and motivated; the hostage-taking movies were appropriate training classes that instilled in them a working solution that could help them get out of the critical situations. Other trainings included the ways of smuggling the weapons and ammunition over the border and past the sensitive points and stations as well as drawing the outlines of camouflages that allowed them to advance without alerting the guards and police forces. One thing the organization insisted on even during the operations was regular confession sessions of cleansing; the teams had to arrange sessions among themselves regularly with the imbued belief that their success or failure all depended on the constancy of the organizational tradition.

SFF: What was the information they were kept away from while in isolation?

BS: From the time they were put in isolation, they would take part in no general meeting with the presence of Massoud and Maryam and no ranking member had the permission to contact them. As there was no new information, the old ones became outdated and thus, their latest information was limited to what they knew about four months ago. In fact, isolation washed their brains of any latest information that could be of any challenge to the organization if they happened to be arrested and talk.

Link to the previous parts

November 3, 2009 0 comment

Former members of the MEK

Series of Batool Soltani interviews on MKO self-immolations

An interview with Batool Soltani on MKO self-immolations
In a new round of interviews with Batool Soltani, she discloses new facts on self-burning operations in MKO

A précis of parts 35-36 – Preparedness for suicide, a prerequisite for MKO operations

A précis of parts 33-34 – Camp Ashraf, MKO’s political excuse in the West

A précis of parts 31-32 –Urgency of safeguarding Camp Ashraf at any price

Part 30 – Hierarchical administration of information within MKO

Part 29 – Primacy of death and violence in the ideology of MKO

A précis of parts 27-28 – Human shield in defense of Ashraf

Part 26 – Neda had been tutored from the childhood

Part 25 – Defining an organizational jargon

Part 24 – The members were coerced into dedicating themselves to Massoud and Maryam

Part 23 – Neda’s family feeling obligated to the organization

Part 22 – 17 June immolations, orchestrated or willful acts

Part 21 – 17 June immolations and the test of commitment

Parts 19-20 – MKO Abuse of Neda and Sedigheh’s death

Part 18 – Rajavi; self-burnings were not enough, you should have sacrificed more

Part 17 – Rajavi; the operations have higher potentialities to utilize

Part 16 – Rajavi; you were derelict in performance of your duty to save Maryam

Part 15 – The manipulated approach to spur immolations

Part 14 – Rajavi, self-immolations forces French authorities to withdraw

Part 13 – Rajavi’s interpretation of the holy and foul suicide

Part 12 – Weekly sessions, a process to secure obedience to Rajavi

Part 11 – Rajav’s leadership, the criterion to legitimize the ideology

Part 10 – Execution, the approach to repel dissenters

Part 9 – Rajavi; set your body on fire to defend Ashraf

Part 8 – Human tragedy in prospect; Mojgan Parsai the first volunteer

Part 7 – Suicide operation, a lever to defend Camp Ashraf

Part 6 – The red-line discriminating between word and action in suicide operation

Part 5 – Suicide, the ideal means to safeguard information

Part 4 – Suicide operation, an ultimate solution to security dilemma

Part 3 – No suicide operation unless commanded by the organization

Part 2 – Suicide operation; a solution or sidestepping it

Part 1 – A Definition of suicide operations

November 1, 2009 0 comment

Former members of the MEK

Camp Ashraf, MKO’s political excuse in the West

An interview with Batool Soltani on MKO self-immolations – a précis of parts 33-34

Sahar Family Foundation: Ms. Soltani, your given reasons for preservation of Ashraf implies that MKO does not shrink to sacrifice all of the camp Ashraf members to survive the organization considers two functions for the camp, political and strategic with your focus more on the latter function. You also had references to the organization’s attempts in the West to preserve Ashraf which I classify as the former function. Do you have anything more to add?

Batool Soltani: Your classification seems accurate and right. Besides considering the strategic potentialities of Ashraf that secures the permanence of the organization, there are other interests that it strives to achieve in the West. As you have noticed especially in the recent years, Ashraf has given the organization a good excuse to orchestrate a variety of rallies and gatherings, some arranged with only a handful of people, in different Western cities. They work as fuels to run the organization’s propaganda machine throughout the world as a vindication of its entity and practically influential political life.

Naturally, to survive on the world’s political stage to show off as a potential alternative it has to buy credit by playing up whatever trifle. The victimization of Camp Ashraf can influentially impress the public opinion that the organization exploits as a working leverage in European countries.

The volume of reports and news released at the present concerning Ashraf indicates that the organization has no other lever to rely on to advance its political ends in the West. While the organization calls the world’s attention to Ashraf to intervene to stop the human tragedy taking place there, which also puts its great impact on the Ashraf residents as well, it does not shrink to sacrifice all of the camp’s members to survive and further its ends. The propagandas persuades insiders to insist on their resistance since they may come to believe that for sure something would come out of these propagandas and they may achieve Rajavi’s promised victory to start a triumphant return to their home country. Would not you be influenced by such illusion if you are made to believe that you have the support of whole world behind you?

The consequent easy result will be that Rajavi can persuade Ashraf residents to commit suicide for the final battle to gain the victory. That is the political function the organization intends to grab at and to convince the West that Ashraf is no more a military camp housing listed terrorists but a city that resists to survive and it is a duty on the world to join the resistance. That is why in most of its programs on Ashraf aired by its TV it focuses on the existing facilities, accommodations, green avenues and gardens as well as people in civilian, clean outfits rather than military uniforms.

SFF: If you will, Ms. Soltani, lets return to our unfinished issue, that is, reasons for Mojahedin to stay in Iraq, and the possible fluctuations that may help them to continue with their strategy of overthrowing the regime. How is it possible and what guarantees it to achieve the end by effectuating its stay in Iraq?

BS: You know, the principal thing Rajavi exclusively relies on is the time, which plays a crucial role for someone in his position. He knows well that the question of time can be either accelerating or deterring the accomplishment of events. He has the experience of being driven forth by the time in tortuous paths and strained circumstances. He knows that the states are after their own interests and may dodge to be observant of their promises. He has reiterated again and again that neither Europeans nor Americans believe in any principle but accomplishment of their own interests and they consider no ethics in their relations, feeling under no obligation to be observant of their pledge.

