The Threat of Cults

36 detainees attend cleansing meeting after their release

The process of manipulation in cults is a never ending and non-stop methodology which guarantees existence of the cult and maintenance of members in the isolated atmosphere of the cult.

The 36 Ashraf residents, who had been detained by Iraqi Police after the raid on the camp, attended their cleansing meeting under the supervision of Massoud Rajavi, following their release from Iraqi prison. The video of the meeting was aired on MKO’s TV channel and published on their website a few days ago but only for a short time. The video showed some of the released members attending the meeting on their hospital bed. They attended the meeting just a few hours after their release. This shows how vital indoctrination meetings are for cult leaders. The immediately held cleansing meeting where some of the participants weren’t feeling well due to the hunger strike they had gone in the prison, according to their indoctrinations.

The participants confessed that they held their self – criticism meetings even in Iraqi prison! They told to their God-like leader, Massoud Rajavi, that they held the meetings even in groups of two under any circumstances. As MKO’s TV channel showed, Current Operation (cult jargon) is so influential that the 36 released members noted that their only objective is satisfying their leader, Massoud Rajavi.

During the meeting Massoud Rajavi spoke to the audience via telephone. The presence of Rajavi himself in the meeting indicated the importance of meeting to the organization that held the cleansing meeting under the supervision of the highest authority of the group.

The video showed the audience including the 36 released members clearly declared that they are always ready for absolute obedience to leaders’ orders. This film represents one of the few times that MKO’s internal relation is revealed to outside world and maybe that’s why they kept it on their website only for more a few days and then they removed it. The true nature of Rajavi’s cult was announced on its website in the best way.

Today MKO’s propaganda champagne launches too much effort to gain the West’s support but the film of the cult’s manipulation session sill bring about contradictions around the group which has always claimed to be democratic, to seek freedom and liberation of thought and speech for people. The show asserts the undemocratic cult-like nature of the group that will definitely make the West feel the threat of such a destructive cult.

The West is absolutely concerned about the threat of cults such as Al Qaida or MKO because the danger caused by such cults today is risking the lives of a lot of people in the world including Iraq or Afghanistan.

The devoted members of the cult always promise that they are prepared to commit suicide operation for the cause the leader says.

As the participants of Rajavi’s cleansing session said, they welcome pain, hunger and death just for their leader who, according to them, is the only one who suffers the most. The confessions of Ashraf residents would be a great lesson for the West since the potential danger of such a cult will not be limited to the cult itself but to the world community as what happened in June 2003 after the arrest of Maryam Rajavi by French Police.

By Mazda Parsi

November 10, 2009 0 comments

Former members of the MEK

Massoud and Maryam were the mainspring of operations

An interview with Batool Soltani on MKO self-immolations – Part 37

Sahar Family Foundation: One of the interesting points you referred to was the organization’s insistence on regular confession sessions of cleansing even in the course of the missions. I am interested to know how they justified it when on a mission.

Batool Soltani: Any operation team was composed of two or three depending on the nature of the operations. One was in charge and he was the one to arrange and run the cleansing sessions. Even in his/her absence, other members had to sit by themselves to conduct it. They insisted on its performance since it was much necessary when members were out on mission in a free world among people and just a few steps away from the adversaries.

In the camp there were no enemy and consequently no fear. But out of the camp there always existed a potential threat that could lead to an influential demoralization. When among the society that the members were long away from, the felt nostalgia could obsess them with the thought of craving to be with their family and starting a warm, pleasant life just like other people. The temptation could easily erode their confidence in the organization to encounter it. That is where they needed to be cleansed of such temptations that could diminish their fighting morale. I think we have already talked enough about the issue.

SFF: Did Massoud have any contact with the teams while in isolation?

BS: before their departure, they would once meet with him which worked as a factor of encouragement. He would talk to them on the phone or received them individually in the presence of Maryam where they gave their pledge of loyalty to the red-line and the organizational principles and that the enemy would never succeed to have access to anything out of them. The emphasis was on Ahmad Rezai as the archetype they had to follow. Then he would say, ‘now move to show what you will give to the enemy and what you’ll take’. These meeting were really instrumental and some looked at it as their unforgettable memories and a matter of honor.

The impact of the meeting was enough to encourage and motivate them to the end and to risk their life for the accomplishment of the mission and the will of leader. The head-team of Lajevardi’s assassination, for instance, had a meeting with Maryam where he, Ali-Akbar Akbari, promised her to shot him just between his eyes. It was Massoud’s skill to instigate and provoke members and there were times when they would kneel before him crying and begging to be sent for the operations. He knew how to prepare them psychologically and if you could listen to his speech delivered before the operation Eternal Light, you would feel his charismatic influence in provoking three-four thousand forces, as he could well justify the failure of the operation.

SFF: Was the age of members of any importance in selecting them for the operations?

BS: Not very much. The average age of the members was 40 or younger. However, it was physical readiness rather than the age that could be counted. A physical test well indicated the degree of members’ readiness.

SFF: In this phase of operation we encounter the arrest of Marjan Malek and the organization’s contradictory reactions. Do you have anything more to add?

BS: At first, the organization thought she had been killed. So it began praising and glorifying her daring deed in its official gazette, Mojahed. Then it was surfaced that she was alive and arrested and it was brought into the Leadership Council to start advertising her collaboration with the regime’s information system. It was immediately put into action and her pictures were removed from the gazette. To justify her published disclosures about the organization, the organization tried to convince the lower cadres that she had failed to stand and resist the regime’s pressures and so had surrendered. Interestingly, the organization never mentioned her team-mate, Akbari, and evaded questions concerning him.

