Lobelog

Iran Unites as Tehran Struck by Middle East’s Proxy Wars

The 7 June attacks in Tehran struck at the symbolic heart of Iran’s revolutionary republic. In this Q&A, Ali Vaez, Senior Analyst for Iran, says the outrages show how the region’s proxy wars are now reaching far beyond the battlefield

How unusual are these attacks for Iran?

If this indeed was, as it claimed, an attack by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), it would constitute the first time the organisation has been able to strike Iran inside its borders. But terrorist attacks are not new to Iran. In the early years of revolutionary turmoil, the leftist-Islamist Mojahedin Khalq (MEK) resorted to violence. In the 1980s, up to 120 terrorist attacks occurred in Tehran perpetrated by MEK and other violent groups, killing hundreds of Iranian officials, including the president and prime minister in August 1981. Even the current supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, was targeted. He survived the assassination attempt, but lost full use of his right hand.

Consequently, the Islamic Republic developed a powerful counter-terrorism capacity through intelligence and security forces that, along with its paramilitary Basij militia, turned Iran into one of the most stable countries in the region – at the cost of highly repressive methods. The only exception to Iran’s successful counter-terrorism record was the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists at the height of the standoff over Iran’s nuclear program. But those were targeted assassinations as opposed to indiscriminate terrorist attacks.

That ISIS had failed to attack Iran up until now wasn’t for lack of trying. There have been multiple reports of foiled attacks in several Iranian cities. According to Iranian officials, Iran’s intelligence agencies detected and dismantled 58 ISIS-affiliated terrorist groups in the past few years. In March 2016, the Iranian army reported killing two alleged ISIS recruits in the western province of Kermanshah. In June 2016, Iranian media reported the arrest of eighteen people who were trying to recruit new members through social media. In August that year, the Iranian intelligence minister said that authorities had prevented 1,500 young Iranians from joining ISIS. In recent months there was an uptick in its propaganda against Tehran as ISIS published a rare video in Persian in March, encouraging Iran’s Sunni minority to wage a religious war against the Shia ruling elite.

The attacks are in all likelihood linked to the extreme sectarianism of the fighting in Iraq and Syria. Iran, a Shiite Muslim power, is heavily involved in both conflicts. Salafi and Sunni Muslim groups like ISIS have long heaped vitriol on the Shiites.

In this sense, it’s not the attacks that are surprising, it’s that Iran was able to avoid one for so long. The attacks were a wake-up call for Iran’s security apparatus, but so too will they probably serve as one for jihadists, who will be encouraged to exploit Iran’s vulnerabilities.

What’s the immediate impact of this attack?

There are different voices coming out of Tehran. Some in the leadership have sought to downplay the attacks. The supreme leader said the “terrorists fumbling with fire crackers” won’t affect Iran, while the speaker of the parliament, where twelve people were killed and many were injured, called them a “trivial incident”. The Revolutionary Guards, however, have vowed revenge, drawing an unsubstantiated link between the attacks and a joint Saudi-U.S. effort to push back against Tehran’s regional policies. The minister of intelligence, however, has said it is too early to blame the Saudis. Nevertheless, the harsh rhetoric on both sides is likely to exacerbate tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia and further diminish the already slim chance of any kind of reconciliation anytime soon.

Still, I don’t see any immediate escalation of friction between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Neither the leadership in Tehran nor the one in Riyadh appears keen on a direct confrontation. Still, with increased tensions, there is higher likelihood of miscalculation on both sides. And of course, all of this fuels sectarianism in the region, which is a gift to ISIS and al-Qaeda.

What was the symbolism of the chosen targets?

The targets seem to have been chosen in order to maximise political impact rather than fatalities. The assailants targeted two key symbolic pillars of the Islamic Republic, the mausoleum of Ayatollah Khomenei, the founder of Iran’s theocratic system, and the parliament, the centre of the country’s republican tradition. Assuming that ISIS was the perpetrator, it is striking that it claimed responsibility for the attack immediately rather than wait as it usually does. This is probably because it considers the attack a rare success as it rapidly loses ground in Iraq and Syria.

What do you think the domestic impact will be?

Initially at least the attacks are likely to rally Iranians around the flag, but this could change quickly depending on two key questions: first, will anybody in Iran use the event politically, and how? Secondly, how were the perpetrators able to carry out these attacks?

President Rouhani is fresh from an election in which he received a strong mandate to deliver on his promise of de-securitising the domestic sphere. The attacks, however, could better enable the Revolutionary Guards to resist him and crack down on internal dissent. If Rouhani succeeds in quickly creating consensus around a path forward that would rectify security loopholes, while tolerating a higher degree of political pluralism, he might be able to prevent a counterproductive blame game and deeper polarisation. This could be done through the Supreme National Security Council, which comprises key civilian and military leaders and takes all key national security decisions in Iran. Given Rouhani’s extensive experience in the country’s national security establishment, he has the know-how to achieve this goal. But at this stage, it is too early to tell whether he will succeed or not.

The answer to the second question is becoming increasingly clear. According to Iranian officials, the perpetrators appear to be ISIS recruits from Iran’s Sunni majority provinces, who had fought for the group in Mosul and Raqqa. This could be used as a pretext to crack down in the country’s western, south-western, and south-eastern frontier provinces where Iran’s 5-10 per cent Sunni population lives. While there is little support for jihadists among Iran’s Sunni populations, despite their discontent with their treatment by central authorities, a government crackdown – if harsh enough and pursued long enough – is the kind of thing that could change that. The single most relevant factor in the radicalisation of jihadists is harsh government treatment. Interestingly, turnout in recent presidential elections was high in majority Sunni provinces like Sistan-Balouchestan (75 per cent) and Kurdistan (59 per cent). They both overwhelmingly (73 per cent) voted for the more pragmatic candidate, Rouhani.

What has been the reaction in the region?

Some countries like Turkey, Oman and Qatar denounced the attacks, but others like Saudi Arabia and Bahrain had a muted response. Some will see a comeuppance for a country that has freely interfered and stoked sectarianism in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon and elsewhere, until now without a backlash inside its borders. The recent attacks represent a different sort of backlash as well. Iran – like every state in the region – has pulled its punches with jihadists, including al-Qaeda, so long as their guns were turned against Iran’s enemies. But tactical relations with these groups often entail collateral damage.

What has been the reaction in the rest of the world?

The U.S. State Department condemned the attacks in strong terms; but President Trump added insult to injury by underscoring that “states that sponsor terrorism risk falling victim to the evil they promote”. On the same days as the attacks, the U.S. Congress also voted to advance sanctions legislation against Iran, particularly targeting the Revolutionary Guards. Iranian foreign minister retorted on Twitter: “Repugnant [White House] statement & Senate sanctions as Iranians counter terror backed by U.S. clients. Iranian people reject such U.S. claims of friendship”.

Following social media in Iran, I was struck by how much Washington’s insensitivity has offended the Iranian public. For years, Iran watchers were baffled by how pro-American the Iranian people remained despite having a highly anti-American government and being exposed to anti-American propaganda for nearly four decades. It appears that the Trump administration, first with its travel ban, then with hostile rhetoric and now with this statement, is succeeding where the Islamic Republic failed in the past 38 years: turning Iranians against the U.S.

For their part, the European and Asian leaders didn’t hesitate to do the right thing and condemned the attacks in Tehran no less strongly than they do attacks anywhere else. The attacks are a reminder that the effects of the region’s ongoing proxy wars are felt far beyond the battlefield. ISIS’s recent losses notwithstanding, so long as those wars and sectarian demonisation continue, we should expect more tragedies of this nature.