Thus, each side was after achieving its own interest more or less and Rajavi believed that it would be so treasured if the organization could convince them to support it even if it imposed makeshift costs on the organization to furnish them with the interests that pleased them. Such reasoning was enough to push them into an attempt to draw the US political support regardless of a notorious anti-American history and assassination of its personnel. The organization hoped that the pass of time had changed many things and the two sides reckoned on a guarantee that could well ensure collective interests.

As a result, the organization needed to procure time to pass over the crises and to continue its anchor in Iraq. That is why from the very beginning of Saddam’s fall the organization began to invest on the existing internal disorder and frictions among the dissident groups. It is still through the support of some factions and individuals that the organization hopes a permanent residence in Iraq. However, the question of buying time and letting their supports profit out of it remains a strategic priority in its global relations. Why France tolerates presence of Maryam Rajavi on its soil while it is well aware of the costs that her presence imposes on the country? Does not it know all problems the organization is facing in Iraq? While France is still opposing removal of the organization from the EU terror list, we see the leader of the organization is freely active in the heart of the country?
SFF: For sure it is looking after its own interests.

BS: Exactly. Since 1997 Maryam Rajavi has two times travelled between Iraq and France with no restriction. France could have easily occluded or expel her for leading a blacklisted, clandestine terrorist group in France. If France had abjured to grant her asylum, no state or organization would have condemned it for breach of human rights because the organization had been listed a terrorist group. Not only the French government let her settle on its soil, but also provided for her protection. Trading a profitable political deal, France tries taking advantage of a potential lever by paying the least cost. Of course, we have nothing to do with Franc’s reluctance to receive Ashraf residents as it is another case to discuss. What is of great importance for the organization at the present is to be removed from the US list of FTO which may grant the organization the legitimacy of a liberation army permitted to carry arms. That is the future in perspective.

SFF: But it is possible on condition that the organization has soil to settle on. It is impossible to organize a liberation army when it has no piece of land on the border. How is it possible?

BS: That is it. It depends on the influence of Americans on the Iraqi government. It would be enough for the organization if the US could convince Iraqis to let it carry arms, of course on condition it is removed from the US terrorist list. It all relies on possibilities and ifs, but does it have any other choice but to wait for the unexpected opportunity to arrive? So, the organization waits and waits for the ripe time that can change its course and connect another ring of the chain. As the violence is innate in its nature, violent tactics of mass suicide and immolation may work as good instruments to evade or pass over the temporal impediments.

Rajavi believes that a tree with dried leaves and branches can possibly bloom but it cannot if it is uprooted. It is the very same case with the organization and the duty on the members is to prevent uproot and demise of the organization so it may be rejuvenated by a new political entity. The members play the role of the leaves that their drop, as they sacrifice for the organization, help safeguarding the trunk that may come to life by shooting greens. So it is the body that is of significance and all have to do their best and sacrifice their lives to protect it.

SFF: Ms. Soltani, will you be clear enough to say that how can the organization kill the time to use the present Iraqi Government as a lever to effectuate its strategy of armed struggle and liberation army?

BS: The organization insists to become an outlet of violence and arms for both Americans and Iraqis to carry out their ambitions against Iran. It hopes to be equipped with arms and does whatever it can to instigate tension that deters any peace. By demonizing Iranian regime, they try to justify the right of carrying arms.

Link to the previous parts

October 28, 2009 0 comment

Former members of the MEK

Urgency of safeguarding Camp Ashraf at any price

An interview with Batool Soltani on MKO self-immolations – a précis of parts 31-32

Sahar Family Foundation: Ms. Soltani, it is of great significance that the organization stresses on defending Camp Ashraf to impede its fall even through a mass suicide or an organized human tragedy. Regardless of the camp’s magnitude in preserving the whole structure of the organization, there must be other strategic factors that necessitate preservation of Ashraf. I think your elucidations can help reach alertness to hamper a human tragedy.

Batool Soltani: it can be observed from a variety of angles, but I believe that the organization is entirely depended on Ashraf for a range of pivotal political, strategic, social, propaganda and even fundraising concerns. For the insiders, Ashraf would be depicted as a strategic bastion where resistance could be fully interpreted, not because it below life into the organization but as it was located in the proximity of Iran’s soil.

SFF: Or to restate it, to continue the very same strategy of liberation war to topple Iranian regime.

BS: Exactly. What they meant at the end was that the fall of Ashraf presaged demise of the liberation army, that meant backsliding to a beginning stage when the organization was desperate what to do and where to begin from. It would cost a lot and could even lead to a crisis that could seriously challenge the permanence of the organization. The stability of Ashraf meant that the liberation army was still alive with a spirit of fighting that legitimized its existence.

So the organization needed a stronghold in the vicinity of Iran’s soil for other reasons as well. It could help fundraising. The organization would say Ashraf had been the cause for many sympathizers abroad to donate. Ashraf denoted that the organization was still alive and active and needed support of the sympathizers to live on. No sooner had the organization suffered its disgraceful defeat in the operation Eternal Light than it plotted the assassination of Sayyad Shirazi and Lajevardi and launched a series of mortar attacks just to advertize and display its military potentiality. It could help drawing sums of money and recruiting new forces from among the sympathizers in abroad. And all these came out of Ashraf, so it was vital both for the organization and the sympathizers and advocates to help reinforce Ashraf and its fighters to keep the military strength going.

The organization was also counting on the regional fluctuations and calculating that a disturbed region could grant it the opportunity of plotting assaults against Iranian borders to lead Iran into a real crisis, or it could collaborate with the US forces if they had any military plans against Iran. It all depended on the existence of Ashraf and its military dynamic.

The significance of Ashraf can be looked from a different angle, too; it is its very context and the fabric of its structure. Natural enough, those who have not seen Ashraf from the close can hardly perceive what I say. But for me who have been there for years it is easy to realize its vitality for the organization. It had long strived and spent money to revive a piece of dead desert and to establish many facilities of a city there; relocation of Ashraf means forcing the people of a city to evacuate their home.