SFF: How successful was the organization in its ‘operations of ultimate’?

BS: They proclaimed them successful because of their wrong evaluation of Iran’s internal climate. They were under illusion of having people’s support which led them reckon on a 90 percent success. It was what they said to the teams to ensure them that they would certainly return to the camp. Actually, less than ten percent would return.

SFF: Why it was so?

BS: It was clear from the very beginning that they wouldn’t because there are reasons to justify. Imagine, how is it possible for a team going to a crowded bazaar to retreat while it is surrounded by crowds of people and police forces? Actually, the organization never reckoned on their return but on their demise; martyrs that benefited the organization for propaganda.

SFF: How they evaluated Iran’s social and security atmosphere?

BS: Their appraisal of Iran’s security and police apparatus was not realistic. Unlike the organization’s cautious considerations about the past regime’s security and police apparatus advertised to be highly cunning and sophisticated, it underestimated the capacity and potentialities of the present regime. While the organization was well aware of the fact that no sophisticated apparatus was needed to hunt one or two penetrated teams and that a simple but exact inspection and scrutiny by the police could lead to betray the teams. It was just what happened to Malek and her team-mate. Furthermore, the organization insisted on the social backing and inspirited the teams that they could reckon on people’s widespread protective umbrella to hit and escape; it was what it would say to lower ranks and operation teams but it was clear for higher layers and the Leadership Council that the teams would never return.

SFF: How they broached the issue of human shield in Auvers-sur-Oise?

BS: In Auvers, they have to abide by the rules of the host country but they run underground establishment. Their surface political struggle necessitates it to be organized and it acts according to legal regulations unless the red-lines are broken, that is to say, the sanctuary of the leadership is violated. The consequence will be something like the 17 June immolations. However, as I was not in Auvers lately, I cannot tell what approaches they are focusing on at the present. But, be sure that such activities never cease within Ashraf; the pass of time will show how they will put them into action in European countries.

Link to previous parts

November 9, 2009 0 comments

Mujahedin Khalq; A proxy force

Terrorism transformed

In the past eight years of the post-911 terrorist attacks, the US and the international community have been unanimous to find a decisive solution to overcome the phenomenon of terrorism and its various forms and to fully eradicate it. Meanwhile, the Americans have learned many lessons and have been aware of the inevitable costs of interacting with terrorist groups yet there have remained many more lessons to be learned. The first lesson to be learned by the US is the fact that terrorism cannot be used as a lever and threat for establishing democracy in other countries.

The dual and paradoxical policy of the US toward MKO in recent years confirms this fact. This approach has provoked heated discussions among the government layers of the US. The report of RAND on MKO, regardless of unexpected events due to the hidden aspects of the true nature of Mojahedin, can be considered an evidence of conservative and ambiguous behavior of the US toward MKO. The lack of a defined relationship between the US and Mojahedin is the main mistake made by the Americans.

According to this report, Americans failed to annihilate the organization intentionally or for any reason and also refrained to encourage MKO members to leave camp Ashraf. Although this is considered the main mistake made by the US in dealing with Mojahedin, it has to be pointed out that the US was unfamiliar with the cultic nature of Mojahedin and their intra-organizational mechanisms and potentials. After the disaster of 911 and its feedbacks inside nations and governments, terrorist groups were inevitably influenced. In other words, the terrorist activities of terrorist groups, including MKO, underwent a qualitative and quantitative shift. The public hatred of terrorism made Mojahedin to make effort to be removed from the terrorist list claiming to have denounced armed struggle. However, this claim and the removal of the name of MKO from the terrorist list of the EU failed to be accepted by those European countries that were well acquainted with the nature of the organization. And it did not take long to prove that they had been right in their judgment as Mojahedin practically proved that they could not make any change in their past policy and indoctrinations.

The innate violence has only changed in the application of the approaches. They have just concealed themselves from the global attentions resorting to other forms of cultic-terrorist activities like self-immolation for furthering their totalitarian objectives. The suicide attacks of Mojahedin in 17 June in France, 2003 occurred only two years after the terrorist attacks of 911 and was an inevitable consequence of their critical situation resulting from their presence in global interactions as well their indoctrinations based on which the ideological and strategic solution for all barriers and challenges is considered to be violence and terrorism. The suicide attack of 911 and that of 17 June have the same background and theory yet have different external manifestations. They enjoy the same ideology and mechanisms too yet the former is considered an action on the part of a reactionary and barbaric group and the latter comes from a scientific-evolutionary philosophy.

There is no doubt that despite the superficial differences, the shared point of al-Qaeda and MKO is their internal mechanisms and techniques. However, after the events of 911, Mojahedin came to the belief that resorting to blind terrors and suicide attacks could no more solve their problems but also may lead to the intensification of their tensions and public hatred. Its registration as a terrorist organization on the very same list that recognized al-Qaeda made Mojahedin do whatever necessary to be removed from terrorist list just due to evading the negative and hostile viewpoint of the global society and western governments. Consequently, Mojahedin were enforced to stop their blind terrorist activities for a while. The insistence of Rajavi on the peaceful approach of MKO on the one hand and the critical situation of the organization in Iraq has enforced him to focus on the possibility of a human disaster in the form of self-immolations in case of the intensification of tensions and constraints in camp Ashraf.