June 13, 2017 0 comment

Mujahedin Khalq; A proxy force

AIPAC Gave $60K to Architect of Trump’s Muslim Ban

The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) has been noticeably quiet about the Trump administration’s slowness to denounce the spike in anti-Semitic attacks and bomb threats, its nomination of an ambassador to Israel who described J Street as “worse than kapos,” and its ties to ethno-nationalists like White House chief strategist Stephen K. Bannon and senior adviser Stephen Miller. But AIPAC has done more than just tolerate the U.S. tilt toward extreme and often xenophobic views. Newly released tax filings show that the country’s biggest pro-Israel group financially contributed to the Center for Security Policy, the think-tank that played a pivotal role in engineering the Trump administration’s efforts to impose a ban on Muslim immigration.

In 2015, AIPAC launched a 501c4 advocacy group, Citizens for a Nuclear Free Iran (CFNI). Expected to spend $20 million in July and August 2015, the group was “formed with the sole mission of educating the public ‘about the dangers of the proposed Iran deal,’” spokesman Patrick Dorton told The New York Times. The Times reported that the $20 million budget would go to ad buys in as many as 40 states as well as other advocacy.

Indeed, the group’s filing (viewable here) show that the AIPAC spin-off paid $18 million for “media related expenses,” $8.35 million for “phone program expenses,” and $58,200 for “survey expenses.”

Shortly after the group launched, my colleague Ali Gharib and I noticed that the group’s website featured two items promoting an exiled, ex-terrorist Iranian opposition group, the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK). CFNI even used b-roll footage from a press conference held by the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), which the State Department deemed the MEK’s “political wing” (earning it a corresponding terrorist designation until the MEK was delisted as a terrorist organization in 2012).

After we reached out for comment, AIPAC’s anti-Iran deal advocacy group scrubbed their website of the MEK related materials, seemingly acknowledging a PR misstep. But the b-roll footage remained in their television commercials and on YouTube.

AIPAC’s flirtation with extreme groups appears to have gone even further than borrowing footage from the MEK.

Tax disclosures reveal that CFNI contributed $60,000 to “Secure Freedom,” a donation to a group with the tax-id number 52-1601976. That tax-id number belongs to Center for Security Policy, a hawkish think tank largely devoted to advocating for greater defense spending (it received funding from Boeing, General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin, Northrup Grumman, Raytheon, and General Electric) and pushing completely unsubstantiated conspiracy theories about American Muslim and Muslim Brotherhood infiltration of the U.S. government.

The contact address for the contribution was a residential address in New Orleans belonging to Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA) staffer Marsha Halteman. Halteman did not respond to questions about why her address appeared beneath the donation.

CSP is headed up by anti-Muslim conspiracy theorist Frank Gaffney who baselessly claimed that Hillary Clinton aide Huma Abedin, anti-tax activist Grover Norquist, and former George W. Bush appointee Suhail Khan were part of a Muslim Brotherhood plot to infiltrate the U.S. government. He also asserted that the Missile Defense Agency logo “appears ominously to reflect a morphing of the Islamic crescent and star with the Obama campaign logo” and helped launch an interfaith group to support Trump’s anti-Muslim agenda.

Gaffney and Trump aide Kellyanne Conway played a pivotal role in bringing about the administration’s efforts to ban immigration from seven (and now six) Muslim-majority countries.

In 2015, Gaffney commissioned Conway’s firm to produce a poll about Muslim attitudes. Released in June 2015, the poll found that 51% of Muslims agreed that “Muslims in America should have the choice to being governed according to Shariah,” among other findings. But the poll’s methodology was deeply flawed, relying on an opt-in online survey which industry experts consider unreliable. Conway’s own firm later admitted the data was not “statistically representative of the entire U.S. Muslim population.”

None of that stopped Trump from citing the poll as his justification for a “total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States until our country’s representatives can figure out what is going on,” on December 7, 2015.

It’s possible that the funds went to support CSP’s advocacy opposing the Iran nuclear agreement. Nonetheless, AIPAC’s willingness to partner with an organization whose president, Frank Gaffney, was denounced by the Anti-Defamation League, the Southern Poverty Law Center and the American Conservative Union (which briefly banned him from their events after he accused political opponents of being part of a Muslim Brotherhood conspiracy) raises serious questions about AIPAC’s commitment to fighting bigotry, discrimination, and, in particular, Islamophobia.

Neither AIPAC nor CSP responded to requests for comment.

By Eli Clifton,

About the Author

Eli Clifton reports on money in politics and US foreign policy. Eli previously reported for the American Independent News Network, ThinkProgress, and Inter Press Service.

March 28, 2017 0 comment

Mujahedin Khalq; A proxy force

EU-Iran Relations in the Trump Era

One undeniable benefit of the historic nuclear deal, or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), is that it opened the channels of communications between Iran and the EU beyond the narrow issue of the implementation of the agreement. As the high-level political consultations between the EU and Iran on November 8-9 in Brussels have shown, the bilateral agenda now includes economic cooperation, discussions on regional issues, notably Syria, and even a nascent dialogue on human rights. Thus, the Brussels meetings have provided a suitable opportunity for both Europeans and Iranians to compare notes on the election of Donald Trump as the US president and what it means for the survival of the JCPOA and broader normalization of EU-Iran relations. What emerged from the conversations shows a considerable convergence of views.

Despite Trump’s pre-electoral pledge to renegotiate the deal that he deemed to be “disastrous,” both Iranians and Europeans have adopted a wait-and-see approach. To illustrate how the electoral rhetoric may not match the real actions in office, Iranians pointed to the quiet removal from Trump’s webpage of his statement vowing to ban Muslims from entering the US. Another glimmer of hope, from the Iranian perspective, lies in Trump’s repeated expressions of willingness to work with Russia in Syria and the broader Middle East on the ultimate goal of defeating the so-called Islamic State (ISIS or IS). Since Tehran’s already works closely with Moscow to achieve these priorities, it would be very hard for Trump to square the circle by simultaneously cooperating with Russia and antagonizing Iran. According to this most optimistic reading, Trump foreign policy’s uncertainty holds out some possibility of a more restrained and realist course—as opposed to Hillary Clinton’s predictably hawkish policies that might have undermined the nuclear deal even without consciously seeking such an outcome.

There is, however, a danger of some neoconservatives moving closer to Trump and setting his administration on a more aggressive course than his campaign pronouncements suggested. Already some notorious uber-hawks, such as New Gingrich, John Bolton, and Rudy Giuliani, are slated for top jobs in the Trump administration, including the crucial secretary-of-state job. All three have deep ties with the Iranian dissident cult MEK, on the US terror list until 2012, bitterly opposed to the current Iranian government and advocating regime change in Iran. Although the Saudis, Iran’s archrivals in the region, cast their lot with Clinton, they may now be busy trying to figure out how they can “buy off” Trump. And one of Trump’s top donors, Sheldon Adelson, a casino magnate with strong pro-Likud views, has threatened Iran with a nuclear strike.

This uncertainty has prompted analysts like Ariane Tabatabai from the Center for Strategic and International Studies to call on the EU to be more assertive in safeguarding and implementing the deal and act as a check on America. The EU might do exactly that. Federica Mogherini, the EU foreign policy chief and chair of the Joint Commission tasked with overseeing the implementation of the JCPOA, explicitly emphasized the multilateral character of the Iran deal, codified by a UN SC resolution. Since Iran, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency, complies with its commitments on the deal, there is absolutely no incentive on the EU side to renegotiate the deal.