Suppose Iraq has no intention of evicting Mojahedin from Camp Ashraf and they have to be relocated for certain protective measures. Do you think it is easy to abandon a piece of land that it has revived and had helped it recuperate many of its losses? It will cost the organization a lot to reestablish a similar bastion anywhere with all facilities designed for short and long term ends as it has set up in Ahraf. Now you may fathom the preciousness of Ashraf for the organization to safeguard it even through persuaded mass suicides and human tragedies. Of course, evacuation of Ashraf may not be considered the total demise of the organization but, for sure, it will burden it with heavy costs and weigh down the scope of its activity for some time. So, as the most worthless thing for the organization is the life of its members, it costs the organization much less if it could keep Ashraf by sacrificing the prepared, ready scapegoats. However, it is not all the thing said concerning the significance of preserving Ashraf.

Sahar Family Foundation: Ms. Soltani, you have already elucidated on the strategic significance of Ashraf for the organization, I mean, its need to preserve a spot on Iraqi soil because of its strategic vitality to confront Iran. But you know best that it was all founded on the patronage of Saddam that had helped the organization to make a shift in its strategy of struggle to open a new war front vis-à-vis Iran and to start a new phase of collaboration with him that tied their destiny together. But now it is different and for a variety of reasons Iraqis cannot tolerate the presence of the organization on their soil or even accepting them as refugees. Now, the question is why the organization insists to safeguard a bastion that deprives it of any chance of utilizing it as a strategic opportunity?

Batool Soltani: It is true from your point of view, meaning that it is better for the organization to leave Iraq today rather than tomorrow. As you pointed, the fall of Saddam blurred the role of Ashraf as a pivotal strategic bastion to a great degree. But immediately, the organization began to calculate how it could both stay and to maintain its already bolstered potentiality. That is true that leaving Iraq benefits the organization in accelerating the accomplishment of the ends sparked within Ashraf, but where can it go? None of the neighbors bordering Iran, regardless of any existing tense of relations with Iran, have problems with Mojahedin themselves and are aware of the consequences of accepting them in. As a result, the organization, also knowing the truth, prefers to accept the risk of staying in Iraq at any price.

SFF: Sorry, why, then, the organization insists to stay in Iraq knowing the very consequences of staying or leaving?

BS: I have already underlined that its existence is tied to the survival of Ashraf. The prospect you pointed to is all guaranteed by the permanence of Ashraf. Consequently, the organization has no other choice but to move alongside the tactic of preserving the camp where its future destiny may shape. To tell you the last word, it is not at all an issue of strategic importance but to survive and it is possible only through the resistance of Ashraf. Then, where can it go when it lacks the needed political footstep all invested within its bastion? The one who is drowning grabs at any stick to survive rather than thinking about his future. That is the case with the organization and it is thinking of the present than the future.

To survive, it appeals to anybody, even to the adversaries. To get the least results, the organization pays the highest prices, that is the life of members through mass suicides. It still believes that the hope to topple the regime originates from Ashraf; the only thing it follows is to be permitted to stay disarmed on Iraqi soil close to Iranian borders. If the circumstance fails to be ripe to overthrow the regime, no problem, maybe future grants it the opportunity it has been after. So long it has been promising its members and fostering hope in them to victoriously assume the power, let them wait some more time! Surprisingly enough, the organization reckons on and hopes for unexpected circumstances that can change the course of events it can well exploit.

Unlike its claims, the unexpected have always worked as parameters that have hampered the materialization of the overthrow and have worked as excuses that the organization manipulates to justify its strategic defeats. It is out of these unexpected factors that the future is determined and the organization takes the next step. Its forward motion relies on a chain of events that keeps each ring waiting to connect it to an unpredicted one. Once, for instance, it deployed its forces to Iranian western borders of Kurdistan province after suffering failure in its announced tactic of armed struggle. But it soon fell out with the Kurdish Democrat Party and had to move to Europe where it was offered to unite with Saddam and to establish its bastion on Iraqi soil. None of these events were already calculated and expected for and the organization encountered the opportunities as it moved forward. Thus, the organization draws on its past experiences of coming across opportunities to pass over the crises.

To be continued

October 24, 2009 0 comment

Former members of the MEK

Hierarchical administration of information within MKO

An interview with Batool Soltani on MKO self-immolations – Part 30

none of the information would be circulated among the rank and file and there was a strict hierarchical discipline with no leak Sahar Family Foundation: Ms. Soltani, you have put your finger on an issue worthy of note, that is, victimizing insiders and sending them to their death. Did they really theorize such issues for the insiders with concretized exemplars from the outside?

Batool Soltani: As for the subjects I mentioned, I have to underline that none of the information would be circulated among the rank and file and there was a strict hierarchical discipline with no leak to the lower ranks. The reactions concerning Zamani’s execution that I mentioned were limited to the members of the Leadership Council. On the surface and among the rank and file you could see what was commonly seen outside of the organization; they were in tears and mourned his death. Massoud and Maryam always insisted on the exigent priority of the Leadership Council and were of the opinion that information had to be restrained within the council. The lower ranks had to only carry out the orders of the top even if the day came when a mass suicide was inevitable.

Rajavi believed there was no need to let the lower body be enlightened about the matters discussed in top levels which could mount unnecessary tensions. It was enough to move on a slow path or effusive acts like that of the June 17 immolations. What was of the significance and vital for the organization was to keep rank and file in readiness and ripe for suicide operations through justifications that could be embedded in them from the top. I tell you for sure that if the subordinate members knew the truth and what they plotted at top layers, half of them would detach from the organization; their role was to materialize the chimeras of the leaders. In contrast to them, the higher echelons had the responsibility of constantly testing the inferiors’ loyalty and readiness and lay the groundwork. Even they would be equipped with the prerequisite means of suicide in a practical test to calculate reactions.

SFF: At the present, what means they have ready at hand in Camp Ashraf for committing mass suicides?