This is the reason why Rajavi has resorted to cultic levers like hunger strike and using human shields in camp Ashraf and it is simple-mindedness to dismiss the possibility of Mojahedin’s committing other terrorist activities. The fact is that there is no guarantee for other countries to be secure from the intrinsic violence of such a cultic group unless Mojahedin would abandon their cultic activities like self-immolation, hunger strike, human shields, etc. As it was pointed out, this is the shared point linking Mojahedin and al-Qaeda together as well as to other cultic trends. The only difference is in their power of adoption to conditions at which Rajavi looks with pride.

According to many MKO former members, Rajavi has repeatedly referred to the point that Mojahedin can remove all barriers as long as they have no fear of death and take part in regular inter-organizational cleansing sessions. The present position of Mojahedin can be considered in this regard not as a tactical retreat but a newly adopted form of employing violence. It seems that Americans need to be notified about the dangers of terrorism, its ideology and how it may operate under a variety of disguises and cults.

October 15, 2009 0 comments

Mujahedin Khalq Organization as a terrorist group

Mojahedin’s suicide operation knows no limits

The challenges posed against Iraq to persuade it to bypass the constitutional legitimacy of expelling terrorist groups, and in particular concerning MKO, can be regarded as a warning for those countries that have offered refuge to members of this organization or authorize its organizational activities. governments should put precautionary actions on their agenda from the time being for preventing the negative consequences of accepting a cultic group.

Currently, many MKO members individually or under the cover of organizational activity are residing in the European countries and France in particular as lawful or even unlawful political refugees. As Mojahedin have mostly concentrated their forces in France where they were provided with political refuge, its government has been confronted with many more problems compared to other European countries regarding the terrorist activities of this cultic group.

Mojahedin’s open dossier of 17 June is one of the main challenges the France government has kept fighting against. It is predictable that France has to go through a long and costly process regarding this challenge added to the considerable costs imposed on this government following the widespread immolations of a number of MKO members in Paris just after the arrest of Maryam Rajavi in June 2003. It seems that these costs will have many ups and downs up to the closing of this dossier and impeachment of its main defendants.

The negative consequences of the presence of Mojahedin in Iraq and its bitter conflicts for the Iraqi government can be regarded as a proof of the challenges caused by 17 June dossier for France. The anti-civil actions of Mojahedin in Iraq exemplify the general approach of Mojahedin toward governments willing to give refuge to its members. While there is a long way up to the final decision about the destiny of MKO in Iraq, its government has been faced with considerable political and financial costs as well as casualties including three dead and numerous injured Iraqi police officers. The recent disturbances in Iraq gives a strong warning to all European countries and France in particular to be on full alert regarding the potential dangers of the settlement of MKO members in their soil.

By the termination of the one-month ultimatum of Iraqi government to MKO, Iraqi officials are highly concerned about the intensification of anti-civil and cultic reactions of Mojahedin in camp Ashraf. It seems that in the next phase of the dealing of Iraqi government with MKO members, Iraq is faced with many more appalling actions on the part of Mojahedin like using Ashraf residents as human shield. These conflicts will continue up to the expelling of Mojahedin from Iraq yet what is of utmost importance is that European countries and France in particular are to monitor the anti-civil and cultic activities of Mojahedin in Iraq watchfully.

Evidently, the misbehavior of Mojahedin toward its host countries is a common procedure of this terrorist organization. They have dunned Iraqi government in many instances one of which is their claim of ownership of a part of Iraqi soil where they are settled under the cover of international conventions. Likewise, they may claim the possession of their settling in Auver-sur-Oise in France. Regardless of the basis of this claim, the significant point is that Mojahedin insist on it firmly even at the cost of members’ victimization.

The present position of Mojahedin in Iraq is the other side of the coin of their presence in France. As much as the legal basis of Mojahedin claims in Iraq is unclear, France government may not be aware of the reason why Maryam Rajavi was granted temporal freedom after her arrest in France in 2003. The current misdeeds of Mojahedin in Iraq are in fact renewing its terrorist attacks in France in June 2003 based on which the warning of Masoud Rajavi of the occurrence of a human disaster in camp Ashraf was predictable. According to the statements of MKO former members and confirmed by the suicide attacks of MKO members in France in 2003, the issue of using human shields has no red line.

According to the history of Mojahedin, they are not a reliable group. If the European governments and France in particular monitor the process of decision making on Mojahedin in Iraqi soil, they would be able to foresee their own challenges and problems in future regarding the presence of Mojahedin in their soil. In other words, the present stranglehold of Iraq in dealing with Mojahedin can be a mirror of the future situation of governments concerned with the settlement of MKO members. These governments should put precautionary actions on their agenda from the time being for preventing the negative consequences of accepting a cultic group.

October 7, 2009 0 comments

Mujahedin Khalq Organization

A report of purges within MKO- part two

Once in a letter addressed to Christopher George of Human Rights Watch/Middle East entitled Human Rights Abuse in Rajavi’s cult, Nowrooz Ali Rezvani, a disaffected and former member of MKO, presented documented reports of many physical and psychological mistreatments of the members by the leaders within the organization.

The following is a detailed and proven list of engineering operations plotted in years 1981 to 1994 in an attempt to purge some members for certain organizational reasons. The confessions by Mr. Rezvani well indicates the potentiality of the organization in subjecting the life of those in Camp Ashraf to severe jeopardy through a preplanned scenario and under the cover of defending the camp against the lawful interference of the Iraqi police to take the control in its hands.

It was a detailed account of human rights violation and now let’s point to some indications of Mojahedin’s inter-organizational relations to develop a better understanding of its anti-human nature and to what degree it respects the principles of democracy and human rights.