Furthermore, the EU’s own interests have been pushing it to invest in its relations with Iran. The EU is closer to the Middle East than the US and is directly affected by the turmoil there in the shape of a terrorist threat and irregular migration. Whether it is the Syrian war or the flow of refugees from Afghanistan, Europeans realize they have to deal with Iran. They also see it as a potentially lucrative market for their businesses. The traffic of officials and businesspeople between Tehran and European capitals is heavy these days. On October 25, the European Parliament (EP) adopted a forward-looking report on relations with Iran. The Council of the EU, the main foreign-policy making body representing the bloc’s 28 member states, is preparing to adopt its new guidelines on relations with Iran, which are expected to overlap significantly with the EP report.

More broadly, there are signs that the election of Trump is already stimulating some hard thinking about the EU’s strategic autonomy. Plans to create a “defense union” are likely to gain further momentum. Of course, transatlantic relations possess a certain inertia that will likely persist. This link is long-standing and deserves to survive the Trump presidency. However, the EU is unlikely to follow the US in doing something as self-defeating as revoking or even re-negotiating the nuclear deal with Iran. What could, however, put the EU in an indefensible position is if Iranian hardliners sabotage the implementation of the deal as a response to American non-delivery on its commitments. It is only to be hoped that cooler heads will prevail in Tehran in the face of possible provocations from the Republican-led White House and Congress.

There is, however, a wild card on the European side as well—Europe’s own right-wing populists, such as the leader of the French National Front Marine Le Pen. Her election as France’s president can no longer be ruled out. Le Pen and her Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF), a far-right group in the EP, generally sticks to a superficially friendly line on Iran, regularly lambasting Iran’s foes such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar. This, however, is part of a general backlash against the French elites, known for their close relations with the Gulf despots, rather than an expression of support for Iran. Le Pen is known for her staunch support for Israel. In the European Parliament vote on the Iran report, she and most of her colleagues from the ENF group abstained. Should Le Pen, who professed her enthusiastic support for Trump, be elected as the president of France, the Iran deal might suffer another blow.

In a world of growing uncertainty, the current leaders of the EU and Iran must do their utmost to ensure that the Iran deal survives the complicated politics of some of its parties. The stakes could not be higher: the fate of a working agreement that not only defused a potentially devastating conflict but also opened a way for re-engaging with one of the key countries in the Middle East.

Eldar Mamedov has degrees from the University of Latvia and the Diplomatic School in Madrid, Spain. He has worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia and as a diplomat in Latvian embassies in Washington D.C. and Madrid. Since 2007, Mamedov has served as a political adviser for the social-democrats in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament (EP) and is in charge of the delegation for inter-parliamentary relations between the EP and Iran.

By Eldar Mamedov

November 17, 2016 0 comment

Mujahedin Khalq; A proxy force

Former Terrorist Group To Enjoy Close Ties to Rumored Trump Cabinet

Donald Trump’s rumored picks for key foreign-policy positions have already set off alarm bells about the future administration’s embrace of war hawks and Islamophobes. Today, Washington Post columnist Josh Rogin pointed out that former New York City mayor Rudy Giuliani, who is currently reported to be under consideration for an appointment to secretary of state or attorney general, potentially violated the law when he made paid speaking appearances for the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK), when the State Department listed the Iranian dissident group as a foreign terrorist organization.

Giuliani isn’t the only likely member of the future administration to have maintained close ties and advocated on behalf of the former terrorist group, which assassinated six Americans in Iran between 1973 and 1976.

John Bolton (another rumored choice for secretary of state), Clare Lopez (who is reportedly short-listed for deputy national security adviser), and Newt Gingrich (who allegedly turned down an offer of secretary of state but has shown interest in serving as a policy adviser in the Trump administration) have all advocated for the former terrorist group and praised its cultish leader, Maryam Rajavi.

Shortly after the overthrow of the Shah, the group experienced a falling out with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and fled into exile. Over the following years, the group’s leaders, Maryam and Massoud Rajavi, aligned with Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war (7,000 members fought alongside Saddam Hussein, against Iran) and shifted toward increasingly cultish behavior, mandating divorces and celibacy for their soldiers while cultivating a cult of personality around themselves.

Massoud Rajavi hasn’t been seen since overseeing the surrender of MEK forces to the U.S. following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. This summer, the former head of Saudi Arabia’s intelligence agency, Prince Turki bin Faisal Al Saud referred to Massoud Rajavi as “the late Massoud Rajavi,” suggesting that he may be deceased. Turki’s participation at an MEK event, meanwhile, was a tacit acknowledgement of Saudi Arabia’s support of the group. Indeed, forming opportunistic alliances has been a hallmark of the MEK. In 2012, U.S. officials told NBC News that Israel’s national intelligence agency, Mossad, was training and arming the MEK to assassinate Iranian nuclear scientists.

The group seeks to portray itself as a government-in-exile and the secular, democratic alternative to Iran’s theocratic government. But the MEK’s lack of influence inside Iran and skepticism about their allegations regarding Iran’s nuclear program—for example, photographic evidence the MEK provided last year allegedly showing evidence of “Lavizan-3,” a secret uranium enrichment facility in the suburbs of Tehran, turned out to be a stock photo from an Iranian safe company – haven’t prevented the group from gaining footholds in Washington through campaign contributions and lucrative speaking gigs for politicians who praise Rajavi and call for regime change in Iran at MEK rallies.

The MEK is known for paying generous sums to former officials who speak at their events. Lee Hamilton, a former chairman of the House Foreign Relations Committee who headed the Woodrow Wilson Center for 12 years, told InterPress Service that he was paid “a substantial amount” to appear on an MEK panel in 2011.

Giuliani, Bolton, Lopez, and Gingrich have all sung the praises of Maryam Rajavi, called for the U.S. to work towards regime change in Tehran, and treated the MEK as a legitimate Iranian government in exile.

Speaking at an MEK rally outside Paris last year, Giuliani, who had taken speaking fees from the group when it was on the foreign terrorist organization (FTO) list, told the audience:

I will not support anyone for President of the United States who isn’t clear on that slogan behind me. What does it say? It says “Regime Change.” … I will not support a candidate who does not have the moral fiber and the courage to stand up to the Ayatollah and tell him “We are going to do everything we can to get you out and you are never going to become a nuclear power.”

Bolton, who also advocated for the group when it was on the FTO list, told an MEK audience outside Paris last summer:

There is only one answer here: To support legitimate opposition groups that favor overthrowing the military theocratic dictatorship in Tehran, and it should be the declared policy of the United States of America and all of its friends to do just that at the earliest opportunity.

Gingrich, who also spoke for the group before it was delisted, told the 2016 gathering in Paris:

There are no moderates in the dictatorship. The dictatorship cannot be trusted. The [nuclear] agreement made with it is insane.

He concluded by praising the commitment of Rajavi’s followers, saying:

I want you to know that the message I will take home to America is that there are thousands and thousands of Iranians who are prepared, who are ready, who are committed to and who believe that we can truly bring democracy to Iran.

Lopez, who serves as a vice president at the Center for Security Policy, a far-right think tank headed by anti-Muslim conspiracy theorist Frank Gaffney, and as executive director of the long-time MEK advocacy group, the Iran Policy Committee, from 2005 to 2006, wrote that Prince Turki’s surprising appearance marked a watershed moment for the MEK.

She wrote:

…[T]he implications of official Riyadh government support for the largest, most dedicated, and best-organized Iranian opposition movement will reverberate through the Middle East.

Although not openly stated by bin Faisal, the new NCRI-Riyadh alliance may be expected to involve funding, intelligence sharing, and possible collaboration in operations aimed at the shared goal of overthrowing the current Tehran regime.