BS: I do not now just now, but when I was there any member of the Leadership Council carried at least two cyanide capsules. Wherever they were present, you could find equal quantity of cyanides. Or there were always supplies of fuel, the alcohols reserved for medical uses, and incendiary substances and devices mainly used in celebrations which could all be utilized easily for self-immolations. In general, the organization is potential enough to access to any type of substance and means needed for suicide and immolation operations. Even if you could detect noting kept by the organization, you will be surprised to see how ready they would be when the right time came.

SFF: Does it mean that the organization has still amounts of weapons secretly stored for a day to come?

BS: As far as I was involved, there was no possession of stored weapons because Americans were so sensitive and had sophisticated instruments that could easily detect hidden arms. Besides, the organization had no intention to give any excuse to Americans which could make them suspect the organization in other grounds that required a reciprocal trust following the disarmament. The organization tried to show straightforward which could ease the way to achieve a comprehensive collaboration. Possession of arms completely spoiled the martyred expression the organization tried to wear.

To be continued

October 19, 2009 0 comment

Former members of the MEK

Primacy of death and violence in the ideology of MKO

An interview with Batool Soltani on MKO self-immolations – Part 29

Sahar Family Foundation: Ms. Soltani, before going on, let’s open a parenthesis to clarify why the organization is primarily motivated by holding at violence as a working strategy; it is either killing others or prompting suicide operations. In fact, a permanent leg among its pillars of relation with the outside is violence and death. Of course, it has been innate from its very beginning and they even believed that when arrested, they had to behave in a way to provoke the Pahlavi’s regime to execute them. A proven fact is its leaders’ fervently presented offensive defenses in the course of their trials. In contrast to the mainstream of the political and struggling groups, the organization has hardly cared about the individuality of its members as the militants definitely framing the main pillars of its structure and to take the decisive precautionary measures to save their lives.

The members of the organization are encouraged to either kill or be killed and there has to be necessarily justifications to convince them choose the either way. Your experience may illuminate some dark aspects of the organization’s resorting to violence. Of course, the organization’s early booklets explicitly chart its worldviews but you are not old enough to be familiar with these early ideological mentalities unless they have been referred to in their ideological instructions. Do you have any perception of the founded innate strategy that can be proved through your personal experiences?

Batool Soltani: It is so sensitive an issue you are referring to. It could have been talked about at the beginning or the end of our discourse about self-immolations. But it is crucial to know why the organization, unlike other similar political or armed groups, cultivates homicidal tendencies with an emphasis on suicidal ones in a struggle to counter its adversaries and exclusively invest on the tactics that highly risk the lives of the insiders. It has to be pointed that when the organization is on a stand to advance with a heavy hand the first priority is an aggressive militarism but it recoils to a defensive suicidal stand when some bottleneck blocks its advance. It can take the form of self-immolations, imposing human shield or any other form and have been adopted as a working strategy from its very formation days.

As a vindication of its rightness in its struggle path, the organization has always boasted about the counts of its killed and imprisoned members believing that these martyrs substantiate its hegemonic legitimacy over all other opposition groups antagonizing the regime. Rajavi is of the opinion that the rightness of any ideology is maintained by the number of its victims and martyrs; in the sphere of his political and ideological imagery, the life and death of man is so simple an issue like drinking water. I remember reading some related sources in the organization but I fail to remind them clearly to give exact details.

Being a product of Rajavi’s own mind-set than a methodological study, I think Rajavi has deduced that when man can so easily sacrifice his life, so he is capable of achieving distant, inaccessible goals. When it is politically and morally, from a certain ideological point of view, acceptable to use unconventional tactics such as violence and fear to achieve certain goals, then why should one waste time to stick to others that fail to be productive at all. The recruited members of the organization that are trained to invoke fear in the opponents and exploit the vulnerability of the victims are themselves the victims that victimize adversaries for certain ambitions. In fact, whether a member kills or is killed it is the organization that profits from all these bloodshed.

I remember my first days in the organization when Rajavi repeatedly highlighted the counts of the casualties the organization had inflicted on the regime, which had been widely covered by the media, as a proof of his organization’s legitimacy and his authoritative hegemony among other opponent groups. Connecting his organization’s terrorist activities with legitimate political struggle, Rajavi played a double-faced role before the Western world; he presented the statistics of his terrorist deeds against the regime as a proof of legitimacy while he exaggerated about the organization’s martyrs as the instances of human rights violation by the regime. Rajavi is not the least concerned about the life of people, either the insiders or outsiders, and even the organization’s press coverage of the executions by the IR is a cunning manipulation of the dynamics of violence to demonize the opponent side.

I have seen plain examples of the glorification of violence and death-seeking attitude within the organization, an experience that can better than any other theoretical sources of ideology lead you to fathom why the organization delights in the martyrdom of its own members. One instance was when the news of the execution of Hojjat Zamani broke inside the organization. I have nothing to do with Zamani’s extent of cooperation and organizational career, the only thing I know is that he was arrested when dispatched on an operational mission. Sentenced to imprisonment, he escaped while he was on leave but was recaptured and at last his antagonistic attitudes led to his execution. My stress on his execution is only to illustrate the organization’s internal reaction after his death. You may be surprised to know that the news of his execution was the cause for a real celebration within Camp Ashraf, I mean a real festivity in which they sang and danced.

Nothing could have pleased them more than Zamani’s execution by the regime since it was a good excuse to appeal to human rights organizations and to condemn the regime for oppressing Mojahedin. Nobody was grieved or became furious about his death as naturally they had to and they openly congratulated his execution as it could influentially fuel the organization’s propaganda machine particularly to array human rights defenders against the regime and to help recruit new forces. Although the organization appealed to a variety of human rights defenders and organizations to bring Zamani’s execution to a halt to advertise a pro-democratic profile, it was also anxious not to have overdone to impede his execution. It will be not wrong to say that the organization prayed the regime would accelerate the process of his execution since it was one way it could boast its position as the sole active alternative the Iranian regime still cared to counter as a trouble-maker.