In winter 1982, Mojahedin Khalq forces stationed in the northern Kurdistan executed three POWs, one of them underage. The commander on the scene were Mr. Mesbah, a member of the central cadre, Mr. Assad, a deputy of the organization’s leadership from Tabriz. The commander of the firing squad was Qudrat-allah Heidari and the firing party was constituted of Mr. Karim Turk and a woman whose son had been executed by the Iranian regime.

In Spring 1984, four more POWs were executed in Kurdistan border zone, the jungles of Shah Nosqeh region just in the vicinity of Pazhveh Village. The executioners were Morteza, working in armory, from Hamada, Naser Turk known as Naser Gestapo, Karim Turk from Tabriz known as Karim fascist, Mr. Assad from Tabriz, Mahdi from Hamadan, and Reza Karam-Ali also known as Yaqub from Tehran.

In 1984, six dissidents were executed in the jungles of Shah Nosqeh region in Kurdistan as they were opposed to Rajavi’s announced imamate. The executed were pseudonymously called Saeed from Tabriz, Qasim from Zanjan, Naser from Shiraz, Rasoul from Kermanshah, Qulam from the northern Iran, and Suhrab from Tehran. The executioners were Karam from Hamadan, Reza Karam-Ali from Tehran, Naser Turk, Karim Turk and Ibrahim Zakeri, the commander of the execution.

In 1985, more than 700 members of the organization were imprisoned in the Iraqi Kurdistan region in jails located in suburb Saveh, Kahrizeh, and Camp Ghayur. Other imprisoned were some members of political bureau and central council including Ali Zarkesh along with other 117. They were all condemned to death and following their preliminary investigations they were sent to prisons in Suleymanieh.

In 1985, more than 50 recalcitrant members of the organization were imprisoned in the Iraqi Kurdistan city of Suleymanieh and built jails in camps Mesbah ans Ghayur. Some were also imprisoned within the safe houses in Kirkuk.

In 1990, more than 500 recalcitrant members of the organization were imprisoned in the castle-like Debs Prison in the vicinity of Kirkuk. The prisoners’ seven day-long hunger strike is an indication of their protest to drastic shortages and harsh prison condition.

In 1991, there were numerous jails and cells inside Camp Ashraf, some of them were the prison of the municipal building, the prison of college, the prison behind the rifle range, the residential prison, and prison H which was one of the most horrible solitary confinements with cell cages in size of graves, there were other prisons in headquarters and army regiments as well.
In 1992, there were prisons and safe-houses set up around Baghdad including prison Muhammad zabeti, prison Saadati, prison Seifi, prison Akbarzadegan, prison Malik Marzban, a prison known as the camp of the members of the National Council of Resistance close to American Embassy, prison Mirzai, prison Dr. Muhammad Tabatabai, prison Rezai, and more.
Pakistan, 1987. Asghar Mirzai working in the Voice of Mojahed from the northern Iran was sent to Pakistan after engaging in some inter-organizational friction. After a while the organization announced that he had broken with the organization and had reported information about the camps of the National Liberation Army and headquarters of leadership to Iranian regime. Still the members were digesting the story that there came the news of his assassination by the regime. His wife was in a state of mental imbalance since it remained an unsolved question why her husband was killed soon after his separation.

Explanation: Asghar had been long working in Rajavi’s private bastion known as Camp Badi-zadegan located 45 km. west of Baghdad in Abu-Ghurib region where he made programs for the Voice of Mojahed. Thus, he had proven information concerning Mojahedin’s implication in Haj massacre and he was also the link between the Voice of Mojahed’s broadcasts and the Iraqi regime.

Of other obliterated members to name was Bahram Turk from Tabriz who worked in Rajavi’s private bastion known as Camp Badi-zadegan located 45 km. west of Baghdad. He knew anything about Rajavi’s residential and its secrets. Later, he was identified as a troublemaker and was degraded to work as a simple gardener in Rajavi’s private courtyard. It did not take long to be announced that he had been found drowned in the camp’s pool. He was reported to have fallen into the pool and drowned as he could not swim and there was nobody around to help him. Bahram was a real source of information and knew things about the organization’s association in Haj massacre. His wife was six month pregnant when he died and the baby was named Bahram after him.

Explanation: Reza Asadi was once a pilot in IR Air Force who had his hand in the escape of Dr. Banisadr and Masoud Rajavi from Iran. He was a comrade working close with Bahram and knew him well. A detached member, now he is living in Netherlands. In a letter to a friend, he gave some details about Bahram’s skill in swimming.

On the day we met, we talked about the article you penned for the Nimrooz. Now I try to give some details. For two years I was working with Bahram in a garage in Baghdad. He was one of those who lacked the proficiency to be invested with responsibility but was enthusiastically devoted to Maryam (Rajavi) and was ready to dive through a window hearing her name. The devotion branded him an ideological element with consequent conferred responsibilities. They say he was drowned in an ordinary pool. Your article in the Nimrooz made me recollect a joint travel I had with Bahram. We were en route to Kirkuk from Baghdad on a hot summer day in month Ramazan. We stopped the car on the bank of river Takrit, a big, rapid and raging torrent, to swim. I am a good swimmer and can swim in any condition.

But Bahram was many times better and swam easily in the deepest part of the river where hardly anybody, and even me, could swim. He swam so comfortably as if he was lying on a soft, flat mattress enjoying himself.

August 18, 2009 0 comments

Members of the MEK

MKO Leaders Forcing Members into Hunger Strike

Leaders of the anti-Iran terrorist group, the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO), force the group members into hunger strike in a bid to exert pressure on the world public opinion and international bodies.