If Lopez, Giuliani, Bolton, or Gingrich serve in the Trump administrations, the MEK will have the highest level access its ever enjoyed in the U.S. government, a remarkable journey for a fringe Islamic-Marxist group that, until 2012, was on the State Department’s terrorism list for its role in assassinating Americans.

by Eli Clifton

November 16, 2016 0 comment

Europe

Europe Capitalizes on the Iran Deal

As Washington think-tanks, with some notable exceptions, keep churning out papers advising the next American president to double down on containing Iran, the European Parliament adopted a report on October 25 that is strikingly different in tone and substance. Drafted by the UK Labour Party politician Richard Howitt , the motion received overwhelming support in the house: 459 votes in favor, with 174 against and 67 abstentions. It outlines a set of recommendations for the EU and its member states to fully capitalize on the opening provided by the historical nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1.

The report praises the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) as a success of a multilateral diplomacy, which has already boosted economic and trade connections between Europe and Iran. The report calls on both the EU and Iran to build on this opening by expanding cooperation in counter-terrorism, environmental protection, academic and cultural exchanges, and aviation and maritime safety.

The report is notable also for the respectful and constructive tone it uses. Although by no means short on legitimate criticisms of Iran, it avoids the kind of bashing that can only provoke angry reactions and further alienation. For example, it recognizes the complexities of Iran’s internal politics and does not seek to take sides in Iran’s domestic political debates. It acknowledges the long history of relations between Iran and various European countries as a foundation to further expand ties. Instead of blasting the “repressive theocracy,” it states that “Iran’s revolutionary legacy and constitution as an Islamic Republic” should not be an obstacle to finding common ground on issues of democracy and human rights, where possible. These are novel formulations for an official position of an elected Western body on the Islamic Republic, and convey an intention to have a dialogue of equals.

Lingering Opposition

Despite the overwhelming support the house has given the report, a minority of MPs expressed vocal opposition. Some of the criticisms reflect what rapporteur Richard Howitt called “the lobbying interests” of forces opposed to the nuclear agreement with Iran in the first place: right-wing pro-Israeli organizations, Saudi Arabia, and the exiled Iranian dissident group Mojaheddin-e Khalk (MEK), which was on the EU terror list until 2009 and removed on technicality. The hawkish American Jewish Committee blasted the report for allegedly “giving Iran a free pass on human rights and support for Assad regime,” although it somewhat mitigated its criticisms when the EP adopted the last-minute amendment condemning Iran for its “calls for destruction of Israel and denial of Holocaust.” MEK, meanwhile, managed to convince enough MPs to consider an amendment calling to investigate the 1988 massacres of political prisoners in Iran—a crime indeed, but one that Iranians themselves, and not foreign legislative bodies, are best placed to address. However, the house ultimately rejected this amendment.

A different kind of opposition emerged from the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats (ALDE), traditionally the third pillar of European politics, after Christian democrats and social democrats. Although ALDE does not oppose the nuclear agreement as such, it rejected the report on the basis that it was “weak” on human rights and “has not preconditioned” any improvement of relations with Iran on tangible progress in this area.

These criticisms do not hold water. The report has no fewer than 34 references to human rights in its 51 paragraphs. It contains very detailed, carefully crafted wording on the death penalty and on the rights of women and religious minorities. It also makes a clear appeal to Iran to release all political prisoners. In the process of drafting the report, the rapporteur and his team consulted extensively with credible human rights organizations, such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.

But pre-conditioning any cooperation on specific, unilaterally imposed benchmarks could have easily undermined any prospects for progress, for example, by leading the Iranians to cancel talks with the EU on human rights scheduled for November 9 in Brussels. Crucially, these talks involve the Iranian judiciary, the bastion of the conservatives and the main source of the human rights violations. As Howitt said during the debates on his report, “those who say they support human rights, but would jeopardize our leverage to influence them, should examine their own consciences.”

As to the regional situation, the report is careful not to take sides between Iran and its antagonists, such as Saudi Arabia. The critics would have liked to see a strong condemnation of Iran’s support for the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria and the removal of clauses that acknowledge the EU and Iran’s common interest in fighting the so-called Islamic State. Instead, the report acknowledges that by following the JCPOA the EU now has increased its leverage over Iran while maintaining ties with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and other traditional Western allies in the region. The EU is thus in a unique position to play the role of an honest broker in the conflicts ravaging the region, from Syria to Yemen.

Indeed, it is disingenuous for the critics to claim that they support the nuclear agreement while at the same time putting so many conditions to any cooperation with Iran. The irony is that such an approach would not only squander an opportunity to build a new relationship with Iran but also undermine the nuclear deal itself. The JCPOA is not something once achieved and put in the freezer until the regime in Iran changes—which, one suspects, is the real agenda of many of the critics of the report. For the agreement to survive, all sides need incentives to comply, and that requires trust. This process would be so much more difficult to accomplish in the absence of a broader rapprochement.

Glimmers of Hope

There are signs that the pragmatic approach espoused by the report works. Contrary to the war of words that usually followed EP resolutions in the past, the Iranian foreign ministry welcomed the report as a positive indication that the EU seeks closer relations with Iran. Of course, the reactions of other factions within the regime are yet to be seen. As the string of totally unacceptable arrests and harassment of dual Western-Iranian nationals shows, influential forces that thrive on confrontation exist in Iran as well as in the West. But ultimately, this is how diplomacy works – by taking patient, reciprocal steps, that strengthen moderates on all sides and eventually lead to the demise of old enmities.

This most recent statement reflects a broader European approach to relations with Iran. Just as the EP was debating the Howitt report, the EU lifted sanctions on Bank Saderat, which, however, remains on the OFAC (US Treasure’s Office of Foreign Assets Control) black list. The EU Commissioner for humanitarian aid and crisis management Christos Stylianides, meanwhile, was in Tehran on the same day committing additional 6 million euros to help Afghan refugees in Iran, bringing the total EU humanitarian support to 12.5 million euros in 2016.

These steps by the EU executive and the parliament reinforce the upward trend in the EU-Iran relations. This rapprochement will enable both sides not only to pursue common interests but also to address problematic issues such as human rights and some aspects of Iran’s regional policies without derailing the relations. Given the investment the EU has already made in these relations, it won’t likely follow the new US president if he or she chooses to heed the advice of hawkish Washington-based think tanks and return to the policy of sanctions and isolation of Iran. And that’s another reason why the next American president would be wise to disregard such advice.

This article reflects the personal views of the author and not necessarily the opinions of the European Parliament. Photo: Richard Howitt

By Eldar Mamedov,

November 3, 2016 0 comment

Mujahedin Khalq; A proxy force

Congressional Research Service Expert and Gulf Lobbyist Headline MEK Event

By outward appearances, the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK), the ex-terrorist Iranian opposition group hell-bent on regime change, appears to be losing their influence in the media. The group’s allegations about Iran’s nuclear program are met with increased skepticism after, for example, photographic evidence of “Lavizan-3,” a secret uranium enrichment facility in suburban Tehran, was revealed to be a stock photo from an Iranian safe company. But their spotty track record on providing verifiable information from inside Iran hasn’t stopped the group from gaining the support of Washington’s biggest Iran hawks—and, more recently, anti-Iran ideologues associated closely with Arab kingdoms in the Persian Gulf.

The MEK’s latest purported revelation, exclusively reported in the UK tabloid, The Daily Mail, is that Iran commands 60,000 pro-Assad fighters in Syria, has spent as much as $100 billion in Syria since 2011, and maintains a secret command post near the Damascus airport. The fact that Iran is supporting the Syrian government comes as no surprise, but the scale of its involvement, if true, would mean Iran is far more deeply invested than was previously thought. But the Daily Mail’s reporting on the MEK’s allegations provides little evidence to back up the tough-to-swallow claim that Iranian led forces outnumber the Syrian army.