In a message addressed to the Leadership Council after Zamani’s execution, Rajavi asserted that his execution was equal to one thousand feats accomplished by the council because his death could muster new recruits and scatter seeds of hatred in the hearts of his family and relatives. In general, the organization craved for the execution of all those members in the prisons of the IR regime, people like Saeed Mansouri, Jamil Bassam and Ibrahim Khodabandeh. Hearing no news of their execution against the organization’s expectation, it elicited anger among us in the Leadership Council and we began criticizing and disparaging them for failing to commit suicide as we did when Arash Sametipour was arrested. We would revile them for not provoking the regime to execute them. Massoud and Maryam had reiterated that the IR Ministry of Information had adopted a new policy not to execute any member of the organization; now the organization was resolute to do its best to inflame the regime to spur executions.

Besides, the organization had contrived ways that led to the demise of the members. When, for example, Beheshteh Shadroo was at the charge of the operation teams sent to Iran, after the frequent successful return of a team, she would order the head of the team to take the forces under his/her command to a non-reconnoitered region where they could be easily hit and killed. In this way, the imposed death begot martyrs from among the forces whose date of practical competency had expired and could best serve the organization by their martyrdom. The organization hoped and prayed that the IR would kill so it had an open hand for propaganda.

There were also suggestions of arranging to club a woman to bleeding and to record the scene to use against the regime in abroad propagandas. The organization presumed that such scenes of violence and flow of blood could beget rebellion and social disturbance that could finally lead to the regime’s collapse. Benefitting the organization in its best use, the news of members killed and executed in Iran carried the menace of what destiny could be awaiting other members if they ever dreamed to return to Iran.

To be continued

October 17, 2009 0 comment

Former members of the MEK

Human shield in defense of Ashraf

An interview with Batool Soltani on MKO self-immolations – a précis of parts 27-28

Sahar Family Foundation: Ms. Soltani, if you will, let’s have a discussion on the issue of human shield and mass suicides and what necessitated its application. What are the parameters that influence the operations and to what degree and under what circumstances they extend?

Batool Soltani: At the threshold of the US invasion against Iraq and when threats were nearing the action, Rajavi was sensitive on two things; defending Ashraf against external threats including closing the camp and expulsion from Iraq and second, adopting an appropriate means to defend Ashraf and resist. He specifically reiterated that Ashraf had to be defended tooth and nail. But the premise developed into more objective form of defense when Saddam collapsed and the suggestion of human shield turned to be a serious option on the agenda of Rajavi. Of course, at the time the organization was busy preparing passports for high ranking members including the members of the Leadership Council to relocate when the right time came.

The option was first brought to attention in a session where Massoud Rajavi addressed the audience through a satellite broadcasted videoconference. Of the subjects he focused on were Ashraf and Auvers, stating that Auvers and Maryam were believed to be the brain of the organization while Camp Ashraf was the beating heart of the resistance against Iran. For sure the brain kept working until the heart beat. Ashraf was the heart that pumped the blood to brain and had to be protected by any means; the two were interconnected and one failed to operate without the other. It was what he talked about from a theoretical point of view.

Following the incidents of the June 17, it was broached that the members of the Leadership Council had to be prepared to protect Ashraf. It was the first time the human shield tactic was implicitly touched on in general. In one of his messages to Mozhgan (Parsai) Rajavi recapitulated that we would stay, die and bury here in Ashraf but never move. It was a question of resisting or dying if the Iraqis decided to repatriate members to Iran or evict from Ashraf to another location. Of course, repatriation to Iran was out of question because of the internationally guaranteed IDs issued for the members under the article four of the Geneva Convention. To tell the truth, it was not at all important for the organization to make any attempt for the safety of the members; all it cared about was survival of the organization and preserving Camp Ashraf and protect it against external threats. Then, the focal point was to think of means to accomplish the end.

The human shield was one of the opted options; mass suicides could effectively frustrate any effort that aimed at dismantling the integrity of Ashraf. It included any other threat like forced entry of American or coalition forces to temporarily close or deactivate the camp. Our first choice to resist against intruders had to be using non-firing weapons; needless to say that the organization actually made no resistance against the American forces and succeeded to take the control and hegemony of the camp in its own hands.

However, the human shield tactic was temporally removed from the agenda since Ashraf continued to be under the organization’s control and there was no need to make use of the ploy.

As Rajavi stated, he preferred the ‘arms carriers’, meaning the disarmed members, to the arms themselves; an incorporated armless army could be much functional and appropriate than the arms. The question of suicide operations and human shield were all directed at safeguarding the entity of the organization and its hierarchical order; it was the red line that could not be crossed and all members had to preserve. It was the policy adopted until 2006 when I left the organization. The deployment of the American forces at Ashraf made no change in the organizational structure and it took the liberty of acting according to its ironbound disciplinary.

The regular commute of individuals into Ashraf followed its routine and they brought anybody into the camp under the cover of the visiting families and they were even present when American forces inspected visitors at the check points.

There is a statement issued by the National Council of Resistance that specifically warns against the outbreak of what the organization refers to as human tragedy in the case of any possible attack against the camp by the IR forces or missile attack. It is what the organization expresses for the outsiders but its real definition for the insiders is the use of human shield to thwart any threat of eviction or expulsion enforced by the Iraqi government. The statement explicitly clarifies the responsibility of members in defense of Ashraf; any member has to become a human shield to impede disintegration of Mojahedin’s main bastion and heart. I remember a time when there came the news of Badr’s 9th army and groups of local Shi’its nearing the gates of Ashraf.

The organization announced full alert and all the members of the Leadership Council began preparations for mass suicide. Some brought arms and cyanides were checked and distributed. So serious were they in carrying out their mission that two members of the council, Marzieh Ali-Ahmadi and Darz Beigi, committed suicide when in their returning to camp they got an impression of being challenged.

SFF: What were the more highlighted factors about mass suicides, the manners, conditions or their reflection in the media?

BS: They were much sensitive to record the scenes of the immolations for immediate and widespread media coverage. In fact, the priority was having the control of media and resources in hands. To air first hand reports, the organization had positioned equips of photography in the vicinity of the scenes of operations.

SFF: How the suicides were planned to be launched and what conditions caused their materialization?