Reports from inside the camp said that the move by the MKO leaders is aimed at securing their stay inside Camp Ashraf (now known as the Camp of New Iraq) – the MKO’s main training center and headquarters – by any means.

Iraqi security forces took control of the training base of the MKO at Camp Ashraf – about 60km (37 miles) north of Baghdad – last month and detained dozens of the members of the terrorist group.
The Iraqi authority also changed the name of the military center from Camp Ashraf to the Camp of New Iraq.

Amid seizure of the MKO training base by Iraqi security forces, leaders of the terrorist group started forming a human chain against the Iraqis in a bid to increase costs of the camp’s seizure for Iraqi police and army.

The MKO top figures, including ringleader Masoud Rajavi, had assumed that the former US administration would issue the permission for attacking Iran so they could fight against the Islamic Republic together with the US forces.

Now the single goal of the terrorist group is preserving the training camp.

The MKO has been in Iraq’s Diyala province since the 1980s. The Iraqi government and parliament has announced that it would not tolerate the group anymore and is seeking to expel the group from the country in the near future.

The anti-Iran terror group has been blacklisted as a terrorist organization by many international entities and countries.

The MKO is behind a slew of assassinations and bombings inside Iran, a number of EU parliamentarians said in a recent letter in which they slammed a British court decision to remove the MKO from the British terror list. The EU officials also added that the group has no public support within Iran because of their role in helping Saddam Hussein in the Iraqi imposed war on Iran (1980-1988).

Many of the MKO members abandoned the terrorist organization while most of those still remaining in the camp are said to be willing to quit but are under pressure and torture not to do so.

A May 2005 Human Rights Watch report accused the MKO of running prison camps in Iraq and committing human rights violations.

According to the Human Rights Watch report, the outlawed group puts defectors under torture and jail terms.

The group started assassination of the citizens and officials after the revolution in a bid to take control of the newly established Islamic Republic. It killed several of Iran’s new leaders in the early years after the revolution, including the then President, Mohammad Ali Rajayee, Prime Minister, Mohammad Javad Bahonar and the Judiciary Chief, Mohammad Hussein Beheshti who were killed in bomb attacks by MKO members in 1981.

The group fled to Iraq in 1986, where it was protected by Saddam Hussein and where it helped the Iraqi dictator suppress Shiite and Kurd uprisings in the country.

The terrorist group joined Saddam’s army during the Iraqi imposed war on Iran (1980-1988) and helped Saddam and killed thousands of Iranian civilians and soldiers during the US-backed Iraqi imposed war on Iran.

The MKO was put on the US terror list in 1997 by the then President, Bill Clinton, but since the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, the group has been strongly backed by the Washington Neocons, who also argue for the MKO to be taken off the US terror list.

August 18, 2009 0 comments

Mujahedin Khalq Organization

A report of purges within Mojahedin Khaq

Massoud and Maryam Rajavi the cult leaders

The confessions by Mr. Rezvani well indicates the potentiality of the organization in subjecting the life of those in Camp Ashraf to severe jeopardy through a preplanned scenario and under the cover of defending the camp against the lawful interference of the Iraqi police to take the control in its hands.

Aggressive reaction of Camp Ashraf residents to confront the Iraqi police, that in the first look may seem to be inevitable in such occasions, demonstrates covert plots that were suspended until a golden opportunity could frame all together. The warning bells had been already rang and the least the Iraqi government can do is to decrease the costs which requires considerable and deliberate prudence when dealing with such a conundrum and odious organization. Now soon after the attacks the organization has started a new round of propaganda blitz mainly focusing on the killed members; a probe into the past thirty years clarifies that it has been typical of the organization and the Rajavis to advance cultic causes by moving over the victims whose death remains a matter of obscurity. The members who are claimed to have died in clashes between Iraqi police and Ashraf residents follow the same craftily plotted scenario that grants the opportunity of helping the organization to get rid of its dissidents.

Facts revealed by former members indicate that a number of MKO members committed suicide because they were prevented from leaving the organization and that suicide was also claimed as the cause of death for recalcitrant members who had to be erased. Once more, we forewarn the international organizations and bodies of the repetition of past incidents that can be best judged by the members themselves; does it sound believable that the members’ death in any form has merely been accidents? Mr. Rezvani’s references to some of these deaths within MKO can provide some answer to some degree.

The first floor in Camp Shafaee located in Kirkuk
A woman called Nahid dropped to her death falling out of the first floor of a building of Camp Shafaee located in Kirkuk, Iraq. She was announced to have committed suicide. According to MKO, she was psychologically ill and her suicide was identified the result of her nurse’s negligence.

Baghdad, Iraq, 1976
A woman named Zahra was designated to work as a kitchen porter in Camp Saadati after she was demoted of her organizational rank. Later, her frozen body was found in the refrigerator.

Sardasht, Kurdistan, 1986
In Sardasht zone, a man from southern Iranian province named Abbas was shot deliberately by his commander as reported by eye-witnesses. He was an old member of the organization and opposed to inter-organizational relations. He had long been watched and sent to the military section as a punishment where he was then liquidated through a plot.

Kirkuk, Iraq, Debs Prison
Mohammad Gamoush imprisoned in section 200 of Debs Prison was found hanged. The organization buried his body behind the walls of the section 200 of Debs Prison.