The National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), the MEK’s political front, will present its findings tomorrow at its Washington offices with a panel discussion featuring, among others, Dr. Kenneth Katzman, a prominent Iran expert at the taxpayer-funded Congressional Research Service (CRS), and Amb. Adam Ereli, a lobbyist for Qatar and former U.S. Ambassador to Bahrain.

Katzman’s participation in the panel is particularly surprising, given his previous critical writings about the group. In 2010, he authored a CRS report featuring a section on the MEK, which he characterized as advocating “Marxism blended with Islamic tenets,” a fact that the MEK—despite its well-documented history—now denies. Katzman cited a 2007 State Department report which “notes the group’s promotion of women in its ranks and again emphasizes the group’s ‘cult-like’ character, including the indoctrination of its members and separation of family members, including children, from its activists.” And in 2012, Katzman warned about exiled opposition groups like the MEK, comparing them to the internal Iranian opposition Green Movement:

Some groups have been committed to the replacement of the regime virtually since its inception, and have used violence to achieve their objectives. Their current linkages to the Green Movement are tenuous, if existing at all, and some indications suggest these movements want to dominate any coalition that might topple the regime.

Katzman did not respond to questions about his decision to participate in the panel.

In contrast to Katzman, J. Adam Ereli, another MEK panelist, is an often-quoted critic of the Iran deal in the media and lobbyist for one of Iran’s biggest regional rivals, Qatar. Over the past year, news outlets have consistently failed to disclose his work on behalf of Qatar when publishing his attacks on the White House’s nuclear diplomacy.

Ereli, along with former Rep. Vin Weber (R-MN), is listed as “personally and substantially involved in the performance” of Mercury’s work on behalf of Qatar, according to the 2015 contract between Mercury Public Affairs, where Ereli is a vice-chairman, and Qatar. Qatar pays Mercury $100,000 per month for Ereli and Weber’s services. That contract has been extended twice and now continues until the end of 2016. Ereli didn’t respond to a question about whether he was appearing on the panel in a personal capacity or as a lobbyist for Qatar.

The Thursday appearance on the panel won’t be the first time that Ereli has participated in one of MEK’s events. In July, 2014, Ereli appeared at a Capitol Hill event hosted by the Organization of Iranian American Communities, a coalition whose sole purpose is supporting the MEK, and praised the NCRI. He noted, contra Katzman’s assessment, that the MEK was a voice for Iranians who are dissatisfied with the country’s leadership, saying, “Outside of Iran, and both inside of Iran, there is a credible organization that helps channel that dissent, that is the NCRI or Mojahedin-e Khalq.”

While the MEK and many of its stateside boosters promote the group as the legitimate Iranian opposition, impartial Iran experts believe the group lost any popularity and legitimacy it once held inside Iran thanks to its decision to fight alongside Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war. Ereli also spoke at another pro-MEK Hill event in 2015 and attended the NCRI’s Nowruz (Iranian New Year) celebration in March.

Ereli wouldn’t be the first MEK-advocate with Sunni-Gulf ties to jump on the MEK’s bandwagon. Prince Turki bin Faisal al-Saud, the former head of the Saudi intelligence agency and longtime ambassador to the U.S., praised MEK leader Maryam Rajavi at the group’s annual gathering last July, in Paris. Prince Turki’s appearance, and his show of open support for the MEK, lends new credence to the rumors that the Sunni Gulf states are a possible source for the group’s mysterious funding.

About the Author

Eli Clifton reports on money in politics and US foreign policy. Eli previously reported for the American Independent New Network, ThinkProgress, and Inter Press Service.

September 1, 2016 0 comment

Mujahedin Khalq Organization as a terrorist group

Saudi Supports Anti-Iran MEK Fanatics

If Saudi Arabia is on a quest to paint itself as a responsible actor in the region, the kingdom took a big step backward over the weekend. That’s when a former top official—who remains an influential figure—declared support not only for regime change in Iran but for one of the strangest would-be agents of overthrowing the Islamic Republic. Prince Turki bin Faisal al-Saud, the former head of the Saudi intelligence agency and a longtime ambassador to the U.S., spoke to a gathering of thousands of Iranian exiles in Paris. The group was gathered to fête Maryam Rajavi and her movement, the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK), a group that, until 2012, the United States and other Western countries listed as a terrorist organization.

Al-Faisal more than played his part in the adulatory chorus. “You, Maryam Rajavi,” he said, according to the Saudi-owned pan-Arab newspaper Asharq al-Awsat, “your endeavor to rid your people of the Khomeinist cancer is an historic epic that, like the Shanameh”—the most famous Iranian epic poem—“will remain inscribed in the annals of history.” Rajavi’s endeavor, of course, has been the monomaniacal pursuit of bringing down the Iranian regime—under any banner she can fly—in order to install herself atop Iran’s government.

MEK has a long and strange history. With roots as an Islamo-Marxist revolutionary organization dating back to the 1960s, MEK launched various terrorist attacks during the time of the Shah to achieve its aim of toppling the monarchy. As a result, it faced a brutal crackdown. During the 1979 Islamic Revolution, MEK fought at the vanguard of anti-Shah forces. But after the king’s overthrow, Ayatollah Khomeini’s Islamic Republicans stripped MEK of its potential place in the halls of power by. Around that time, the group consolidated itself around the leadership of the charismatic and mustachioed Massoud Rajavi. Facing another round of brutal repression, this time under Khomeini’s nascent rule, Rajavi led his followers into exile, setting up a political base in France and a military one in Iraq, where Saddam Hussein’s regime lavished weapons and cash on MEK fighters. In 1985, Rajavi took Maryam Abrishamchi as his wife and co-leader. Critics, including no small number of former adherents, allege that a cult of personality has developed around the pair.

MEK and Petrodollars?

Al-Faisal’s appearance at the MEK gathering was remarkable on a number of fronts. The anti-Iran Gulf Arab monarchies, among which Saudi Arabia is the driving force, haven’t made a show of open support for such a controversial anti-Iran groups like MEK. (Other Gulf monarchies and their allies also appeared at the Paris summit: a member of parliament from Bahrain gave a speech, as did a delegation from Jordan, another monarchy with close security ties to the Gulf.) The Sunni Gulf states—flush with petrodollars and bearing sectarian grudges against Shiite Iran in a regional battle for hegemonic primacy—have long been suspected as a source of funding for MEK’s lavish spending, but no reliable reports have definitively established where the group gets its cash. Al-Faisal’s public move in support of the group certainly provides one more piece of evidence to link Gulf States to MEK’s financing.

Then there was al-Faisal’s speech explicit call for regime change in Iran and support for MEK. The crowd at the MEK rally, donning their standard yellow vests and hats, interrupted al-Faisal’s speech with Arabic chants in favor of bringing down the Iranian regime. Al-Faisal, who had been delivering his speech in Arabic, responded in kind: “I, too, want the fall of the regime.” At The Intercept, Robert Mackey noted an irony: the Arabic chant to which al-Faisal responded so positively is the same one that “was used in the pro-democracy protests across the Middle East in 2011 that Saudi Arabia fought so hard to repress.”

A host of other ironies also loom over al-Faisal’s appearance. MEK, for instance, long ago gave up its aim of an Islamic Marxist state in favor of hollow pledges to establish a secular democracy in Iran. But Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies are about the farthest thing from a secular democracy. Conservative religious sentiments inspire the Saudi royal family’s rule, and political repression is endemic wherever Saudi Arabia enjoys considerable influence. What’s more, MEK directed the first decade of its terrorist attacks at bringing down the Shah’s repressive monarchy, denouncing its form of government as inherently unjust. The kingdom of Saudi Arabia, then, makes an especially strange bedfellow.