BS: the suicides had to be carried out first individually and one by one. In the next stage, if threatening forces behind the gates of Ashraf were resolute to break into the camp, the members had the order of committing suicides in groups. In the case of a widespread military intrusion that could lead to the fall of camp, all the members were to commit a mass suicide. The Leadership Council had clearly delineated anything to counter threats against the heart of the organization and to coerce a line of human shield before Ashraf.

To be continued

October 12, 2009 0 comment

Former members of the MEK

Neda had been tutored from the childhood

An interview with Batool Soltani on MKO self-immolations – Part 26

Sahar Family Foundation: Ms. Soltani, you know better that the organization had highly invested Neda Hassani,had been tutored from the childhood to become a devoted MKO memebr on Neda who was hardly of any weight and importance within and without the organization until she was burned to death, an anonymous girl who had suddenly become the focal attention of the media in a week. I believe she achieved preeminence in public and it can be said that she had great impact on the whole situation. Of course, that was exactly what the organization expected. As Neda’s case is sensitive, let’s talk about her and her life and struggle background and I will pose further question if necessary.

Batool Soltani: You are right. Neda was not a preeminent among the members before her immolation. It was possible that in the higher echelons they had given her some attention but nothing amongst the rank and file. Her popularity is considered to be for a variety of reasons especially her age. To talk of my acquaintance with her, we were once on the same team-work in Camp Ashraf before the US invasion of Iraq and when Maryam (Rajavi) was still in Ashraf. the organization had highly invested on Neda who was hardly of any weight and importance within and without the organization until she was burned to death, However, Neda left for the Europe simultaneous with Maryam’s relocation to France. Of course, Neda had been raised and living in Europe and came to Ashraf after she was graduated.

SFF: Pardon me, Ms. Soltani, I prefer to pose questions on the spot. Was Neda an active member of the organization abroad?

BS: Not from the very beginning. The organization first worked on Neda’s family and they became sympathizers through participation in rallies and protest meetings. Gradually, the organization succeeded to recruit Neda and her brother to transfer them to Ashraf. The family, however, remained just sympathizers. You know, it is one of the approaches through which the organization recruits members. There are countless instances of the families that ceased their support for the organization while their children are still enthusiastic cadres who gainsay their own families. There are also instances of the parents detached from the organization while their children are active members or vice-versa; a real tragedy that has been going on all these years within the organization.

SFF: There is a photo of Neda in her seven or eight busy fundraising for the organization. Have you seen the photo?

BS: Yes, I have seen. The very same year Neda set herself on fire, it was one of the many photos they publicized in a biography of her. It is an indication of the organization’s impact on her family to have convinced them to let their daughter to engage in fundraising activities because of her low age. So she was somehow a sympathizer from the childhood. She was naive and emotionally sensitive and could be easily impressed. I think such photos talk enough to condemn the organization of abusing the sympathizer’s children.
SFF: Were Neda’s family political refugees?

BS: I do not know. But it was typical of the organization to establish contacts particularly with the political refugees since a cause of sympathy could easily convince them to cooperate with the organization especially when the families were on the fence or were facing problems. Because of its influence abroad, the organization could attract some of these families under its umbrella to exploit them for its political aims. Noteworthy, many of these families that had been granted political asylum through mediation of the organization faced troubles after they announced their detachment.

SFF: Was Neda born in Europe?

BS: I do not know, but I know she was raised in abroad.

SFF: What about her education?

BS: I have no exact information but I have seen a videotaped celebration of her graduation as well as her photos.

SFF: I think there is something ambiguous about her academic education because of her age. How old was she when she committed suicide?

BS: I think she was twenty-one.

SFF: Naturally, she could not have possibly been a university graduate. Beside her age, she was on a continuous process of moving and relocation.

BS: I may have seen a videotaped party of her becoming a high school graduate. So she must have been nineteen when she came to Ashraf. (Here Ms. Soltany pressed some keys on the laptop at her hands to make sure) Yes, it is here, she was nineteen. However, she was in Ashraf for a year and then left for the Europe accompanying Maryam; she came in 2001 and left in 2002.

SFF: How did she behave in Ashraf?

BS: She was a kind of friendly, I mean, she was warm and intimate and very active.

SFF: What organizational rank did she carry?

BS: She was a K2, the lowest organizational rank. But she caught their attention because of her active potentiality and they were satisfied with her activeness. At the time, they hardly sent anybody abroad and they were sensitive to select one if one had to be sent to Europe. But they selected Neda to send abroad and she was one of the few who accompanied Maryam.

SFF: Did not it raise question when they decided to send someone in her eighteens abroad especially after she had just arrived at Ashraf?

BS: She was too close to organizational standards and was well melted in the relations. These parameters were influentially decisive.

SFF: How is it possible that a young, europeanized girl who had just detached from a common, bourgeoisie world to join a remote camp and whose only distinctiveness was to have been recruited from a sympathizer family could so fast become the main focus of the organization’s attention. Could she in a one-year span reach a practically ideological maturity?

BS: You know, a great drawback that disputed sending members abroad was a risk of sticking to the tastes of the bourgeoisie life there. In contrast to what you think, the age and
struggle background were not the fixed canons to pick a member for a mission abroad.

There were members with a forty-year record of struggle who the organization never consented to send abroad because they could be easily enticed by the threats of the bourgeoisie life. Nasrin Asadi, for example, was a real expert in accounting who had long lived in abroad. Then, she could be a suitable choice to be sent abroad since she was well acquainted with the social atmosphere there to play an influential role but they opposed her dispatch.

Even I, who had been already sent to England for some time to receive computer trainings, had failed to win their trust since there was a possibility of making contacts with my family and children. In general, they never selected exhausted, questionable members to dispatch to abroad where they could be probably magnetized by the bourgeoisie life. It was of great importance for the organization to learn that the selected members had truly despised the bourgeoisie life and abhorred returning to it in the same way that they loathed the imperialism and the regime.