Kurdistan, Iran-Iraq borderline, 1987
Hassan Muhammadi, a member of MKO, is suspiciously drawn in the border river Zab. He had been condemned to death by the inter-organizational court located in Iraqi soil. Suffering long days in a prison located in Kurdistan, Iraq, he was transferred to Mesbah Prison in Suleymanieh where he managed to escape in an attempt to make contacts with the organization’s rankings and even the leader himself in Baghdad to inquire why he had been condemned to death and imprisoned.

For the second time in Camp Saadati in Baghdad he stood trial and again Abbas Davari and Muhammad Hayati condemned him to death and imprisonment. On Rajavi’s order his death verdict was commuted and he was employed in a transportation stock as a simple worker where he had to stay day and night. Two times he was violently attacked and beaten by Mojahedin thugs, two of whom can be named as Hassan Tahmasebi and Mashaallah from Tehran. Muhammadi was then dispatched to the organization’s military section where he was ostensibly drawn in the River Zab overnight. He was an old member of MKO and imprisoned in the Pahlavi’s regime. His brother was a ranking member and had detached from the organization in 1978 after being released from the prison.

Khalis Province, Iraq, Camp Ashraf 1991
A man was found smothered with a handkerchief in his mouth in a resident prison in Camp Ashraf. His body was found while they were checking and inspecting residential.
Two other women died in suspicious and the organization announced they had committed suicide by taking cyanides while access to such toxic substances was impossible in Camp Ashraf. The two were dissidents who intended to leave and had refused the ideologically enforced divorces.
A recalcitrant member had announced his separation; his head was crushed between two military IFA trucks in regiment 96. The organization announced his death an accident as a result of cloud and the darkness.

In 1991, nearly 1000 dissident members ran a hard life in the camps’ jails as well as Saddam’s notorious prisons where they spent weeks and months in solitary confinements. At the end it was the awful camp in Romadi that awaited the dissident, a fearsome place where Rajavi had sworn to banish the dissident, where they would pray one thousand or one million times a day to die and would see and touch death in any moment.

And so it was that a dissident named Javad failed to tolerate the rough condition dominating the camp and hanged himself before the Office of the Refugees’ Affairs just before the eyes of his comrades. Many reports have been so far directed to you concerning the act and I deem it necessary to unveil some facts about a number of murders committed by MKO.
In May 1984 in Paris, a woman named zhale commits suicide by jumping before a train to show her opposition to MKO’s internal ideological revolution and Masoud Rajavi’s leadership. She had been under psychological pressure by her organizational supervisors.

In 1984 in Kurdistan, Iraq, a MKO’s military commander, called Abbas, shots a dissident back in the head causing his immediate death. The murderer is still in the organization.

In 1984 in Kurdish zone of Iranian Sardasht-Baneh, for three times the injured, captive forces of Iranian army were machine-gunned on the command of a MKO’s commander named Nasser Gestapo.

In 1983 in Kurdish zone of Iranian Sardasht, Zamziran Village, a wounded POW was machine-gunned by a commander of MKO named Yahya from Zanjan.

In 1983 in Kurdish zone of Iranian Sardasht, Kavalan Village, two wounded POWs were machine-gunned by a commander of MKO’s operation team named Hadi Gestapo.

In 1984 in Kurdish zone of Iranian Bukan, two wounded POWs were machine-gunned by a commander of MKO named Reza Sanandaji.

In 1986, Baghdad, Iraq, Mojtaba Mirmiran, a member known to be poet working in the propaganda section of the Voice of Mojahed, was found hanged in Camp Mirzai located in Baghdad, Al-Saadun St. He was one of those recalcitrant members strongly opposed to Rajavi’s leadership. The organization announced his death another case of suicide.

August 9, 2009 0 comments

Massoud Rajavi

Outcome of Rajavi’s Ambitions

In any cult-like culture, cult leaders generally seek their own ambitions by enslaving a group of individuals who have left their ordinary life behind to achieve the goals of the cult leader. These members are prepared by the cult leader to run his ambitions. That’s why today the world is very crucial about groups that represent cult culture, as what the world saw in September 11th The leaders of Rajavi’s cult always consider the list of their victims as their honor. disastrous act that was committed by cult ( Al Qaida ) members who were able to perform the most unthinkable act of suicide.

In the cult of Rajavi, Massoud Rajavi’s extreme ambition for power has already taken the lives of a large number of people including the organization’s members, Iraqi and Iranian civilians and authorities. The shameful part is that the leaders of Rajavi’s cult always consider the list of their victims as their honor.

More important is the danger linked with MKO which endangers today’s international community.

As an ambitious cult leader, Massoud Rajavi and his co-leader Maryam “make the members believe that Massoud is the only one who is always ready for change and revolution; the only one who sacrifices himself to solve other people’s problems; the only one who assumes every responsibility. Therefore he is not an ordinary man! This is what the organization makes us believe” according to Batoul Soltani, former member of MEK’s Leadership Council. The figure that the cult draws of Massoud presents him as the master and owner of members, so they just obey the internal dynamic that dominates the cult.

The position Massoud considers for himself is the one of a person who is “the bridge between people and God. Now from that position he can more or less order his followers to do anything” , says Ann Singleton an MKO ex-member. And this position is the one that convinces the members to set themselves on fire following the arrest of Maryam Rajavi in June 2003.

Marjan Malek, another defector of MKO who was arrested by Iranian Police when she was supposed to carry out a mortar attack in Tehran, says that “the MEK tells members that Massoud Rajavi is not only your leader, but also your husband, father and brother. He is the only one who should matter in your life and you shouldn’t think about any one else.”