Let’s be blunt: MEK is neither a viable agent for regime change in Iran nor the “government-in-exile” the group pretends to be. They enjoy almost no support among Iranians at home or abroad. Exiled royalists hate them for their terror war against the Shah’s regime and their part in the Islamic Revolution. Inside the country, they are reviled across the political spectrum for siding with Saddam Hussein—and fighting against Iranians—in the Iran-Iraq war.

Saudi Interests

Why, given all that, would such a well-connected former Saudi official make such a show of supporting MEK? Although MEK is famous for lavishing money on its supporters—paying as much as $50,000 for a short speech and investing in politicians through campaign contributions—al-Faisal, as a member of Saudi Arabia’s super-rich royal family, probably scoffs at the sort of cash MEK offers. Instead, al-Faisal attended for obvious reasons: to put a thumb in Iran’s eye. In this, the high-ranking prince is acting like the Washington Iran hawks that have warmed up to Saudi Arabia since, mostly out of mutual enmity for Iran, the Gulf Arab states and Israel began blowing kisses to each other over their shared antipathy for the Iran nuclear deal. Several such hawks were in attendance in Paris. As The Intercept reported, among the attendees were Newt Gingrich and superhawk former UN ambassador John Bolton.

For close MEK watchers, such as myself, perhaps the most interesting wrinkle—aside from the Saudi prince’s ridiculous gesture toward Rajavi—was al-Faisal’s apparent announcement of Massoud Rajavi’s death. The MEK leader hasn’t been seen in public since the US invaded Iraq in 2003, at which time Massoud was holed up with thousands of MEK fighters at the desert base Saddam Hussein had bestowed upon the group. Occasional reports of Massoud addressing followers by phone have appeared, but even the last of these was years ago. Rumors of his death have swirled for years. Al-Faisal appeared to confirm them when he referred to Massoud Rajavi as “marhoom,” which means “late.” Here’s how Al Monitor’s Arash Karami reported the fallout:

In response to Faisal’s comments about the “late” Massoud Rajavi, the MEK continued to deny Massoud’s death. Shahin Ghobadi, spokesman for the MEK, said Faisal’s comments were “misinterpreted.” In the audio, however, Faisal refers on two different occasions to Massoud as “marhoom,” which means “late” in both Arabic and Persian.

That’s just like MEK: lying about something everyone can see is true. The possible revelation of Massoud Rajavi’s death, however, doesn’t change the geopolitics: Maryam Rajavi is still around. With Massoud out of sight for nearly a decade and a half, MEK has operated under her aegis, their relevancy slipping away but the core of adherents holding to the pipe dream of retaking Iran. Perhaps al-Faisal’s appearance does indicate a program of Saudi Arabian support for MEK. But it will only allow the group’s followers to cling to their fantasy of putting Rajavi in charge of their homeland. MEK trudges on, thanks to supporters with deep pockets in high places.

By Ali Gharib,

About the Author

Ali Gharib is a New York-based journalist on U.S. foreign policy with a focus on the Middle East and Central Asia. His work has appeared at Inter Press Service, where he was the Deputy Washington Bureau Chief; the Buffalo Beast; Huffington Post; Mondoweiss; Right Web; and Alternet. He holds a Master’s degree in Philosophy and Public Policy from the London School of Economics and Political Science. A proud Iranian-American and fluent Farsi speaker, Ali was born in California and raised in D.C.

July 16, 2016 0 comment

Mujahedin Khalq; A proxy force

IAEA Intelligence Acquisition Practices

Tariq Rauf, a former Canadian diplomat, and Robert Kelley, a former US nuclear weapon scientist, have published an assessment of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) handling of the Iranian case on the website of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

Both were working in the IAEA secretariat during the years that followed Iran’s 2003 admission that it had failed to declare certain nuclear material and activities, Rauf in the external relations division and Kelley in the safeguards department. So their assessment benefits from first-hand knowledge gained on the inside.

The following passage concludes their assessment:

A structural weakness of the IAEA is that there is no transparent process for the supply of intelligence information and confirmation of its authenticity. The usual process is for a Member State(s) to provide the intelligence information either in documentation or electronic form to a special assistant in the Director General’s office and/or to the Deputy Director General for Safeguards, alternatively to give a closed briefing in its embassy/mission. The IAEA then deals with the information as described in an earlier section above. There is no established process to share such information with the accused State or with the Board of Governors….

The supply and use of intelligence information is a sensitive yet complex issue…. The IAEA cannot serve as a feedback loop to intelligence agencies on the veracity of information provided by them…. Nor can or should the IAEA rely on such information without confirming its authenticity. This obviously leaves the IAEA in a difficult position as is clearly evidenced by the Iran PMD file where the Agency seems to have been caught short.

The authors recommend that the Board put in place a methodology for the acceptance and use of intelligence information drawing from the practices of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). In these two organizations, allegations of non-compliance can be raised by any State Party which provides information to the Director General, who in turn shares it with the Executive Council. The Executive Council is convened; the Accuser State puts forward its case on allegations of non-compliance or suspicious activities in another State along with supporting information/evidence. The Accused State has the opportunity to present its defence. Following deliberations, the Executive Council can stop a challenge inspection in the case of the OPCW or authorize an on-site inspection in the case of the CTBTO. Such a practice could serve the IAEA well…. In fact, the JCPOA contains a somewhat similar provision for the Joint Commission in paragraph 36 on dispute resolution…

It is essential that the IAEA Board expeditiously come up with a mechanism governing the provision and handling of intelligence information to the IAEA Secretariat. There is great potential for misuse of such information and of suborning the independence of the Agency in the absence of such a mechanism, as abundantly demonstrated by the cases of Iraq, Iran and Syria in recent times.”

A Lack of Confidence

This passage contains echoes of an intervention by the Russian Federation’s governor to the IAEA, Grigory Berdennikov, at an IAEA safeguards symposium in October 2014:

The Secretariat has the right to use for safeguards implementation all safeguards relevant information available to the Agency about a State. This information includes, inter alia, data from open sources and data provided by third parties. It should be noted that third parties include not only States that provide information with regard to another State but also organizations and even private individuals.

No proper mechanism that could guarantee the accuracy and authenticity of information used for safeguards purposes is provided for [in the report under consideration]. In essence it is suggested that all analysis should be done by the Secretariat as decisions on whether certain data can be used for safeguards purposes are left entirely with the Secretariat. Member States, according to this approach, should simply trust the Secretariat’s choice of information.

The risk here is obvious. False allegations generated by interested parties in order to exercise political pressure on a State unfortunately remain part of the current international landscape. They are quite common in many areas, including non-proliferation, and one should admit could be very important, sometimes involving issues of war and peace.

We think that if the Secretariat decides to use any information, except for data obtained through its own inspection activity, it should duly disclose its origin and be ready to defend its credibility in an open discussion at the Board of Governors. Every State should have the right to publicly defend itself against false allegations and accusations generated by interested third parties or by the media.”

These passages reflect a lack of confidence in the authenticity of some of the intelligence material on Iran submitted to the Agency by member states. There is no proof that any of this information was fabricated. But that lack of confidence is not unreasonable, because motives for fabrication can be imagined without straying far into the thickets of conspiracy theory.

Grounds for Doubt

Gareth Porter has written in A Manufactured Crisis that, according to a former German foreign ministry official, German intelligence obtained the “alleged studies” that underpinned the PMD case against Iran from a member of the Mujahideen E-Khalq (MEK) in 2004. MEK hostility to the Islamic Republic is well-documented. Is it inconceivable that this source forged or fabricated that material? The material was never shown to Iran in full and it contains factual inaccuracies and anomalies for which a satisfactory explanation has never been offered.