SFF: How is it logically acceptable that a girl in Neda’s age had reached a point to despise such a life? Of course by logic I mean the very logic that rules within the organization. Possibly that is because the organization had worked on Neda from her childhood when values deeply form in man. It can be said that Neda received her ideological trainings from the very childhood which precisely differentiated her with the adults who received their trainings in their young and mid-ages. Besides, Neda voluntarily came to Ashraf while the organization insisted her stay in Europe. She had reiterated many times that she preferred a militia life to political activities and she was absolutely opposed to her transfer to Europe and even cried and begged to stay in Ashraf while others like Laleh Tariqi and Zelal Habibi who had been picked to be sent abroad submitted to orders with pocketed pleasure. I want to know how Neda could overcome the threats of being melted in bourgeoisie life while the more experienced, old members had failed?

BS: Neda was selected for abroad because she felt no attraction for the bourgeoisie life. There was no doubt and the organization had been convinced. She had no craving to return to the world she had divorced. As a rule, the organization dispatched recruits to Ashraf to caulk their bourgeoisie appeals and to obviate threats of returning to it. Talking about Neda, it is different. She was young and standing at the beginning of a long path full of costs and threats and she lacked the organizational maturity to understand these facts in a theoretic, political and ideological framework. Her sympathy for the organization was the result of her childhood enthusiast and the information the organization had instilled into her in a one way relation. Above all, she was so young to face any challenge and adversary.

She was different with those who had been tied in with the organization at least from its post-revolution phase and had long been witnessing repeated losses and Rajavi’s promises that never came true. They had surmounted a tortuous path that had raised further doubts in each step; they had been broken many times but remodeled through Rajavi’s justifications and promises. They know how Rajavi dealt with the dissidents and they were well aware of the costs they had to pay to defect; they have long been engaged in a never-ceasing battle with the past and future and the organization has to devise approaches to monitor them and to discover what passes in their mind. How busy is the young mind of Neda to know anything of these wrestling?

Unlike Neda, these members have lost a precious life with no hope to refurbish. At least they try to take advantage of any possible opportunity to rebuild the remaining days of an unsecure future, let them call it threats of reunion with the bourgeoisie life or anything, for them it is closeness to freedom. They have long been filled with promises but nothing has ever changed. That is the reason why the young Neda is selected while the old veterans are kept behind the closed doors.

To be continued

October 10, 2009 0 comment

Former members of the MEK

Defining an MKO organizational jargon

An interview with Batool Soltani on MKO self-immolations – Part 25

Sahar Family Foundation: Ms. Soltani, one of the intriguing subjects to talk about is the unlike the world outside, a member of Mojahedin has established a relation of ‘pardakhtgar’ with the family and associates organization’s use of an internal jargon on which one can collect a book. You have repeatedly used such jargons in the course of you interviews and that may be because you have failed to find equivalents for them or you are used to using them. One of these jargons is the term ‘pardakhtgar’. If you please, start by explaining about this jargon.

Batool Soltani: Frankly speaking, you are right and one can compile a terminology of jargons used in the organization’s internal relations. More interesting is when you listen to an inter-organizational debate and for sure you need a jargon expert to interpret so you may understand what they mean. To talk about the stated jargon of ‘pardakhtgar’, the organization always insisted that in contrast to rumors outside that the members displayed no sign of emotion towards their children, families and relatives and denounced them just as heartless people devoid of love and amity would, we do value emotions and are sentimental beyond ordinary people.

To prove, the organization gave examples to show that much of the affection and friendliness dominating the society are conditional, superficial and shows of formality; a trademark only to secure interests. It reasoned that as soon as people felt their interests were threatened, all love and friendly passions would vanish and brothers tried to cheat and tear each other to protect their interests.

It holds the persuasion that unlike the world outside, a member of Mojahedin has established a relation of ‘pardakhtgar’ with the family and associates. To have a better understanding of the term, they would say a member of Mojahedin establishes his relations with his family and associates according to the prevalent social norms but he never engages in an interest-rated relation to turn his back on them for personal interests. A member of Mojahedin, they would say, is a clear-sighted revolutionary highly appreciating feelings and sentiments and who intends to purge them of the filth of caste and exploitation.

It is only possible through cleansing the society and people’s living milieu, or as they would say, to purify the oxygen they intake. In a purged society, motivations transcended worldly interests and feeling were no more means to trick and hoax the intimates and people. In that case, no class system and personal interest could possibly blur the feelings with illusions of materialism and unconditional and true love would find its real value with no relative bond to define it.

Then, they raised the question that the most appreciated love and affection was the unconditional kind the organization was after and it was impossible to achieve unless the society could be purged. As the revolutionary elements undertaking the responsibility to implement the cause, Mojahedin saw no other way but to temporary sacrifice whoever they loved.

Here the term ‘pardakhtgar’ can be defined; that is to say, a member of the organization sacrifices his love and affection for the family and associates so they may transcend the limits of the material world and achieve the sphere of an unconditional love and affection that could include not only the beloved around them but the humanity in general. His struggle and immolation is to stop people paying for the attention and affection they receive and to purify the atmosphere and set up a utopia wherein the unconditional love will reign.

This is a one-way demonstration of love and feeling and only a Mojahed is believed to fully discern the meaning of love and passion for the close and the humanity. He curbs all his feelings and deprives himself of a common give and take interest-rated love for a permanently stable tender and unconditional love. To achieve the goal, one side has to sacrifice and he is a Mojahed.

SFF: Ms. Soltani, the fact is that such claims are much alluring and idealistic. But a question to ask, were they really truthful in what they claimed or it was another abused means to achieve organizational ends? Was Rajavi after creating the claimed utopia or he was channeling the feelings towards a milieu of highly committed relationship?

BS: To tell the truth, Rajavi is a real, ingenious sophist. I have reiterated many times that when you look at the organization from the inside, you see an integrated order wherein everything looks to be at its own place. But the problem begins when you look at it from the outside and try to discern the encountered ambiguities and paradoxes according to the existing system before you, nothing is at its place and you are left in the middle of complete disarray. It is the very same matter with the term ‘pardakhtgar’. In contrast to its internal interpretation, it is meant be spent for and direct all love and affection to the leadership alone and to force all in his obedience. Of course, you will notice a flagrant contradiction in Rajavi’s claims. I think even a revolutionary struggling for a certain cause has to secure an emotional bond first with his own family and relatives before trying to universalize it.