Marjan Malek left her children, and husband after she joined MKO .she was trained in Camp Ashraf, sent to Iran where she launched mortar attacks against her own compatriots. She defected from the cult after her arrest and as one of the founders of Nejat Society, she could join her children in Sweden where they were kept by MKO supporters after they were separated from their mother. See how the ambitions of a cult leader change a mother to an assassin who leaves her family to kill the civilians of her own nation. And Massoud Rajavi is personally accountable for everything his cult members do.

Nowadays, while Camp Ashraf is completely going under the control of Iraqi Police, Massoud Rajavi is the only responsible for lives of those six members who were killed during riots at Ashraf gates. Those members are only some brainwashed manipulated individuals who were ordered by their leader to defend their Camp by rocks or knives.
By Mazda Parsi

August 6, 2009 0 comments

Auver-sur-Oise

Camp Maryam: The Potential Danger

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‘ font-size: 10pt”>Auvers-sur-Oise, Camp Maryam: The Potential Danger

‘ font-size: 10pt”>Methodology of MKO has always been based on cult-like principals. Managing cult-like practices is not feasible except by isolating the members in a closed location as the most famous cults do throughout the world, like the castle of Alamut, in Iran which is the ancient version used by the Assassins (the followers of Hassan Sabbah, a Shiite extremist)and the FLDS church in Colorado city, US is the modern version.

Managing cult-like practices is not feasible except by isolating the members in a closed location as the most famous cults do throughout the world, like the castle of Alamut, in Iran

‘ font-size: 10pt”>For MKO this isolated corner of the world includes camp Ashraf in Iraq and Camp Maryam in France. As Saddam Hussein and his Baath regime was the only sponsor of MKO, the existence of Camp Ashraf in Iraq seems more tolerable regarding the existence of Camp Maryam in France in the Parisian suburb since the group is using cult-like practices in the heart of a modern democratic society!

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‘ font-size: 10pt”>Question is that: how the group’s leaders can convince the members to stay in the isolated camp Maryam? How, in Europe of the 21st century, in a liberal country ,there are some people who are convinced and even forced to stay in a closed camp of which the walls are topped by the barbed wire?

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‘ font-size: 10pt”>MKO leaders try to convince the members to avoid the bourgeoisie society and along with their struggle avoid any bourgeoisie thought that according to their doctrine, is equal to Capitalism because from the political view bourgeois is against communism and MKO is obviously a communist cult which claims to be Islamic, advocating a secular regime. Now the MKO wants to make the members accept this bizarre mixture of ideology. Therefore MKO takes its victims out of the so-called bourgeois atmosphere but it has no ideals to replace it because the MKO’s methodology is basically opposed to idealism. Thus the only way to keep the members in is to brainwash them inspiring the feeling of being superior to the public. To achieve this goal, the organization’s leaders haven’t failed to use any cult techniques. They have used any manipulation techniques and mind control methods to freeze the individuals’ minds.

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‘ font-size: 10pt”>As we can see now: in the cradle of civilized world, in Paris country-side the walls of Camp Maryam have bared wires on top. The people in the camp are wearing uniforms without any variety in colors and styles. The female members are forced to wear scarves. The members attend daily meetings of self-criticizing and they confess all their thoughts in their weekly meetings of “Current Operation” where consequently they are insulted or sometime beaten by their comrades. Their entire activities are scheduled by the officials of the cult and the individual has no right to plan or to make change in his schedule. They have no access to mass media.

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‘ font-size: 10pt”>All the above-mentioned rules make a freezer out of camp Maryam where the minds are frozen and turned into a machine that MKO uses to advance its objectives. These prepared machines are ready to commit suicide and homicide operations when ever the organization orders; as what they did in June 2003, following the arrest of Maryam Rajavi, the cult members set themselves on fire in European cities.

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‘ font-size: 10pt”>Today the terrorism of MKO is not only an Iranian problem but an international problem. Today Auver Sur d’Oise is a center to train victims who have not their individuality due to the manipulations made on their minds. The complex methods used by MKO turns this potential threat into an actual danger.

‘ font-size: 10pt”> This picture shows one of the tricks the MKO plays to inspire the members to commit self-immolations.

‘ font-size: 10pt”>This picture shows one of the tricks the MKO plays to inspire the members to commit self-immolations.

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‘ font-size: 10pt”>After Maryam Rajavi was arrested by French Police in 2003, they performed a Masud and Maryam Rajavi have several times noted that in case of their arrest the members should commit suicide dramatic piece of play to encourage the forces to commit suicide.

‘ font-size: 10pt”>According to the testimonies made by former members of MKO, Masud and Maryam Rajavi have several times noted that in case of their arrest the members should commit suicide and of course according to the organization’s methodology the leaders’ orders are considered as God’s rulings that members should obey.

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‘ font-size: 10pt”>The threat of the cults is a serious danger all over the world and the MKO is not only a cult but also an organization with a black file of terror and assassinations and also designated as a terrorist organization by US, EU and Canada. Any negligence towards this terrorist destructive cult will end up with irreparable damages for the West.
2008/12/27

July 27, 2009 0 comments

Former members of the MEK

Human tragedy in prospect; Mojgan Parsai the first volunteer

An interview with Batool Soltani on MKO self-immolations – Part 8

Sahar Family Foundation: In our last session we talked about the possibility of a human tragedy. You said that all volunteers had signed a written pledge for self-immolation. The question is to what degree the organization can exploit these signed pledges to stage a human tragedy?