In autumn 2007, the US, UK, France, and Israel were furious with the Agency’s then Director General Mohamad El Baradei because he had agreed to a work-plan with Iran and was well on his way to clearing the Agency’s last remaining “issues of concern.” Those issues cleared, these states would be bereft of sources of pressure on Iran to submit to their demands.

In that situation there could have been a temptation to produce information that would appear to corroborate aspects of the “alleged studies.” Initially El Baradei and some of his advisers had doubted the authenticity of these studies. But in early 2008 the studies, apparently corroborated by fresh information, metamorphosed into a “possible military dimension.” From then on they were the West’s instrument of choice for keeping Iran under international pressure. In November 2011, they formed the core of an IAEA assessment that persuaded EU member states to adopt harsh economic sanctions against Iran, and Asian states to comply with US secondary sanctions.

Was any temptation to fabricate resisted? One would like to think so. But, given the Stuxnet program to sabotage Iran’s centrifuge machines, and hints that a hostile intelligence agency commissioned the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists, one has to wonder whether certain states would have hesitated to resort to fabrication to get themselves out of a spot of difficulty in autumn 2007.

Such speculations explain the lack of confidence implicit in the recommendations of Rauf and Kelley, and the intervention of Berdennikov. The IAEA Board of Governors can ignore that lack of confidence—and may well choose to do so. But that will be short-sighted. Over time allowing distrust in the Agency’s intelligence-acquisition practices to fester can weaken international acceptance of the Agency as an impartial and objective verifier of compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Rauf and Kelley recommend drawing lessons from OPCW and CTBT practices and provisions. No doubt there are other options. Reconciling source protection with transparency and due process may not be easy. But a collective Board effort to find a solution can heal some of the divisions within the IAEA membership that perceptions of Western lack of scruples in prosecuting the case against Iran have helped to cause.

About the Author

Peter Jenkins was a British career diplomat for 33 years, following studies at the Universities of Cambridge and Harvard. He served in Vienna (twice), Washington, Paris, Brasilia and Geneva. He specialized in global economic and security issues. His last assignment (2001-06) was that of UK Ambassador to the IAEA and UN (Vienna). Since 2006 he has represented the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership, advised the Director of IIASA and set up a partnership, ADRgAmbassadors, with former diplomatic colleagues, to offer the corporate sector dispute resolution and solutions to cross-border problems. He was an associate fellow of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy from 2010 to 2012. He writes and speaks on nuclear and trade policy issues.

by Peter Jenkins

December 21, 2015 0 comment

Mujahedin Khalq; A proxy force

AIPAC’s Military “Expert” Loves the MEK And GOP’s Islamophobic Fringe

The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) has committed over $20 million to defeating the Obama administration’s nuclear agreement between the P5+1 and Iran. But that doesn’t mean its campaign has gone smoothly. One of the top challenges facing AIPAC is finding reputable ex-military validators to denounce the agreement.

With a plethora of experts signing letters in support of the Joint Comprehensive Program of Action—one signed by 36 retired top-ranking military officers, another signed by Jewish communal leaders (including AIPAC’s former executive director), and a third signed by 75 leading nuclear non-proliferation experts— AIPAC is dipping into the third or fourth string of “experts” to find anti-deal voices.

On Thursday, the AIPAC-funded Citizens For a Nuclear Free Iran (CFNI) released its third television commercial and its first attempt to put forward a retired military officer, Ret. Lt. Gen. David A. Deptula, as a voice against the deal. But Deptula has a history of associating with extreme elements opposing diplomacy with Iran.

Deptula’s Bedfellows

Deptula has appeared at multiple events supporting the Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MEK), a fringe Iranian opposition group that advocates regime change in Iran and, until 2012, was listed on the State Department’s terrorism list.

In April, Deptula signed on to a letter supporting the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade’s controversial decision to invite MEK leader Maryam Rajavi to testify. An Obama administration official told Al-Monitor at the time that, “[The MEK] has shown time and time again that they’re not the most credible voices,” and warned lawmakers to be wary of any claims made by Rajavi’s organization.

Deptula, on the other hand, vouched for the MEK’s intelligence-gathering capabilities on multiple occasions.

In February, 2012, according to remarks posted on an MEK website, Deptula praised the group, saying:

The MEK’s access to intelligence about all aspects of Iranian society are very important to countering the malicious aspirations of the current regime in Iran.

And, in May 2012, Deptula told a MEK-hosted Capitol Hill briefing:

It’s also important to recognize that the most secretive information about the current Iranian regime’s connection in international terrorism about its nuclear weapons program and about its menacing intentions for Iraq has to a large extent come from the Iranian opposition movement.

But the MEK has had a questionable track record when it comes to providing sound intelligence on Iran’s nuclear program.

In February, right-wing media outlets leapt at the MEK’s claim that it had evidence of a secret underground nuclear site. The MEK exhibited photos allegedly showing a tunnel leading to the facility and a steel door. And that’s where the story fell apart. The DailyKos matched the photo to a safe company’s website. The full, uncropped image showed windows and sunlight, refuting the MEK’s claim of having acquired evidence of a nuclear facility but also revealing that the group had intentionally cropped a catalog image of a safe in a warehouse to look like a surreptitious photograph of an underground bunker.

The group’s biggest intelligence coup came in 2002, with the public exposure of the Natanz uranium enrichment facility and Arak heavy water production plant for plutonium extraction. The MEK claimed its clandestine network in Iran had unearthed the nuclear facilities but The New Yorker reported in 2006 that Israeli intelligence had made the discovery and passed information about the sites to the MEK.

Indeed, the CFNI has, through either happenstance or intention, relied heavily on the MEK since its founding earlier this summer.

Ali Gharib and I reported back in July that the group promoted news articles citing the MEK’s rejection of the nuclear deal and incorporated b-roll footage from an MEK press event in its first television ad. (CFNI deleted the articles from its website but offered no explanation for the removal.)

Aligned with Gaffney

But vouching for the MEK’s intelligence capabilities isn’t Deptula’s only brush with fringe foreign policy views. In April, Deptula signed on to a Center for Security Policy letter praising the highly controversial “Open Letter to the Leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran” assembled by Sen. Tom Cotton (R-AR) and 46 fellow senators, a letter that Obama characterized as part of an effort, led by Cotton, to “make common cause with the hard-liners in Iran.”

In January, Deptula signed another letter, alongside Frank Gaffney. Gaffney, Deptula, and the other signatories, congratulated Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal for comments he made at a Henry Jackson Society event in London. The letter praised Jindal’s harsh remarks about Islam, saying:

It is high time that the rest of our present and future leaders come to grips with the unhappy reality you observed so succinctly when you said: “A so-called religion that allows for and endorses killing those who oppose it is not a religion at all, it is a terrorist movement.”

Deptula’s decision to sign letters organized by Frank Gaffney—a leading figure in pushing conspiracy theories about Muslim Brotherhood infiltration of the U.S. government and questioning whether Obama is a native-born U.S. citizen—strongly suggests sympathy for, if not identification with, the Republican far right.

But AIPAC’s promotion of Deptula is part of an emerging pattern of the organization’s shredding of its bipartisan image, as a growing number of Democrats, as well as centrist ex-military and non-proliferation experts, line up in support of the Iran nuclear deal. AIPAC’s shift towards the GOP is also hinted at in CFNI’s incorporation papers in Washington, DC. Craig Engle, a Republican political operative, is listed as the group’s incorporator.

On Tuesday, the Huffington Post’s Sam Stein flagged an AIPAC memo quoting six former military commanders opposed to the Iran deal. One of those, retired Adm. James Lyons, speaking at an event in January, echoed Gaffney’s conspiracy theories about the Muslim Brotherhood’s penetration of “every one of our national security agencies” and accused CIA Director John Brennan of being a “Muslim convert.” He also said that the Muslim Brotherhood has “carte blanche entry into the White House.”