Those who easily turn their back on their children, parents and any beloved one are in fact practicing to cut all attachments with the outside world. When Rajavi states that all love and devotion has to be directed to him, he means to be replaced with all the sources of attachments; he must be the sole entity without whom the promised utopia could not possibly be established.

Such a theory works for a variety of abusive purposes. A member devoid of familial attachments, for instance, can easily carry out a mission of purging a member of his own family just because the victim is claimed to be an agent of the regime. Thus, I believe such rhetoric is mainly aimed for personal interests to guarantee Rajavi’s egocentric dominance over the organization.

To be continued

October 7, 2009 0 comment

Former members of the MEK

The members were coerced into dedicating themselves to Massoud and Maryam

An interview with Batool Soltani on MKO self-immolations – Part 24

Sahar Family Foundation: Ms. Soltani, in our last session, you pointed to instances of the The members were coerced into dedicating themselves to Massoud and Maryam organization’s persuasive approaches in its contact with the victims’ families with particular emphasis on Neda’s family. Did not such dual behavior raise any suspicion when the family saw that on the one hand the organization eulogized Neda as a holy martyr but on the other hand claimed her immolation as an impulsive and willful act? Did the organization or Maryam have any other scenario to justify the dual deal?

Batool Soltani: it is a good point. In General, the organization had adopted a dual position concerning the immolations. You could easily make out two images of the victims; an image was to demonstrate them as holy individuals to fuel its propaganda machine and encourage others to take the same line, and the other, to put the responsibility of immolations on the victim themselves to dodge any charges against the organization. But, as you pointed out, the organization is clever enough not to err and prepares an exact scenario before stepping into action. To make Neda’s family to believe, for example, the organization forged a journal that it claimed belonged to Neda.

It contained some personal photos and some recollections from her family and friends and especially notes indicating her enthusiastic devotion and commitment to Maryam. Neda’s parents were simple people who could simply believe as if their daughter’s life was tied to Maryam and finally, they appeared to be convinced to show no reaction even if they could not believe it all at the bottom of their hearts.

At the end, they came to be persuaded that their daughter had committed suicide and they could change nothing for her loss. Then, the organization put two choices before them; to move in parallel with the organization’s scenario in glorification of their daughter’s death or take an opposite side and spoil everything and sully their daughter’s name. Facing such a dilemma, of course they preferred to consent to the organization’s will and follow its scenario. Thus, in spite of the fact that they might have discerned the contradiction in the organization’s manner, they faced the bitter truth that they could in no way change anything. Of course, I am not sure if Neda’s parents or other victims’ families had ever become aware of such contradiction. In any case, the organization had thought of a plan to ward off any criticism or charge. The first priority was to make them reconcile themselves to the organization through a variety of offers, threatening, deception and smearing the reputation. Each can be a different subject to talk about.

SFF: In relation to the approaches you pointed out, what could have been the reaction of the organization if Neda’s family took a different turn against it?

BS: Naturally, the organization would face a rocky road to ride but not impossible. It always had a trick up its sleeve and the best working one would be to classify them as the opponents. Everything would be clear then and the organization did to the family whatever it would do vis-à-vis its opponents. To mention, remember Reza Asadi the father of Zohreh Asdi. The father separated from the organization while his daughter is still a member. Or the case of Somayeh Muhammadi whose father strives to get his daughter out of Camp Ashraf. The least charge against them is that the organization has labeled them the agents of IR regime. The organization does everything to spoil their characters and indicting them for a variety of baseless charges of theft, immorality and the like.

Imagine a defector in its worst become the agent of the regime, it might be possible. But being so scoundrel an individual was impossible especially when he had served the organization for some time and they had disclosed nothing about such a rogue. Anything for the organization is either black or white, nothing in the middle. You have to be either on its side or the opposite against whom it has adopted an antagonist attitude to the end. Even if a defector had once been exalted as a hero, nothing can save him from the wrath of the organization by joining the opposite side.

I mean to say that it could be the same thing with the families if they failed to compromise with the organization. Only if it happened that Neda’s family had taken an antagonistic route against the organization, the first person who stood against the family would be their own son living in Ashraf. And only God knows what charge would be posed against them and they would be accused of what untold scandals; and it was enough to mobilize the sympathizers against them to disturb and annoy them and turn their life into a real hell.

The organization had always a coin with two sides at hand; a brilliant, alluring side and a hell of a bad side and I have seen the bad side abroad when it decided to treat the opponents. The simplest approach was to instigate hatred among the sympathizers and the opponents; there was nothing more to do but to sit and watch them finish the job themselves. For sure, the organization had shown the other side of the coin to Neda’s family and what it was capable of doing to change things completely; they could choose to become wretched, dejected people who could not even dare to visit their daughter’s tomb.

It is a tactic for the organization not to open a war front at the first stage and to arrive at a compromise through other approaches and promises. That is because it may inflict much cost on the organization and a longer process to follow if it shows an antagonistic attitude from the very beginning. Of course, there is a red line nobody should ever transgress; the sanctity of leadership, Maryam and organizational principles should never be violated. Now imagine Neda’s family had taken a different path and had fallen with the organization; their very first move to make preparation for their daughter’s burial and mourning would turn as a backlash against themselves and they would face accusations of being provisioned and provided for by Iranian regime and more.

An odd but common approach was to coerce members to endorse in their own handwriting that they had entrusted whatever they had to Massoud and Maryam, as I did myself. We put it in writing to announce we were possessions of the two and had willingly chosen our path of struggle and devotion. We also stated that our emotional communion with family and relatives was not a superficially common and limited but relatively ‘pardakhtgar’ (an organizational jargon meaning sacrificing all love and emotion for a greater cause).

Our real love and devotion all had to be spent for the accomplishment of higher and dearer causes and for Massoud and Maryam; they were the central integrity of all love and devotion and all families had to be grateful of entrusting the life of their children into the hands of the two. I am sure Neda too had signed such papers before committing immolation and had conceded her life and love to Maryam which could be used as a winning card before her family.

To be continued

October 5, 2009 0 comment

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