Batool Soltani: This is an issue of high potentiality. In fact, these letters helped the organization have an effective evaluation to plot its future scenarios. They are substructures on which the organization will lay the groundwork for its political strategies. But regardless of these potential means and developing a true assessment of the devoted on whom it can relay, it shows the organization’s own fascination in such activities that are some true aspects of cultic relations. Admittedly, most cults behave according to pre-planned scenarios in their relations with the outside world. It is also the same with Mojahedin.

When a member like Sedigheh Mojaveri commits self-immolation, for sure her feat has been already discussed in detail in higher echelons of the organization. It fails to be an arbitrary decision, not even one percent, to step into the street and set oneself on fire; any instance of unbridled passion is absolutely rejected by the organization and fails to be accounted as an organizationally directed objective.

Frankly speaking, no member of the organization with whatever ranking, being in charge of any post or else, hardly takes a step uncontrolled and uncoordinated by the organization. In a hierarchical order within an organization with tight discipline and very limited internal democracy, the responsible ranks have to be aware of the slightest overt and covert things about the members under their authority and there is nothing kept secret about the members in respect to their status.

For example, I was in England for four years and my massul (the one in charge) was aware of the single moments of my stay there; it was the same with the members under my authority. Hardly can you find an organization with so strong sense of cohesion and tight internal discipline. Consequently, no decision of self-immolation remains concealed from the ranks in charge and nobody ever dares to disobey the organization to engage in any self-motivated act of suicide.

SFF: From what layer of the organization were specifically the first volunteers of self-immolation in Camp Ashraf? Can you, for instance, name the first volunteer?

BS: You know, anything in an organization emerges from the top layers and gradually, through a well orchestrated mechanism, is spread to lower layers. It is done so skillfully that after a while those in the top can hardly believe that what is so easily embraced and theorized among the lower ranks is a magnified reflex of what had been originated in the top.

SFF: Now, can you name the first volunteer for self-immolation in Camp Ashraf when it was resolved on the act?

BS: In the department I was, Mojgan Parsai was the first who broached the subject and she was also the first volunteer. Her first sentence to begin was ‘It is worthwhile to set on fire whatever we have in Camp Ashraf for Maryam’s freedom’. Of course, what she said was another interpretation of Massoud Rajavi’s message stating that we had to make use of all our facilities and potentialities wherever we were to set Maryam free. He would say any Mojahed breathing on this planet had to be ready to sincerely sacrifice and set on fire whatever he had for the sake of Maryam. Thus, it all began in the echelon of the Leadership Council and the enthusiast slid down to the lower layers. It is also the same with other issues. Consider, for instance, they want to elect a first secretary.

The candidate would be elected in the first layers of the Leadership Council but remained secret. Idiomatically they would say ‘let the string of anything loose and it will unwind to the lowest layers’. They meant that whatever they decided on would be indirectly conveyed to the lesser ranks down to the bottom where it again quickly and energetically bounces back to the top layers as something new. Now it was our time to galvanize them into action and arrange a formal meeting to elect the one we had already decided on. None of the members present at the meeting knew what was really going on and how they had been inculcated to vote for Mojgan Parsai or Sedigheh Hussaini for example. Anything would end happily. On the one hand the top layers had picked up their favorite one and on the other hand, it would be propagated that a candidate had been elected through a totally democratic process. Everyone thought that his/her has been respectfully accomplished. Now suppose that somebody from the top layers had decided to commit self-immolation.

The decision had to be discussed in detail in all three layers of the Leadership Council before being approved by the first secretary and the leadership. I mean to say again that nobody with whatever ranking and organizational status, even if a proxy for the leadership, could take a perverse and decisive action or decision for whatever personal and organizational objective. Only those familiar with the layers of the Leadership Council can understand what I mean.

Systematically, when one from the top volunteers for self-immolation, as I did, it denotes that the person has grabbed at the loosed string whether he accedes to it or not. When I myself unwillingly volunteered for the act, in fact, I was sizing the string Mojgan Parsai had let down to let it pass to lower levels. It was only a reaction to what the organization tried to instill into the members. When I saw how devoted Mojgan was when she announced her readiness to burn herself for the sake of Maryam, although I did not know how sincere she was in what she claimed, naturally it could impress me to be the second to volunteer. Of course the sincerity is not at all a matter of any significance but the enthusiast and incitement such an atmosphere created among others.

Now the question is how the incitement could provoke the human tragedy you mentioned. Through the same mechanism of the idea being passed down from the top to the down, the crystallized ideas in the lesser layers very easily generate actions and the created enthusiast erupt into actions that may lead to human tragedy. It is much expected among the lower layer than the top since the rank and file are more emotive and impulses from the top easily impress themselves on them. Of course, you may notice that the top layers never fail to show off their emotions but for sure they are rational and reasonable when they have to act.

That is why they are the first to volunteer but hardly the last to put the words into action; unlike them, the lesser layers are resolute not only to do what they volunteer themselves for but also enter a compete and try to outstrip each other. That is how it may end to a human tragedy in its worst form. When I see that a ranking member like Mojgan Parsai volunteers for self-immolation, what do you expect of me as a subordinate! To be sure, as I have been already notified, I will not be the one to set myself on fire when the time comes because I know they will never let me harm myself as one belonging to the higher echelon. However, the occurrence of a human tragedy inside Camp Ashraf depends on Massoud Rajavi’s will and a number of other factors well identified by him to trigger the disaster. And it is all because of the strategically decisive role Camp Ashraf plays in Mojahedin’s existence and survival. So important an issue it is for Mojahedin that it requires a long discourse.

To be continued

Translated by Mojahedin.ws

July 22, 2009 0 comments

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