With validators like Deptula and Lyons, AIPAC risks whatever reputation it has enjoyed as an influential voice on U.S. Middle East.

By Eli Clifton,

August 23, 2015 0 comment

Mujahedin Khalq; A proxy force

Seventy-Plus Nuclear Non-Proliferation Experts Endorse Deal

As an abundance of nuclear non-proliferation experts rallies behind the Joint Comprehensive Program of Action (JCPOA) signed last month by the P5+1 and Iran, the paucity of arms-control specialists who oppose the deal has become increasingly apparent. Indeed, the latter seem as rare as the diminishing number of climate and atmospheric scientists who still question whether human activity is contributing in important ways to global warming.

The Arms Control Association (ACA) released a joint statement on Tuesday endorsed by 75 of the world’s leading nuclear non-proliferation specialists, including a former director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and former top U.S., UN, and foreign government non-proliferation officials. The statement concludes that the July 14 agreement “is a strong, long-term, and verifiable agreement that will be a net-plus for international nuclear non-proliferation efforts.”

The accord, the statement goes on, “advances the security interests of the P5+1 nations (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), the European Union, their allies and partners in the Middle East, and the international community.”

Though all of us could find ways to improve the text, we believe the JCPOA meets key nonproliferation and security objectives and see no realistic prospect for a better nuclear agreement.

We urge the leaders of the P5+1 states, the European Union, and Iran to take the steps necessary to ensure timely implementation and rigorous compliance with the JCPOA.

The statement comes just 10 days after 29 top U.S. nuclear scientists and engineers released a two-page letter to Obama congratulating him and his team on “negotiating a technically sound, stringent and innovative deal that will provide the necessary assurance in the coming decade and more that Iran is not developing nuclear weapons, and provides a basis for further initiatives to raise the barriers to nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and around the globe.”

As noted in The New York Times account, the first signature on that letter was from Richard L. Garwin, “a physicist who helped design the world’s first hydrogen bomb and has long advised Washington on nuclear weapons and arms control. He is among the last living physicists who helped usher in the nuclear age.”

Garwin and five others who signed the August 8 letter—including Frank von Hippel, the former assistant director for national security at the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy—also signed ACA’s statement released Tuesday.

Particularly notable among the other 70 are former IAEA Director General Hans Blix, several former UN under-secretaries-general for disarmament affairs, including the current commissioner of the Japan Atomic Energy Commission, Amb. Nobuyasu Abe, Amb. Jayantha Dhanapala, and Amb. Sergio Duarte. Signatory Jacqueline Shire served as a member of the UN Panel of Experts for Iran established under a 2010 UN Security Council resolution that, among other things, was set up to tighten restrictions on Iranian financial and shipping enterprises related to “proliferation-sensitive activities.”

Other former senior international officials with responsibility for non-proliferation oversight or enforcement include Tariq Rauf, the IAEA’s former head of the Verification and Security Policy Coordination unit; Laura Rockwood, a nearly 30-year veteran as head of the IAEA’s section for Nonproliferation and Policy making in the Agency’s Office of Legal Affairs; and Thomas Shea, former IAEA Safeguards official and head of its Trilateral Initiative Office.

The signers also included a host of former senior State Department, Pentagon, and White House officials who have had direct responsibility for nuclear proliferation issues, such as Amb. Kenneth Brill, a founding director of the US National Counterproliferation Center (2005-09); Robert Einhorn, the State Department’s Advisor for Nonproliferation and Arms Control (who also participated in the P5+1 negotiations; former Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Jan Lodal; and Andy Weber, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs.

Absent from the list of signatories is Gary Samore, who worked as White House coordinator for Arms Control and Weapons of Mass Destruction during Obama’s first term. He subsequently served as president of the strongly anti-Iran United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) until last week when, as we noted, Sen. Joseph Lieberman replaced him. Samore has decided to support the deal, while UANI’s leadership and donors remain strongly opposed.

Vox’s Max Fisher published an interview on Monday with UANI’s CEO, former Amb. Mark Wallace, that helped illustrate the challenge faced by UANI, AIPAC, and other groups opposed to the JCPOA: the dearth of serious non-proliferation experts who support their position.

Max Fisher: One of UANI’s real assets has been having a leader with Gary Samore’s credentials as a pedigreed arms control expert. Did you guys think about looking for a replacement who could also be seen as firstly an arms control wonk?

Mark Wallace: Well, Olli Heinonen, for example, is on our advisory board. I still have Gary’s arms control expertise; I don’t think that has changed. We have [head of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center] Henry Sokolski. Olli Heinonen has been a big player in this. Even David Albright, even though he’s not affiliated with us, has been very useful. I’m trying to label them all arms control wonks, you know what I mean; they’re familiar with the space.

We’ve been doing this now for a long time, and I think that the nature of the deal is quite well-framed. I don’t think there’s a lot of debate about the terms anymore. Certainly that expertise matters, but all of our team, we have a very seasoned team, but there are no secrets to that agreement anymore. Well, actually, there are some parts of the agreement that are secret, but you know what I mean. The terms of the agreement are well-baked, and there’s enormous commentary on all of them.

And you do see skepticism from the very serious people in that community, which I would characterize as Gary Samore, Olli Heinonen, and David Albright. I think their skepticism has been quite loud and clear about the agreement.

Max Fisher: With a couple of exceptions whom you named, the arms control community seems to have generally lined up behind the Iran deal. I think some people see the change in leadership in UANI as a sign that you guys are no longer focusing on trying to persuade the arms control community. Is that fair?

Mark Wallace: I don’t see what you describe. When I think of the real experts who have led in the space, it’s really been Gary [Samore], Olli [Heinonen], Henry [Sokolski], and [David] Albright. Those are leaders in that space. Olli’s statements have been quite concerned about the deal, and even Gary acknowledges that there are some real problems with the deal.

Max Fisher: Okay, still, the fact remains that UANI will transition from being led by an arms control expert to being led by a politician. How should we read that?

Indeed, weighed against the list of signatories compiled by Arms Control Association, and what with Samore explicitly supporting the agreement, the list of non-proliferation experts on the opposition side looks very thin indeed. And, to the best of my knowledge, neither Albright nor Heinonen has come out explicitly against the JCPOA, although Heinonen has made it a habit to speak about his reservations at events sponsored by just about any group opposed to the deal. For instance, Heinonen has spoken at least twice (see here and here) before front groups of the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq (MEK), the expatriate Iranian group that a lengthy lobbying and legal campaign helped get removed from the State Department’s terrorism list in 2012 in exchange for its agreeing to disperse its Iraq-based militants to third countries.

One key signatory of Tuesday’s statement was Leonard “Sandy” Spector, deputy director for nonproliferation studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies and a former assistant deputy administrator for Arms Control and Nonproliferation at the U.S. National Security Administration. In early 2013, Spector co-authored a report with Albright, Foundation for Defence of Democracies (FDD) president Mark Dubowitz, and two others that called, among other measures, for Washington to “increase Iranian isolation, including through regime change in Syria” and “undertake …overt preparations for the use of warplanes and/or missiles to destroy Iran’s nuclear capabilities with high explosives.” Only if Tehran provided “meaningful concessions,” it said, should sanctions relief be considered, according to the report.

It appears clear that Spector, presumably like Samore and the expert non-proliferation and arms control community in general, has been persuaded that the Obama administration has indeed obtained “meaningful concessions” from Iran and that the deal should be approved. But it also appears that, as with climate change, Republicans don’t care.

Jim Lobe,

August 20, 2015 0 comment

Newer Posts

Older Posts